Melvin Chen

The US neutrino community gathered at the Workshop on the Intermediate Neutrino Program at Brookhaven National Laboratory February 4-6, 2015 to explore opportunities in neutrino physics over the next five to ten years. Scientists from particle, astroparticle and nuclear physics participated in the workshop. The workshop examined promising opportunities for neutrino physics in the intermediate term, including possible new small to mid-scale experiments, US contributions to large experiments, upgrades to existing experiments, R&D plans and theory. The workshop was organized into two sets of parallel working group sessions, divided by physics topics and technology. Physics working groups covered topics on Sterile Neutrinos, Neutrino Mixing, Neutrino Interactions, Neutrino Properties and Astrophysical Neutrinos. Technology sessions were organized into Theory, Short-Baseline Accelerator Neutrinos, Reactor Neutrinos, Detector R&D and Source, Cyclotron and Meson Decay at Rest sessions.This report summarizes discussion and conclusions from the workshop.

In this paper, we defend a theory of structure that we term ontodynamic structural realism. The theory rests on four core assumptions: the Galilean assumption (A1), the Noetherian assumption (A2), the Banach-Tarski-Bueno assumption (A3), and the Prigoginean assumption (A4). The latter provides a principled Prigoginean extension to ontic structural realism by incorporating insights from non-equilibrium thermodynamics. Whereas standard versions of ontic structural realism typically rely on fundamental physics and therefore say relatively little about dissipative structures, far-from-equilibrium dynamics, and the emergence of complex or biological organization, our framework offers a unified account of these phenomena within a structural realist ontology. In particular, we introduce a generative mechanism in which structure emerges through symmetry-breaking driven by the dynamical operator (F), together with a maintenance condition that explains how such structures persist over time in non-equilibrium settings. In the richer, Prigoginean regime, this persistence is captured by a flux-dependent stabilizer subgroup (H(s, Φ)) that reflects the role of energy, matter, and information gradients in sustaining organized states. The resulting framework, onto-dynamic structural realism, yields a formally well-defined and internally coherent account of the emergence and persistence of structure across multiple scales of the universe.

The infinite regress problem involves the identification of a set of foundational problems in logic, deductive reasoning, and the epistemology of understanding through an allegorical dialogue between Achilles and the tortoise. In this paper, the infinite regress problem, traditionally referred to as Carroll's paradox, will be re-identified as the Bolzano-Carroll-Wilson paradox, in recognition of its multiple provenances. Furthermore, we shall investigate the nature and scope of the paradox and attempt to identify the real moral behind what the tortoise said to Achilles. In particular, we shall engage with the Russell-Grice point concerning the need to distinguish between a material implication relation (→) and an inferential relation (⊢), the further need to distinguish between first-order logical statements and higher-order statements (metalogical, meta-metalogical, and so on), and the Ryle-Wittgenstein point concerning the nature of proper inference as knowledge-how and rule-following.

The infinite regress problem involves the identification of a set of foundational problems in logic, deductive reasoning, and the epistemology of understanding through an allegorical dialogue between Achilles and the tortoise. In this paper, the infinite regress problem, traditionally referred to as Carroll's paradox, will be re-identified as the Bolzano-Carroll-Wilson paradox, in recognition of its multiple provenances. Furthermore, we shall investigate the nature and scope of the paradox and attempt to identify the real moral behind what the tortoise said to Achilles. In particular, we shall engage with the Russell-Grice point concerning the need to distinguish between a material implication relation (→) and an inferential relation (⊢), the further need to distinguish between first-order logical statements and higher-order statements (metalogical, meta-metalogical, and so on), and the Ryle-Wittgenstein point concerning the nature of proper inference as knowledge-how and rule-following.

What is it in virtue of which any poetic output will be included or excluded from the category of art? I will first identify the external demarcation problem, which is concerned with whether or how the cut-off is made between art and non-art. I will then adopt a nonclassical approach to conceptual analysis by relying on a set of examples of poetry generated by aleatory processes to evaluate an intention-based response to the external demarcation problem. I will argue in favor of an intention-based response that is grounded in hypothetical intentionalism. According to this response, a contextually informed audience will form a hypothesis about poetic intentions on the basis of the evidence that a work makes publicly available. Semantic, categorial, and ostensive intention and intention traces may help this audience to determine whether a work counts as art and is worth effortful interpretation. My proposed version of an intention-based response to the external demarcation problem will be based on the p-valued hypothesis-testing approach in science and will be highly relevant to a context of production in which we find human poets, poetry-generating AI systems, and human-AI interfaces.

In order for something to count as a distinct field of inquiry, it seems that we must be able to locate its centre and boundaries. Grand basic questions help to organize a field, allowing us to locate its centre and boundaries. It has been argued that the question of how to live is the grand basic question of ethics. ‘What do or can we know?’ and ‘What is there?’ can similarly be regarded as grand basic questions, around which the fields of epistemology and metaphysics are respectively organized. An example of a grand basic question that could help us to organize the field of aesthetics is ‘What is art?’.

