Merel Talbi

Oftentimes, interdisciplinary research is heralded as an effective way to approach complex problems from a diverse range of disciplinary perspectives. However, many scholars of interdisciplinary research agree that doing interdisciplinary work is difficult and prone to failure. In this paper, we argue that this difficulty is better understood in light of a tension between the aim of interdisciplinary integration on the one hand, and the goal of normative epistemic pluralism on the other. This tension, which we believe takes place at the above-disciplines level of interdisciplinary research teams and projects, leads to difficulties in interdisciplinary research in practice. Additionally, we argue that the conflicts on the local, practical level where disciplinary researchers work together in multidisciplinary research teams - which we term the between-disciplines level - are caused by researchers insufficiently acknowledging the differences in (non-)fundamental epistemic goods that vary per academic discipline. In teams that do interdisciplinary research, it can occur that disciplines are brought together that have very different underlying epistemic presuppositions (or epistemic systems) that value different forms of research, methodologies and aims. We illustrate the difficulties of interdisciplinary research with the case study of the Mill Town Example, an interdisciplinary project that was deemed a failure by its participants, in order to sketch what epistemological conflicts look like in practice on the between-disciplines level. In order to address differences in how disciplinary researchers value (non-)fundamental epistemic goods, we suggest various forms of epistemic work that offer strategies to make epistemological conflicts manageable in interdisciplinary research.

Disagreement on political and social issues often seems intractable, but personal narratives may offer a means of bridging epistemic divides by vividly conveying lived experiences and personal motivations. My recent work emphasizes the role of narrative structure in fostering common ground, highlighting its ability to convey the contextual richness of marginalized perspectives while mitigating risks of epistemic exploitation. Ulatowski and Lumsden respond by emphasizing the "personal reality" of narratives and suggesting the importance of matching self-narratives between narrators and audiences. I argue that narrative structure enhances persuasiveness by contextualizing lived experiences without overburdening marginalized narrators, though allyship must be approached cautiously to avoid co-opting or distorting such narratives.

The paradoxes of (in)tolerance in epistemic networks Does the Capitol invasion of January 2021 teach us that intolerant viewpoints have no place in public debates? This view is defensible on the basis of Karl Popper’s paradox of tolerance, which states that too much tolerance will ultimately entail the demise of that very tolerance. But how are the limits of (in)tolerance to be determined? We argue that Popper’s purely epistemological interpretation of the concept of tolerance is untenable; determining such limits ultimately requires a political-normative interpretation. As an alternative epistemological perspective, we show how network epistemology can give us insight into how information, especially intolerant content, spreads through communities. This analysis can help us assess the consequences of potential interventions in public debates, and thus make informed choices.

In situations of disagreement in a polarized social world, rational argument is not always successful in persuading those who do not share our beliefs. Narratives of personal experiences have empirically shown to help bridge divides between disagreeing interlocutors, though this raises the question of how particular, personal narratives relate to the universal appeal of argumentation. It also leads us to reflect upon the dangers of these narratives functioning as a type of propaganda that bypasses reason. In this paper, I discuss how understanding narratives as ways to build common ground using standpoint-informed knowledge (hereafter: standpoint knowledge) can explain the empirical belief-changing potential of narratives. Additionally, viewing deliberation in the public sphere as a communal constitution of common ground may alleviate worries of narratives functioning as propaganda and explain how narratives foster perceived rationality, respect and humanity. On this account, our shared history is constantly shaped by narratives that we build together, which also allows for criticism of these narratives in a pluralist public sphere.