Michael Aaron Lindquist

In this paper I consider whether Mars and its associated environments qualify as wilderness for, if they do, then reasons pertaining to wilderness value and wilderness protection thereby extend beyond Earth. Through a critique, modification, and subsequent application of Mark Woods's (2017) wilderness ethic, conceiving of wilderness as an untrammeled, significant location of the value-adding properties of being natural, wild, and free, I argue that Mars, in qualifying as wilderness, ought to be protected as such. In response to this conclusion, I then consider a planetary park proposal put forth by Charles S. Cockell and Gerda Horneck (2004, 2006). Finding their proposal insufficient, I propose further parks and conditions for drawing boundaries, as well as explicate ways in which the preservation of wilderness values on Mars may constrain the construction of future settlements or scientific research outposts.

In this paper, I undertake a conceptual analysis of ordinary usages of the concepts of “litter” and “pollution.” If “litter” or “pollution” applies to space debris in its various contexts, then in dealing with space debris as an ethical concern, we may more neatly apply arguments for the wrongness of litter and pollution to these new contexts. After engaging in a conceptual analysis of “litter” and “pollution,” I consider whether these concepts apply to space debris, examining three contexts: (1) surface debris on Moon and Mars, (2) intentionally crashing objects into gas giants, ice giants, and stars, and (3) the pressing issue of orbital space debris. I conclude by finding that neither “litter” nor “pollution” cleanly applies to any of these three contexts.

This chapter explores the role of the sense of smell in aesthetic evaluations of natural environments, arguing that the smells of nature are distinct, aesthetically relevant factors in the appreciation of natural environments. Further, I argue that the perceived naturalness of a smell, i.e., finding its origins in the other-than-human world as opposed to the artifactual world of human design and intention, affects aesthetic judgments about the natural environment under consideration and ought to, as attending to naturalness is a key component of aesthetically appreciating a natural environment qua natural environment. Finally, I make a case for cataloging changes in the smellscapes of natural environment as a tool for tracking environmental changes, as well as preserving the natural and cultural history that those smells are a part of. I conclude that the smells of nature are vital for a full aesthetic appreciation of natural environments, and that they have further importance beyond the aesthetic, both scientifically and historically.

This paper approaches the question of terraforming—the changing of extraterrestrial environments to be capable of harboring earth-based life—by arguing for a novel conception of moral status that accounts for extraterrestrial bodies like Mars. The paper begins by addressing pro-terraforming arguments offered by James S. J. Schwartz before offering the novel account of moral status. The account offered builds on and modifies Keekok Lee’s No External Teleology Thesis (NETT), while defending a proposed Non-Fungibility Thesis (NFT). The NETT is modified and defended with specific reference to Lee’s work on artifactuality and transgenic organisms. The NFT builds on work around objectification and irreplaceability, offering an account that recognizes the importance of bearers of value above and beyond the mere value they purportedly possess. Finally, the plausibility of the account is established by an overview of its applicability to other possible candidates for moral status.

De-extinction technology aims to bring extinct species back into existence, often with the goal of releasing created organisms into natural environments. In this paper, I argue that there are aesthetic reasons to avoid engaging in de-extinction and release projects, even if they pass moral permissibility criteria. The strength of these reasons depends on conclusions regarding species authenticity – a problem that arises at the intersection of de-extinction technology and the ‘species problem’ in the philosophy of biology. Since species authenticity affects the perceived naturalness of ‘natural’ environments, and thus the aesthetic judgments thereof, I contend that there will be negative aesthetic consequences of de-extinction efforts that ought to be further explored before such projects move forward.