In Chap. 3, art-making was described as an activity, governed by the idea of an artistic goal, whose characteristic artifacts are works of art (H1). Human beings engage in the activity of art-making with the intention of their output being regarded or treated as works of art. We further contend that art-making activity is a problem-solving activity: works of art represent various ways in which problems are solved and obstacles are overcome. For instance, Monet’s (1890–1891) Haystacks series of 20–30 paintings can be interpreted as a bold, serial attempt to solve the problem of representing the same subject (stacks of harvested grain) under transient and varying conditions of light (sunrise, sunset), weather (mist, frost, snow), and atmospheric effects across the different seasons of a year.

In Chap. 5, we identified the theory of problem-solving as a computationalist approach that explains human problem-solving behaviour in terms of a problem space, a search strategy, heuristics, evaluating and choosing among alternative actions, and a goal to be accomplished. In Chap. 7, we made sense of the possible goals of art in terms of various theories of what art is (mimeticism, representationalism, neo-representationalism, expressivism, neo-formalism, anti-essentialism, institutionalism, and historicism). That by virtue of which an artifact qualifies as art rather than non-art has been parsed in terms of imitation, representation, the communication of semantic information (aboutness), the communication of individualized and clarified emotions, the exhibition of significant form, the relation of form and content in a satisfyingly appropriate manner, the satisfaction of emendable conditions of application of art and related concepts, the situation of the artifact within the institution of art, or the situation of the artifact within a historical narrative. In this chapter, we will make sense of the central artistic task.

Art is a relatively recent phenomenon. The Λ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\Lambda $$\end{document}CDM (Lambda Cold Dark Matter) model, a standard cosmological model for describing the evolution of the universe, tells us that the age of the universe is approximately 13.8 billion years. Evidence of the first life on earth (in the form of single-celled organisms) may be traced to approximately 3.8 billion years ago. By contrast, the first modern humans or Homo sapiens evolved from their early hominid predecessors only around 300,000 to 200,000 years ago. The first agrarian civilizations developed in Mesopotamia around 5200 years ago and Western philosophy as we know it was born around 2600 years ago, with the emergence of the Presocratics. This implies that we have evidence for neither art-making nor artworks for more than 13 billion years, only the hum of physical, chemical, biological, and other related processes. In big historical terms, the human brain is a relatively recent evolutionary development, as are the artifacts (including artworks) associated with human-level intelligence.

What is art-making? What is it in virtue of which an artifact counts as a work of art? In this book, it is contended that art-making is best understood in the context of problem-solving. Works of art are various ways in which artists solve problems and overcome obstacles, while typically exhibiting creative thinking. Our theoretical support will hail chiefly from the theory of problem-solving, its theoretical milieu, and various philosophical tools that will help us to build a robust, coherent, and consistent computationalist approach to art-making and the production of works of art.

In Chap. 3, we first distinguished between the philosophy of art (concerned with the nature of art, various theories of art, and the relationship between the artist and the artwork) and aesthetics (concerned with characteristics of beauty and the lack thereof). We then focused on a subset of concerns in the philosophy of art: the activity of art-making and artworks as its characteristic artifacts. We effected the informational turn in the philosophy of art and proceeded to characterize an information-theoretic philosophy of art in terms of a set of related hypotheses about art-making, artifacts, and works of art (H1–H3). In particular, H3 reveals the underlying digital nature of art-making activity: how artifacts are generated and whether or not they come to be regarded or treated as works of art (‘hits’) depend ultimately on answers to yes-no questions (‘bits’).

Creativity is a special class of problem-solving activities, just as problem-solving behaviour is a special class of intelligent behaviour. Intelligent behaviour is associated with computations over symbols and intelligent, symbol-manipulating physical symbol systems such as human beings exercise their intelligence by searching a problem space until the symbol structures of solutions are produced. This is the account of creativity, intelligence, and problem-solving under the Newell-Simon research paradigm. Its two central planks are the theory of problem-solving and the theory of computer science as empirical inquiry.

The information age in which we live began at about roughly the same time as the computing age: their origins may be traced to Turing (Mind 59:433–60, 1950) groundbreaking paper on computing machinery and intelligence (published in Mind). 1950 has been described as the beginning of the informational turn in philosophy, with information-theoretic concepts being applied to areas of philosophy such as philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, computation theory, philosophy of science, decision theory, and even philosophy of music (Adams Minds Mach 13(4):471–501, 2003). This book constitutes an attempt to effect the informational turn in the philosophy of art, install a computationalist approach at the heart of an information-theoretic philosophy of art, and provide a twenty-first century update on philosophical discussions of the nature of art and art-making.

