Merrick Anderson

This article provides a new defense of moderate comic immoralism, the thesis that the morally objectionable features of jokes or other attempts at humor sometimes increase their funniness. Though this thesis is widely accepted outside of philosophical circles, it has been challenged by a number of philosophers, prominently including Aaron Smuts, who has argued that moral flaws never contribute to—and often detract from—the funniness of jokes. Smuts correctly suggests that to defend moderate comic immoralism one must show both that funny jokes can be genuinely morally flawed and that their funniness is at least partly caused by their moral flaws. But he is incorrect to claim this cannot be done. Many jokes are funny, morally objectionable, and plainly funny in part because they are morally objectionable. This is especially true of practical jokes. Smuts and others have failed to realize this because past scholarship has focused on a fairly narrow range of racial and gendered humor. I argue that if we expand our focus and study the full range of jokes, it is quite obvious that moral flaws sometimes contribute to the funniness of jokes.

In a series of recent works, Jan Maximilian Robitzsch has argued that a number of sophistic authors deny that humans are naturally social animals. According to Robitzsch, the accounts of early human political history in these authors take humanity’s weakness as a starting point and, building upon that, they maintain that humans entered into political society out of a concern for their own well-being rather than any natural inclination. Robitzsch’s interpretation is unfortunately overly simplistic and at times presents an inaccurate picture of the early Greek thinkers and what they thought about human nature and history. Features of his interpretation are also shared by other scholars, who make similar errors. In this article, I argue against Robitzsch and show that there was more diversity among the sophistic authors than he suggests vis-à-vis the question of why humans first entered society and also that in a number of relevant texts, there is a clear sense in which humans are naturally social animals.

In the 5th century a number of sophists challenged the orthodox understanding of morality and claimed that practicing injustice was the best and most profitable way for an individual to live. Although a number of responses to sophistic immoralism were made, one argument, in fact coming from a pair of sophists, has not received the attention it deserves. According to the argument I call Immortal Repute, self-interested individuals should reject immorality and cultivate virtue instead, for only a virtuous agent can win the sort everlasting reputation that makes a life truly admirable and successful.

A growing number of scholars have seen that the Republic’s division of goods includes goods which possess value δι᾽ αὑτό in virtue of some of their causal effects. Building on this, I argue that goods, including justice, which are valuable διὰ τὰ γιγνόµενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ (and whose effects can contribute to the value a good has δι᾽ αὑτό) are so in virtue of a limited class of beneficial effects: those that depend on the recognition of other agents. This way of dividing goods explains why Socrates legitimately invokes some effects of justice in his demonstration that justice is valuable δι᾽ αὑτό.

In the 5th century a number of sophists challenged the orthodox understanding of morality and claimed that practicing injustice was the best and most profitable way for an individual to live. Although a number of responses to sophistic immoralism were made, one argument, in fact coming from a pair of sophists, has not received the attention it deserves. According to the argument I call Immortal Repute, self-interested individuals should reject immorality and cultivate virtue instead, for only a virtuous agent can win the sort of everlasting reputation that makes a life truly admirable and successful.

Abstractabstract:This paper offers a new interpretation of courage in Plato's Republic. Despite the attention that this dialogue has received in the past, scholars have been disinclined to explore the metaphysics of the virtues. I argue that courage is, by its very nature, a δύναμις of the sort described in book 5. In particular, I argue that courage is the power over reason's correct practical deliberations about what one ought to do and that it accomplishes the preservation of these deliberations in the face of appetitive threats. I then explore the implications this has for the moral psychology of the virtuous agent and the question of who can be genuinely courageous.

In this paper, I oppose the now-dominant view that Thrasymachus offers a definition of justice in Book I of the Republic. This way of interpretation Thrasymachus does not pay sufficient attention to the methodological assumptions he makes during his disagreement with Socrates. To better understand Socrates’ antagonist, it is crucial to remember that he was, in fact, a sophist. I argue that what the character Thrasymachus is doing in Book I is importantly akin to a certain genre of sophistic arguments from the 5th century. In his discussion with Socrates, Thrasymachus attempts a genealogical unmasking of justice, which he hopes will change the action-guiding beliefs of his audience. Although my discussion is primarily about the methodology or structure of Thrasymachus’ argument, I conclude by offering a brief discussion of its substance, as well.