Meredith Trexler

This article examines how Kant’s conception of sacrifice in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason connects with his account of the sublime in the Critique of Judgment. We argue that the analogy between sacrifice and sublimity illuminates the transformation involved in moral rebirth, whereby the old self is relinquished for the sake of the new. This transformation comprises two interrelated aspects: suppressive sacrifice, which subordinates self-centered inclinations to the moral law, and kenotic sacrifice, in which self-centeredness is relinquished as part of a radical reorientation of one’s disposition. By situating these aspects within Kant’s discussions of grace, the archetype–prototype distinction, and the imagination’s “sacrifice” during experiences of the sublime, we show how sacrifice functions as a symbol both of the moral exemplar (Vorbild) and of the conversion process. The resulting threefold analogy—between the old/new self, Christ’s kenotic self-emptying, and the imagination’s renunciation within the experience of the sublime—reveals how aesthetic experience, especially the sublime, helps exemplify and empower moral transformation in Kant’s thought, supplementing what his ethics alone can explain.

ABSTRACT In my dissertation, I examine the connection between aesthetic experience and morality. I specifically focus on the work of Plato, Kant, and Iris Murdoch, who all share the thesis that aesthetic experience has an ineluctable moral component, which enables it to play various roles in moral education and development. In chapter 1, I give an analysis of Plato's discussion of experiences of beauty via art in the Republic, and his arguments that art can be used in moral training. I also examine Plato's discussion of erotic experiences of beautiful people in the Symposium and Phaedrus and his arguments that these sorts of experiences provide an insight into the nature of true value and a certain kind of vision: they lead to the knowledge of true Beauty, and illuminate the value of the life lived by the lover of wisdom. In Chapter 2, I give an analysis of Kant's discussion of beauty in nature and art, and his discussion of sublimity. I argue that, as a result of the different symbolic relationships that the beautiful and the sublime have with the moral, these kinds of experiences, each in a different way, are morally instructive. In Chapters 3 and 4, I examine Iris Murdoch's view regarding the connection between moral progress and aesthetic experience. Drawing Plato's and Kant's theories together, Murdoch argues for her own theory of moral progress, which involves a pilgrimage that one must make from the self-focused fantasy life into which one is born to the apprehension of reality, particularly in its moral dimensions. I examine the way in which aesthetic experience is involved in the Murdochain moral pilgrimage and the connection between aesthetic experience and what Murdoch refers to as `unselfing.' In Chapter 5, I address the theoretical underpinnings of the relation between morality and aesthetics that I argue for. I present three interrelated theses, one in moral psychology, one in normative value theory, and one in the intersection between them. The first thesis is motivational internalism about the good, and the second thesis is the substantive claim that the moral is, in fact, good. Therefore, when one understands the moral as good she has motivation towards it. However, humans do not necessarily have such an understanding. A person may believe that something is morally required without believing it to be good. Thus, the third thesis is that art may help us to see the moral as good by giving us a new kind of perspective: a new point of view from which one understands that there is a higher self. I end the dissertation with a Coda, wherein I review the way in which aesthetic experience functions in Plato, Kant, and Murdoch. Then, I consider the main philosophical objections that arise against the thesis that aesthetic experience gives rise to moral transformation. Finally, I sketch a view of aesthetics in which I make some relevant distinctions that help clear up these difficulties.