What is art-making? What is it in virtue of which an artifact counts as a work of art? In this book, Melvin Chen contends that art-making is best understood in the context of problem-solving. Works of art are various ways in which artists solve problems and overcome obstacles, while typically exhibiting creative thinking. Using the theory of problem-solving, its theoretical milieu, and various philosophical tools, Chen builds a robust, coherent, and consistent computationalist approach to art-making and the production of works of art. This computationalist approach to art-making and the production of works of art, in turn, is articulated against the backdrop of an information-theoretic philosophy of art. This computationalist approach takes discussions in the philosophy of art into the twenty-first century.

Guiding you through the topics that shape aesthetics, this introduction explores the truth, meaning, taste, aesthetic merit and the role of perception. Each chapter offers a wealth of examples from Asia, including Sonny Liew's The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye, Tan Tai Yong, Kueh Appreciation Day and dragon kiln pottery. They deal with controversies and address central questions, such as: When are artworks considered dangerous? Why does Socrates recommend the banishment of the poets? What are the problems and challenges posed by forgery? Here is a creative and accessible introduction that inspires a love for art and aesthetics.

Singularitarianism is a view that is grounded in certain claims about the technological singularity. In this paper, I identify a trilemma that confronts singularitarianism. This trilemma may be characterized in terms of the following horns: the concept of a technological singularity having a literal sense, the concept of a technological singularity having a metaphorical sense, and the concept of a technological singularity having neither a literal nor a metaphorical sense (i.e., its being nonsensical). I will outline the unpalatable consequences that are associated with each of these three horns of the trilemma. I will also anticipate a few argumentative moves on behalf of singularitarianism and suggest why these moves may be insufficient. I will conclude by arguing that we have good philosophical grounds to defend an eliminativism about the concept of the technological singularity.

How might we philosophize about the metaverse? It is traditionally held that the four main branches of philosophy are metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and logic. In this article, I shall demonstrate how virtual walt-fictionalism, a particular version of virtual irrealism, is able to offer a straightforward, internally consistent, and powerful response about the metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology (ethics) of the metaverse. I will first characterize the metaverse in terms of a reality-virtuality (RV) continuum and distinguish between virtual realism and virtual irrealism, before elaborating on the explanatory power and potential of virtual walt-fictionalism relative to the metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology (ethics) of the metaverse.

Could translation be fully automated? We must first acknowledge the complexity, ambiguity, and diversity of natural languages. These aspects of natural languages, when combined with a particular dilemma known as the computational dilemma, appear to imply that the machine translator faces certain obstacles that a human translator has already managed to overcome. At the same time, science has not yet solved the problem of how human brains process natural languages and how human beings come to acquire natural language understanding. We will then distinguish between the task of translation and the responsibility of the translator. Thereafter, we will conduct a survey of the methods of machine translation (viz. RBMT, SMT, NMT, foundation models or large language models). These methods will then be critically evaluated both in general and relative to Bar-Hillel’s hypothesis about the impossibility of fully automatic, high-quality machine translation (Fahqmt). Some concluding remarks will be made about the scope, prospects, and limits of machine translation.

The long-tailed macaque (Macaca fascicularis fascicularis) is a non-human primate species that is native to Singapore. From mid-2020, the Nanyang Technological University campus witnessed a sharp increase in the number of human–macaque encounters. In this article, we will first identify a set of technological tools that we have developed to guide decision- and policy-making on the wildlife management front and mitigate human–macaque conflict. Thereafter, we will describe how we applied these tools to the activity log cataloguing the macaque activity on campus and offer an analysis of the trends in macaque behaviour that may be shared with members of the public and affected residents. Among the results that will be discussed are the following: a significant decline in the number of macaque sightings at Student Residences over the weekend, a majority of the reported macaque sightings occurring in the early evening, no significant difference in the damage and proximity scores over time, and a trend in observed macaque activity at critical sleep-relevant time intervals and areas on campus. We hope that our approach will promote, through an improved and data-driven understanding of macaque behavioural trends, technology-assisted decision-making and a more harmonious co-existence between humans and macaques on campus and in Singapore. Last but not least, we anticipate further extensions of our approach with respect to other forms of wildlife.

Ever since its formulation by Hume, the idea of an inferential barrier between non-ethical (“is”) propositions and ethical (“ought”) propositions (also known as Hume’s is-ought thesis) has received much philosophical attention. Prior’s Paradox appears to demonstrate that the ban on “is”-“ought” inferences is violated in every possible instance, from which it follows that Hume’s is-ought thesis must be false. In this article, I will formulate a logically rigorous version of Hume’s is-ought thesis, introduce Prior-style counterexamples, and suggest how they might demonstrate the falsity of Hume’s is-ought thesis, identify the substitution criterion, and develop at length the unrestricted and restricted versions of this criterion as it is applied by Pigden and Schurz. Thereafter, I will outline Schurz’s defence of the is-ought gap in accordance with his interpretation of the substitution criterion, before introducing a more sophisticated version of Prior-style objections, proposing a possible response from Pigden, identifying the costs of Pigden’s response and counter proposing a response on behalf of Schurz through an extension of his approach, and offering concluding remarks.