Messay Kebede

Underdevelopment is the most controversial issue of our time. In a world which apparently exhibits so much power and yet does so little to drive it back, it represents the challenge par excellence. However, concerning this most pressing and controversial issue of underdevelopment, of all the disciplines which study man, philosophy is the one which until now said the least. At first sight, to mark off in the topic of underdevelopment an area of real philosophical concern does not seem feasible indeed. Underdevelopment understood as a mere failure of development appears to be within the competence of the disciplines of the social sciences, especially of economics, rather than that of philosophy. Viewed as a technical problem, it could thereby be declared outside the sphere of direct philosophical inquiry. But this reason is no sooner accepted than it comes up against itself by the very nature of the conflicts in which the social sciences got bogged down in their attempt to understand underdevelopment. Although not directly spelt out, the conflicts are unmistakably pervaded throughout by philosophical questions. It suffices to point out the main cause of the theoretical split which divides scholars, in the general issue of tradition and modernity, to really bring out the eminently philosophical nature of the debate. We are obviously referring to the conflict between modernization theory and the neo‐Marxist school. The purpose of this paper is precisely to show that the topic of underdevelopment, not only raises one of the basic and oldest problems of philosophy, namely the nature of the connection between the spiritual and the material, but also helps positively to reformulate it.

This chapter tackles the mind–body problem. It shows that the prolongation of the past into the present, namely, memory is the basis for the continuity of the subject. Thanks to the ability of the brain to focus consciousness on the needs of the present, memory acquires practical role through the function of forgetting. This entails the distinction between pure memory, which is imageless, and memory-images, which condition memory’s passage into the conscious present. Going against Deleuze’s recourse to “word-memory” and the phenomenologist reduction of the past to retention, the chapter shows that memory is the ontological continuity of the being-made. Accordingly, mind–body union is how the mind both overflows the body but also limits itself to the body to support action.

This chapter extends the concept of self-overcoming to morality, social issues, and social progress by conceiving social life as a stoppage carrying the injunction to overcome the halt. The stoppage yields the closed society, which acts as a source of obligations supporting an internal hierarchical order and inducing hostility toward other groups. The creative continuity of life initiates the movement in the direction of open society, defined by democratic order and human fraternity, and spearheaded by the mystic love of humanity. The latter overflows the closed society, and so inspires rather than determine progress. In light of this relation, the chapter examines Bergson’s stand on modernity and its problems, such as social and gender inequalities, ecological degradation, the handling of human diversity, and the threat of war.

This chapter situates the book in the recent and ongoing revival of interest in Bergson’s philosophy. It spells out its ambition, which is to contribute to the renewal by offering an interpretation of Bergsonism that either corrects or avoids the misunderstandings and reductionisms responsible for the decline. It proposes that time, understood as duration, that is, as prolongation rather than as passing, when taken seriously, unravels the originality and problem-solving ability of Bergsonism. What else does this notion of time convey but a self-overcoming reality such that it excludes negativity? The chapter then provides a taste of this new reading by offering a summary of each chapter.

This chapter begins with a detailed contrast between duration and representative conceptions of time. It shows that philosophers reduce becoming either to an appearance or to an unfolding of what is already given (dialectics) or to a subjective notion (Kant) because they miss that the fusion of moments, and not their passage, defines duration. Conceived as fusion, time is creative continuity and the very substance of reality. This durational monism establishes that tension and relaxation respectively define consciousness and materiality and that their unity is productive of effort. With this notion of effort, the chapter moves to characterize freedom as self-creation: the reality of novelty refutes both determinism and the idea of freedom as the ability to choose between given alternatives.

This chapter establishes the existence of two forms of knowledge, intuition, and intelligence, and elaborates their distinctive features. While representation and intelligence juxtapose things in space and moments in spatialized time for the purpose of practical and social life, intuitive knowledge gathers the spatially distinct moments and things and thinks them in duration. In so doing, intuitive knowledge enacts the real and so grasps it from inside. The relationship between intelligence and intuition is thus not one of opposition but of complementarity, since intuition is the effort to reintegrate what the analytic function of intelligence separates and externally connects.

