Mesfer Alhayyani

This paper argues that al-Ghazali’s (1058–1111) distinction between taqlid (uncritical acceptance of authority) and ijtihad (independent reasoning) can offer a normative response to the contemporary challenge of fake news, thereby connecting a medieval epistemic framework to a pressing twenty-first-century problem. This study treats fake news as both an epistemic and an ethical challenge. Epistemically, fake news undermines the aim of belief, which is the aspiration toward truth, by introducing and sustaining falsehoods within the testimonial networks on which individuals depend for knowledge. Ethically, it constitutes a form of deception that manipulates audiences, corrodes intellectual virtues such as honesty, and disintegrates the trust between individuals and public institutions that is essential for collective life. Methodologically, this paper adopts an analytical–critical approach. It examines recent philosophical literature on the epistemology of misinformation, reconstructs al-Ghazali’s taqlid–ijtihad framework from his original texts, and then adapts it to the conditions of digital information environments. The resulting model distinguishes between digital ijtihad, the responsible and competent verification of online information, and justified digital taqlid, the legitimate reliance on credible digital authorities when independent verification is impractical. The findings suggest that this adapted framework not only enriches contemporary epistemic theory but also offers practical normative guidance for cultivating responsible belief formation, including in educational contexts where teaching itself functions as a structured form of testimonial exchange.