•  108
    Is mental time travel real time travel?
    with Melanie G. Rosen
    Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1): 1-27. 2020.
    Episodic memory (memories of the personal past) and prospecting the future (anticipating events) are often described as mental time travel (MTT). While most use this description metaphorically, we argue that episodic memory may allow for MTT in at least some robust sense. While episodic memory experiences may not allow us to literally travel through time, they do afford genuine awareness of past-perceived events. This is in contrast to an alternative view on which episodic memory experiences pre…Read more
  •  91
    The role of experience in demonstrative thought
    Mind and Language 34 (5): 648-666. 2019.
    Attention plays a role in demonstrative thought: It sets the targets. Visual experience also plays a role. I argue here that it makes visual information available for use in the voluntary control of focal attention. To do so I use both introspection and neurophysiological evidence from projections between areas of attentional control and neural correlates of consciousness. Campbell and Smithies also identify roles for experience, but they further argue that only experience can play those roles. …Read more
  •  44
    Starting with Gareth Evans, there’s an important tradition of theorizing about perception-based demonstrative thought which assigns necessary epistemic conditions to it. Its core idea is that demonstrative reference in thought is grounded in information links, understood as links which carry reliable information about their targets and which a subject exploits for demonstrative reference by tokening the mental files fed by these links. Perception, on these views, is not fundamental to perception…Read more
  •  27
    Some hallucinations are experiences of the past
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3): 454-488. 2020.
    When you hallucinate an object, you are not in the normal sort of concurrent causal sensory interaction with that object. It's standardly further inferred that the hallucinated object does not actually exist. But the lack of normal concurrent causal sensory interaction does not imply that there does not exist an object that is hallucinated. It might be a past‐perceived object. In this paper, I argue that this claim holds for at least some interesting cases of hallucination. Hallucinations genera…Read more
  •  25
    An Impromptu Visit to Rien-à-Faire A Tribute to Bernard Suits
    with M. Andrew Holowchak and Michael Barkasi
    Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 35 (2): 111-119. 2008.
    No abstract
  •  16
    What's presented in our normal waking perceptual visual experiences feels present to us, while what we "see" in pictures and imagine does not. What about dreams? Does what we "see" in a dream feel present? Jennifer Windt has argued for an affirmative answer, for all dreams. But the dreams which flow from the brain's registration of myoclonic twitches (body-driven dreams) present a challenge to this answer. During these dreams (so I argue) motion-guiding vision is shut off, and, as Mohan Matthen …Read more
  •  4
    What should the sensorimotor enactivist say about dreams?
    Philosophical Explorations 24 (2): 243-261. 2021.
    ABSTRACT Dreams provide a compelling problem for sensorimotor enactivists like Alva Noë: they seem to replicate our perceptual experiences without sensorimotor interaction with distal sensory stimuli. Noë has responded by saying that dreams actually fail to replicate perceptual experiences in virtue of their lack of detail and stability. Noë's opponents have replied by pointing out that some dreams are richly detailed and stable, and that instability and a lack of detail in dreams can anyway be …Read more