Relying on Bergson’s arguments against nothingness and his restriction of negative judgments to practical significance, this chapter shows how the notion of élan vital understands consciousness, life, and materiality as different levels of durational tension, thereby providing an integrative ontology transcending both dualism and the idealist and materialist schools of monism. Where dualism sees an opposition and where monism argues for reductionism, intuition obtains the vision of an élan, precisely by grasping life as an effort to surpass itself. Living beingbeings are divergent and creative outcomes of this striving, otherwise called evolution. The striving nature of life means that the élan is limited but that it is also an unending process of self-overcoming.

Since the immanence of life to matter excludes dualism, this chapter explains perception as the genesis of the subject through the display of a world reflecting its possible actions. Going against the sacrosanct view of realism and idealism making perception into a projection of subjective images and, by extension, against the phenomenological thesis of intentionality, Bergson advances the bold thesis that things are perceived where they are, and not in the brain or the mind. This means that perception is just selection and that the role of the brain is to retard the reactions of the body to selected stimuli. Hence the distinction between pure and concrete perception: it means that the selected portion develops into images as a result of the intervention of memory.

The purpose of this essay is to show that the issue of "underdevelopment" not only raises one of the most basic and oldest problems of philosophy, namely the relationship between the spiritual and the material, but also helps positively to reformulate it. For, on closer examination, it will appear that the striking aspect of underdevelopment is that it constitutes a glaring symptom of a characteristic disturbance or maladjustment. By its strangeness and distortion, it displays a unique and unexpected tension between the spiritual and the material. Indeed, we cannot discard the possibility that the link between the spiritual and the material is likely to be better exposed in a situation of maladjustment than in one of fusion. Besides, this method of studying tension in order to observe the connection between the mental and the physical is not something new in philosophy.

D’aucuns pensent que la critique bergsonienne de l’idée du néant et des concepts négatifs ne va pas de pair avec la présentation de la matière comme l’opposé de la vie. Cet article est en désaccord avec cette interprétation et propose une solution basée sur la nécessité de distinguer entre la vision intuitive de l’unité de la nature et celle de l’analyse intellectuelle, dont la caractéristique est d’appréhender la même unité au moyen de concepts opposés. Le résultat est que l’intuition transcende l’opposition et unit la vie et la matière dans la vision d’un effort d’autodépassement. According to some critics, Bergson’s critique of the idea of nothingness and negative concepts does not fit with his presentation of matter as the opposite of life. This article disagrees with this interpretation and proposes a solution based on the distinction between the intuitive vision of the unity of nature and its intellectual analysis, whose function is to grasp the same unity by means of opposing concepts. This means that intuition transcends the opposition and unites life and matter in the vision of self-overcoming life.

This paper discusses the ideas of Asres Yenesew, who was a leading clerical scholar during Haile Selassie’s reign. Frustrated by the marginalization of Ethiopia despite the preservation of its independence, Asres identifies the introduction of Western education as the main culprit and derives the economic satellization of Ethiopia from the cultural ascendancy of the West. As a remedy, he proposes a return to the source by which alone Ethiopia can again recenter itself and make choices in accordance to its interests. He supports his proposal by expounding the empowering forces of some important components of the traditional system of social organization and cultural beliefs. The paper underlines the revolutionary message of Asres’s discourse, but also shows how the timidity of his political stand singularly diminished its resonance.

This book proposes a new reading of Bergsonism based on the admission that time, conceived as duration, stretches instead of passes. This swelling time is full and so excludes the negative. Yet, swelling requires some resistance, but such that it is more of a stimulant than a contrariety. The notion of élan vital fulfills this requirement: it states the immanence of life to matter, thereby deriving the swelling from an internal effort and allowing its conceptualization as self-overcoming. With self-overcoming as the inner dynamics of reality, Bergson dismisses all forms of dualism and reductionist monism because both the absence of negativity and the swelling nature of time posit a creative process yielding a qualitatively diverse world. This graded oneness is how the lower level activates intensification by turning into limitation, making possible higher levels of achievement, in particular through the union of mind and body and the integration of openness and closed sociability.

