Michael A. Rosenthal

This essay defends a reading according to which Spinoza is a type of moral anti-realist. Since Spinoza allows that we can have certain knowledge of the good, this naturally invites the question, what is it that such knowledge is knowledge of? Spinoza’s political theory, in Rosenthal’s view, holds the answer to this question. Just as there is neither a transcendent nor a natural foundation for knowledge of the means to our good, Rosenthal argues that, for Spinoza, there is neither a transcendent nor a natural foundation for knowledge of justice and a just society.

There are two ideas of freedom in Spinoza's work, one stoic, the other republican. The stoic idea is expressed in the themes of individual self‐mastery through knowledge of one's place in the natural order. The republican idea of freedom expresses the necessity and nobility of political engagement in a state that is not fully rational. Spinoza's own theory of republican sovereignty was inspired by Machiavelli and other contemporary Dutch republican thinkers. Though, it originates as a critique of the Hobbesian social contract theory. Spinoza argues that participation is the key to a state's stability, both in regard to external and internal threats. Spinoza thinks that the more a state is based upon republican principles of participation the more freedom its citizens will have. At the core of a virtuous individual's relation to the state is the idea of participation, an idea that reflects the fundamental premises of Spinoza's theory of sovereignty.

In this paper I make four claims. First, there is an apparent contradiction in Spinoza’s theory of justice. On the one hand, in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670), he argues that justice is entirely conventional and depends on the ruler’s decision. On the other hand, in the later and unpublished Tractatus Politicus (1677), he claims that man really is a social animal and that we can articulate ideal forms of justice on that basis. Second, to address this apparent inconsistency, we need to look at Spinoza’s use of early modern scholastic metaphysics. Although he rejects scholastic natural law theory, he has adopted another concept from the scholastics that is crucial for his theory: the notion of a ‘being of reason’ (ens rationis). Third, if we consider justice as a kind of being of reason, then we can resolve the apparent contradiction in Spinoza’s approach. I shall argue that concepts of justice are imaginative ‘beings of reason.’ They are products of convention that are not derived from general features of the world but from a particular set of circumstances. Fourth, Spinoza’s social ontology of political concepts like justice has some distinct advantages for contemporary theory. This approach shows how we might be able to provide a framework to integrate politics and natural science without reducing one to the other.

ABSTRACT This commentary defends an interpretation of Spinoza that preserves some key elements of traditional rationalism, in which reason does have an independent path to the truth. While it agrees with Lloyd’s general view, in which reason, imagination, and emotion are more closely tied than the Cartesian scheme, in which reason is distinct from the world of bodies, the paper disagrees with her central claim that reason is constituted by the imagination. It argues that the imagination is effective to the extent that it produces forms of knowledge that are analogous to reason. The paper considers her interpretation of Flaubert and the Biblical prophets and claims that it cannot account for why some forms of the imagination might be mistaken or superior to others. In conclusion, it points out that, while ‘unresolved multiplicity’ might be the predicament of those led by the imagination, Spinoza thinks that reason leads to a common perspective and is a superior guide to life.

In this ambitious and important book, Justin Steinberg attempts to explain the significance of the project for both contemporary political philosophy and the history of political thought. He argues that Spinoza offers a much-needed antidote against "ideal theory" in political philosophy. He also wants to expand our horizons concerning the context of Spinoza's political thought, primarily by noting the influence of Renaissance Civic Humanism. He argues for two main theses: the political works are continuous with the Ethics; and the role of the state is to help perfect the individual.The first chapter, "Metaphysical Psychology and Ingenia Formation," argues that there is a human essence, which is nonetheless...

Edwin Curley published the first volume of his translation of Spinoza's Collected Works more than thirty years ago. It was a landmark that signaled a renewed interest among English-speaking scholars in Spinoza's work. Now, the second volume has appeared, and it too is a monument to scholarship and promises to inspire new research in the field.It contains new translations of the Theological-Political Treatise and the Political Treatise, as well as the rest of the correspondence, letters 29–84. As in the first volume, Curley has drawn on the important work of European scholars and added much that is new and important. The scholarly apparatus is remarkable. In addition to a general introduction, Curley has provided...

