Mengxue Wu

Derrida’s thought on “trace,” “différance,” “writing,” and “supplement” is always thought the breaking of logocentrism, the essence, the positive meaning, and the closure of the metaphysics of presence; this thinking is accordingly regarded the thinking with the fundamental structure of difference and openness. By tracking back to Saussure, Husserl and Levinas, this fundamental difference breaks the myth of ideal meaning as well as the illusion of the absolute open; its lack of ideality and absoluteness contains the fundamental difference within itself and thus has the structure of open. However, from a broader perspective, I will re-ask the question “Whether or not Derrida’s ‘trace,’ ‘différance,’ ‘writing,’ and ‘supplement’ have a structure of open.” When the web of differences encompasses everything even its own “exit,” this “open” thus conceals and denies other modes of thinking. With the impossibility of going out of this mode of thinking, the structure of différance is closed.

Abstract: This Thesis is to examine Jacques Derrida’s idea of trace, différance, and supplement; to examine whether or not they have a structure of open. By closely reading Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena, “Violence and Metaphysics”, Of Grammatology, and “Différance,” I will discuss this question in two levels of inquiry: one is on the microscopic scope and the other one is on the large-scale scope. In the microscopic scope, Derrida’s trace, différance, and supplement can be regarded as open, because trace, différance, and supplement contain the fundamental difference within themselves and they are never in the status of purity and / or plenitude. In this sense, they are open to the difference in relation to themselves. In this scope, Derrida’s critical reading of Edmund Husserl’s “ideal meaning” and “ideal impression” of time shows that the original truth of the “ideal meaning” and sense is never fully ideal, and it is lacking such “ideality” even from the very beginning. Moreover, Derrida’s critique of Emmanuel Levinas’s “absolute Other” and “infinity” demonstrates that trace, différance, and supplement never let the other remain beyond, keeping it instead in the closure of the subject deciding to accept the responsibility beyond calculation. In short, under Derrida’s examinations, Husserl’s phenomenology and Levinas’s philosophy of the Other are in the domain of closure, unlike to where Derrida sees himself, in the open. Indeed, in the microscopic scope, Derrida’s philosophy is open. However, in the large-scale scope, when the web of trace, différance, and supplement is prevailing and encompassing everything even its own “exit,” the “open” thus covers and denies other modes of thinking, that is to say, conceals the possibility of going out of this mode of thinking. In this scope, the structure of différance is closed.