Bergson imputes the generation of false problems in philosophy to the idea of nothingness and negative concepts. Yet, all his books are fraught with oppositional thinking, such as the oppositions between space and time, quantity and quality, life and matter. Understandably, this apparent discrepancy has led a philosopher like Merleau-Ponty to speak of inconsistency, while Jankélévitch and others counter the charge of inconsistency by arguing that Bergsonism embraces operational opposition as opposed to substantial opposition. This article disagrees with both interpretations and proposes a solution based on the need to distinguish between the level of intuitive vision of the unity of nature and the level of representative analysis whose defining feature is that it operates by means of opposing concepts. The progression from representation to intuition transcends opposition and unites life and matter in the vision of a self-surpassing effort or élan.

Underdevelopment is the most controversial issue of our time. In a world which apparently exhibits so much power and yet does so little to drive it back, it represents the challenge par excellence. However, concerning this most pressing and controversial issue of underdevelopment, of all the disciplines which study man, philosophy is the one which until now said the least. At first sight, to mark off in the topic of underdevelopment an area of real philosophical concern does not seem feasible indeed. Underdevelopment understood as a mere failure of development appears to be within the competence of the disciplines of the social sciences, especially of economics, rather than that of philosophy. Viewed as a technical problem, it could thereby be declared outside the sphere of direct philosophical inquiry.But this reason is no sooner accepted than it comes up against itself by the very nature of the conflicts in which the social sciences got bogged down in their attempt to understand underdevelopment. Although not directly spelt out, the conflicts are unmistakably pervaded throughout by philosophical questions. It suffices to point out the main cause of the theoretical split which divides scholars, in the general issue of tradition and modernity, to really bring out the eminently philosophical nature of the debate. We are obviously referring to the conflict between modernization theory and the neo-Marxist school. The purpose of this paper is precisely to show that the topic of underdevelopment, not only raises one of the basic and oldest problems of philosophy, namely the nature of the connection between the spiritual and the material, but also helps positively to reformulate it

This paper is about the Bergsonian synchronization of the perpetual present or memory with the passing present or the body. It shows how forgetting narrows and focuses consciousness on the needs of action and how motor memory allows the imagining of the useful side of memory. The paper highlights the strength of Bergson’s analysis by respectively confronting classical theories of memory, the highly regarded perspective of the phenomenological school, Deleuze’s interpretation of Bergsonism, and Sartre’s theory of mental imagery.

Regardless of the metaphysics that inspires them, theories of perception invariably end up in the trap of subjectivism. Thus, idealism argues that the world can be nothing more than a representation of the mind. As to dualism and materialism, despite fundamental differences, they share the common assumption that perception is a subjective replica of external objects. Opposed to these theories is common sense with its tenacious belief that an external world exists and that things are perceived where they are and as they are. This paper contends that Bergson’s theory of perception should be approached from the question of what the relationship between matter and mind must be for perception to retain an objective character. It shows that only its emergence from things themselves rather than from the subject can provide objectivity to perception. In thus grounding objectivity in the impersonal character of perception, whose implication is that it precedes the subject, which is then posteriorly formed, Bergson’s theory constitutes, so the paper argues, a radical reversal of the traditional position, including that of phenomenology.

Recourse to intuition to tackle philosophical issues brought the charge of irrationalism on Bergson. The charge overlooks that Bergsonian intuition has nothing to do with a sudden and mysterious illumination. Rather, it is a methodic procedure resulting in an outcome that it is effectively produced, and not a spark that falls from the sky. This paper shows that the misconception has its source in the neglect of two interrelated factors: (1) philosophical intuition is a method specifically invented to get past philosophical antinomies, as they are framed by Kant; and (2) the method is inseparable from the philosophy of duration, notably from the originality of a monism that generates differences in kind, thereby allowing the enactment of the various modes of being. So that, both the invented nature of philosophical intuition and the stratified attribute of duration combine to give intuition the character of a cognitive breakthrough that is not reducible to the old opposition between rationality and irrationality.