While many writers have emphasized the vital importance of Hobbes and the natural law tradition in the formation of Spinoza's political thought, most have neglected or underestimated the significance of Machiavelli and the republican tradition of civic virtue. I claim that it is worth reexamining Machiavelli's influence on Spinoza for two reasons. First, and perhaps most surprisingly, it sheds light on the structure and content of Spinoza's thought, not only in his political writings, but in the Ethics itself. Second, it helps us place Spinoza's work more accurately in the history of early modern ethics and political thought. ;In this dissertation, then, I examine the ways in which Spinoza elaborated upon and modified not only Machiavelli's idea of republicanism but also the related ideas of virtue and fortune . I show how Spinoza makes sense of these ideas in terms of his own rationalist metaphysics and epistemology and then uses them to structure his ethical theory. I argue that, in Spinoza as in Machiavelli, the individual must struggle against fortune in order to become fully virtuous, and that struggle requires participation in the state. I discuss Spinoza's political theory in light of his reading of Machiavelli, and I defend his views against Hobbesian and contemporary criticisms of republican theory. In addition, I argue that not only political leaders but also political theorists must account for the effect of fortune in their work. I illustrate this point with an extended analysis of Spinoza's use of the example of the ancient Hebrews in his Theological-Political Treatise. In conclusion, I sketch Spinoza's place within the history of debates over the nature and influence of fortune in human affairs

This paper tests the extent of Spinoza’s liberalism through examining the question whether he would tolerate atheists. The first section analyzes the meaning of atheism through the epistolary exchange with Lambert van Velthuysen. It argues that it makes a difference whether Spinoza is an atheist in the strict sense—someone who explicitly denies the existence of God—or a deist—someone who holds a view of unorthodox God. Spinoza denies the charge that his idea of God undermines morality and he also defends his claim that other monotheistic religions than Christianity might contain a kernel of truth. In the second section, the paper discusses Spinoza’s views on toleration. It argues that the state has a limited interest in regulating religious views and it does this through the “dogmas of universal faith.” The state should tolerate a variety of beliefs about God, including those labeled deist, but strict atheistic beliefs, however, are not to be tolerated. In the third section the paper discusses the challenge of the “virtuous atheist” and compares Spinoza’s views to those of Locke and Bayle. Not only Spinoza’s metaphysics but also his ethical project depends on the proper idea of God. Spinoza explicitly contrasts his view, based on a deist conception of God, with that of Hobbes. He reads Hobbes as an epicurean and an atheist. Spinoza’s critical description of Hobbes’s view helps us understand what he thought atheism was and why he was not very sympathetic to it. Spinoza is intolerant towards atheism because it leads to an immoral life and justifies an absolutist state.

Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise was published anonymously in 1670 and immediately provoked huge debate. Its main goal was to claim that the freedom of philosophizing can be allowed in a free republic and that it cannot be abolished without also destroying the peace and piety of that republic. Spinoza criticizes the traditional claims of revelation and offers a social contract theory in which he praises democracy as the most natural form of government. This Critical Guide presents essays by well-known scholars in the field and covers a broad range of topics, including the political theory and the metaphysics of the work, religious toleration, the reception of the text by other early modern philosophers and the relation of the text to Jewish thought. It offers valuable perspectives on this important and influential work.

Michael A. Rosenthal - Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise: Exploring 'The Will of God' - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 334-335 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Michael A. Rosenthal University of Washington, Seattle Theo Verbeek. Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise: Exploring 'The Will of God'. Aldershot, UK-Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003. Pp. 224. Cloth, $99.95. Theo Verbeek, an eminent historian of Dutch Cartesianism, uses his considerable knowledge of the philosophical and political context to examine with..

In what follows, then, I will make four basic points. First, I will take what Spinoza says in the Ethics about an exemplar of human nature as a clear and basic indication of what the purpose of an exemplar is: to transform value from an individual and subjective utility to a universal and objective standard. Second, I will argue that the function of prophecy in the foundation of the state is essentially to fulfil the role of an exemplar, but on a political level; that is, to persuade the individual that his or her interest is only fulfilled through submission to the state's authority. Third, I will show how the history of the Hebrew state exemplifies the tension inherent in an exemplar between its particular imaginative origins and its universal pretensions. Fourth, I will claim that the narrative of the Hebrews' use and misuse of prophecy spoke directly to the Dutch of Spinoza's time and speaks indirectly to the political theorists of our own time