Mesbah Khandan

The idea of phenomenology seeks to revive the position of philosophy as the first and foundational knowledge. By referring to Descartes, Husserl tries to introduce philosophy as a broad and responsible knowledge about to other sciences, and for this reason, he considers mathematical and natural sciences to be related to philosophy in their foundations and principles, and claims that philosophy is a necessary and inherent Precedence over natural knowledge. In this regard, examining the quality and how the exact sciences depend on phenomenology is a theme that can be traced in some of Husserl’s works. Although these topics in contemporary philosophy have never been widely considered by phenomenologists and interpreters of Husserl’s opinions, in recent decades and influenced by some conflicts in the “philosophy of science”, the rereading of this neglected aspect of phenomenological thinking has been given attention. In the current research, focusing on Husserl’s medieval thought, which is known as “transcendental phenomenology”, I have tried to provide a macro- framework for the philosophical asse”sment of physics knowledge. In the first chapter, a historical introduction is given,”during which the unique advantages and possibilities that exist in Husserl’s intellectual heritage for discussing the foundations of mathematical physics will be explained. In the second chapter, in two separate axes, the general relationship between philosophy and science is discussed from a phenomenological point of view. In the first axis, while re-reading Husserl’s perception of “natural thesis” and his proposed path for transitioning from this situation through the actions of “phenomenological Epoche”, I will explain how phenomenology Precedence over the exact sciences through redefining the entire range of knowledge attainable for humans as relations and verbs of Transcendental Ego. In the second axis, by reviewing the treatise on logical Investigations, Husserl’s fundamentalist view of ideatic sciences is examined, and in the next step, the basic distinction between the laws of mathematical physics and the above sciences is discussed, and thus, it will be clear that in Husserl’s view, the laws of natural sciences and empirical, they do not have the mastery and necessity and generality of ideatic sciences and have an estimated and approximate nature. In the thi’d chapter, focusing on the challenge of theoretical and unobservable identities, I will reread ’usserl's opinions in ideas 1 about the identity of the object determined by physical concepts with the Common perceptual object, and I will try to complete his theory by referring to the basic components of phenomenological epistemology. Referring to the idea of categorical intuition and discussing the quality of constitue of Universals will be the main pillar of this effort. I will argue that theoretical identities are Universals whose calendar involves a primary imaginary givenness, and this Universality, in the sense intended by Husserl, is a Kantian Universality (geometric and ideal essence) and not a Platonic Universality (an imprecise Universality). In the second half of this chapter, I will critically examine the interpretation of Husserl’s theories in the context of the philosophy of science and their registration under the realist-instrumentalist dichotomy, and by drawing a framework based on the principles of phenomenology to discuss reality and existence in the realm of material nature, I discuss about the laws of physics. For this purpose, it is necessary to reflect on the transition of phenomenology from a theory of knowledge to ontology and to explain the development of “transcendental idealism” based on the idea of phenomenology. In the final chapter, while rereading three basic challenges in the contemporary philosophy of science, each of which is an obstacle to the realistic acceptance of scientific laws, I will examine the possibilities available in Husserl’s philosophical science to overcome these bottlenecks. Pessimistic meta-induction, Underdetermination of Theory by Date and historical constructionism about science and doubts about the existence of “progress” in the history of science are three axes that, while examining them, put the theory that was formed in the previous two chapters about the phenomenological reality of the laws of physics to the test. I will show some of its advantages and limitations.

حکمت اشراق به مثابه یک کل، کوششی است برای نقد و گذار نظام‌مند از منظومۀ فلسفی ارسطو و بسط تاریخی و تبلور آن در آراء ابن سینا. هرچند برای سهروردی شناخت عالم طبیعت و مسائل متفرّع بر آن شأن والایی ندارد و طبیعیات هیچ گاه اولویت فکری او نبوده است، اما در همین موارد هم در پی فراروی از چارچوب تبیینی ارسطو و پیروان مشائی او بوده است. این فراروی در مواردی مانند تلقی وی از چیستی جسم، متأثر از مبانی خاص هستی‌شناختی حکمت اشراق صورت گرفته است. بررسی این موارد محل بحث ما نیست. اما در موارد دیگر، با نظر به این که سهروردی در مقایسه با پیروان ارسطو، الگوی متفاوتی را دربارۀ چیستی فلسفه و کیستی فیلسوف و به تبع آن، تاریخ تفکر حکمی و فلسفی دنبال می‌کند، شاهد چرخش ریشه‌ای و بنیادین او به جانب فهم طبیعّیاتی فلسفه‌های پیش از ارسطو در یونان باستان و همچنین جهان‌بینی‌های اسطوره‌ای دیگر تمدنهای باستانی هستیم. سهروردی در بخش «طبیعیات» رسالۀ المشارع و المطارحات تصریح میکند که طبیعیات ارسطو یی از عهدۀ تبیین و توصیف بخش عمدهای از تحولات و تغیرات عالم طبیعت بر نمی‌آید و برای جبران این نقیصه و ارائۀ یک الگوی بدیل، باید به میراث حکمای پیش از ارسطو مراجعه کرد. هرچند سهروردی به چرایی این امر نمی‌پردازد، اما فرضیۀ پژوهش حاضر این است که در ادعای فوق، بیش از هر چیز خصلت اسطوره‌ای جهان‌شناسی افلاطون و پیشاسقراطیان مورد توجه او بوده است. در جهان‌بینی اسطورهای، بر تنگناها و محدودیت‌های تفکر مفهومی و منطقی غلبه می‌شود و به جهت یکپارچگی و وحدتی که بین امر الوهی، انسان و طبیعت فرض میشود، تحولات عالم طبیعت نیز به نحو متفاوتی تبیین می‌شود. در این مقاله تلاش بر این است تا ضمن بازخوانی چیستی اسطوره و نسبت آن با فلسفه و با تمرکز بر بخش «طبیعیات» رسالۀ المشارع و المطارحات، توجیهی برای ارجحیت جهان‌شناسی پیشاسقراطی بر طبیعیات ارسطویی به نزد سهروردی ارائه‌ شود.

Titus Burkhardt, in line with his major criticisms of modernity and modernism, while presenting an essentialist and inclusive narrative of modern sciences, critically reviews the foundations and principles of modern sciences (physics, psychology and biology). His special understanding of what these sciences are is rooted in the foundations and special approaches of the "traditionalism" trend, including their ontology and philosophy of history, the evaluation of each of which can be the subject of independent research; In this article, without directly paying attention to the criticism of the foundations of traditionalism, while focusing on Burckhardt's narration and criticisms of modern physics, I will present some considerations that can be considered a violation of Burckhardt's metaphysical understanding of modern physics and also be considered a criticism of his confrontation with the modern age. First, I will show that modern physics and cosmology have Pythagorean and Platonic elements, and as a result, we cannot understand them in a fundamental break from Greek mystical and spiritual traditions. Then, while making a passing reference to some disputes of the philosophers of the beginning of the new era about modern cosmological concepts, emphasizing the role of theological and metaphysical concerns in the beginnings of the establishment of modern physics, Burckhardt's claim that this cosmology ignores immaterial facts and assigns a purely mathematical quantification to it is criticized. At the end, while pointing to Newton's place in the establishment and development of modern sciences and philosophies, I will express the claim that there is no definite and clear relationship between Newtonian and post-Newtonian physics with a specific philosophical and theological and value system; As a result, the way is not closed for interpretations of modern physics that consider it to be combined with a spiritual and sacred perception of existence, and Burckhardt's opinion of introducing modern physics as a science indifferent to divine values and the cause of the emergence of spiritual crises will not be acceptable.