In his philosophy of life, Bergson's aim is very clear: to determine, beyond mechanism and finalism, the essence of change and of evolution according to the order of duration in opposition to the order of space or juxtaposition. His intention is to penetrate the specificity of the order of duration. Regarding time, the analyses of the previous philosophers are proved to be deceiving, since all of them, according to him, ended up in reducing time to a succession of simultaneities. Founded on the order of magnitude, mechanism lines up succession as a series of numbers, finalism adds to succession the law of the better: in both cases all is already given and time is reduced to a mere appearance. Nowhere do we find a process in depth; as time is conceived as the realization of a programme previously arranged, everything is simply spread out in space.

According to most scholars, what defines modernity is the prevalence of change and mobility in all aspects of life, as opposed to traditionality in which immobility of beliefs and statuses is said to be the dominant trait. One major implication of this definition is the conclusion that the occurrence of modernity involves generational conflicts on the grounds that older people are less open to innovation and change. This paradigm of modernity has led to the exclusion of elders from political life in Third World countries, especially in those countries that opted for a revolutionary course. In light of traditional views of old age and recent gerontological findings, this paper examines the validity of the assumption according to which younger leadership is best equipped to achieve modernity in developing countries. It finds out that both factual and theoretical considerations underline that integration as much as deviation defines positive change and that the failure of generational interaction results in detrimental outcomes.

The book provides a theoretical explanation of the major outcomes of Ethiopia’s social revolution, namely, the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and the implementation of a far-reaching Marxist-Leninist revolution by a military committee (the Derg) and its collapse in 1991. The book extensively discusses the question of knowing whether existing theories of revolution throw light on the eruption of a radical revolution in Ethiopia and, most of all, whether they can accommodate the major anomaly of a socialist revolution being executed by a military committee that radicalized after the removal of the imperial regime. Hence the central thesis of the book: both the overthrow of the monarchical order and the radicalization of the Derg must be tied to social conditions that exasperated elite conflicts for scarce resources, with the consequence that the espousal of radical ideologies (socialism and ethnonationalism) became the sole avenue for the exclusive control of state power. Moreover, the book shows how the struggle of exclusive elites for the control of the state explains the Derg’s need to put its fate in the hands of a providential leader, to wit, Mengistu Haile Mariam. In light of the theoretical debate over the role of charismatic leaders in history, the book establishes how Mengistu’s narcissism led him to become the sole owner of the revolution and how his dictatorial rule brought about his own demise and that of the Derg, following the military defeat of the Ethiopian army in the hands of ethnonationalist insurgents. Another fundamental contribution of the book is a theoretical articulation of political conflicts and ideology that critically intervenes in the divisive issue of the primary cause of revolutions. Granted that ideology is more of a justification than a drive, the Ethiopian case illustrates how conflicts between mutually exclusive elites favor the path of political outbidding mobilizing utopian projects so as to galvanize the support of the masses. The perceived transcendence of utopia from partisan politics gives the proof that ideology is a predatory form of thinking in that it hijacks values belonging to different cognitive and affective realms for the purpose of empowering exclusionary interests.

There is an old but still unresolved debate pertaining to the question of Bergsonian monism or dualism. Scholars who think that Bergson is ultimately monist clash with those who claim that he has consistently maintained a dualist position. Others speak of contradiction and point out his failure to reconcile dualism with monism. What feeds on the debate is Bergson’s undeniable change of direction: while his first book is flagrantly dualist, his second book takes a sharp turn toward monism. Without denying the intricacy generated by the change of direction, this paper argues that the originality of his position is overlooked every time that the problem is presented in terms of Bergson being dualist or monist. Notably, it contends that Bergson’s third book, Creative Evolution, overcomes both dualism and monism by removing their contradiction through a durational or slanted approach to Being.