Michael Baur

This paper makes an argument about how Hegel’s thought is relevant to contemporary critical theory. This paper refers mainly to the work of Axel Honneth as a proponent of contemporary critical theory, since Honneth has deliberately developed his version of critical theory in reliance on ideas and themes drawn from Hegel; nevertheless, the argument of this paper is relevant to others (such as Habermas) who share Honneth’s key premises about critical theory. The argument of this paper unfolds in three main stages. First, the paper explains Honneth’s basic approach to critical theory, including Honneth’s use of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic in articulating his critical theory. Secondly, the paper provides a Hegelian immanent critique of key premises at work in Honneth’s critical theory. Third and finally, the paper offers a reading of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic which not only rebuts Honneth’s reading of that dialectic, but also points the way forward to an alternative approach to critical theory. The main point of my Hegelian argument against Honneth can be briefly encapsulated as follows. Honneth holds that all, or virtually all, members of society implicitly accept or act in accordance with a common or shared social norm. Honneth offers an interpretation of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic in order to support his claims for critical theory. I argue that Honneth is an insufficiently dialectical thinker, and has not properly understood Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. My argument aims to show that, even if the master and slave implicitly accept or act in accordance with a common or shared social norm (as Honneth claims), it is impossible—contrary to what Honneth says—for master and slave themselves to recognize that they share such a norm.

This companion provides original, scholarly, and cutting-edge essays that cover the whole range of Hegel’s mature thought and his lasting influence. A comprehensive guide to one of the most important modern philosophers Essays are written in an accessible manner and draw on the most up-to-date Hegel research Contributions are drawn from across the world and from a wide variety of philosophical approaches and traditions Examines Hegel’s influence on a range of thinkers, from Kierkegaard and Marx to Heidegger, Adorno and Derrida Begins with a chronology of Hegel’s life and work and is then split into sections covering topics such as Philosophy of Nature, Aesthetics, and Philosophy of Religion.

The thought of G. W. F. Hegel (1770 -1831) has had a deep and lasting influence on a wide range of philosophical, political, religious, aesthetic, cultural and scientific movements. But, despite the far-reaching importance of Hegel's thought, there is often a great deal of confusion about what he actually said or believed. _G. W. F. Hegel: Key Concepts_ provides an accessible introduction to both Hegel's thought and Hegel-inspired philosophy in general, demonstrating how his concepts were understood, adopted and critically transformed by later thinkers. The first section of the book covers the principal philosophical themes in Hegel's system: epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, ethical theory, political philosophy, philosophy of nature, philosophy of art, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history and theory of the history of philosophy. The second section covers the main post-Hegelian movements in philosophy: Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, analytic philosophy, hermeneutics and French poststructuralism. The breadth and depth of _G. W. F. Hegel: Key Concepts _makes it an invaluable introduction for philosophical beginners and a useful reference source for more advanced scholars and researchers.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) is considered a philosopher of the Tradition, both in the sense that his work is rooted in the political, artistic, religious, and philosophical traditions of European culture and in the sense that he takes up the notion of tradition as an object of philosophical investigation. This collection examines Hegel's philosophy as it bears on the meaning and relevance of tradition - historical, legal, aesthetic, religious, and philosophical. The thirteen original essays draw upon and celebrate the work of H.S. Harris, who is considered by many to be the most influential interpreter of Hegel in the English-speaking world. The collection as a whole examines Hegel's rich and nuanced relation to his own traditions, including his creative reworking of the legacies of Greece, Rome, Christianity, the Middle Ages, early modernity, and his immediate predecessors. It also shows how Hegel's thought has direct relevance for us today as we seek to understand ourselves in relation to our inherited traditions. The volume concludes with an afterword by H.S. Harris and a comprehensive bibliography of Harris's published works. This important anthology represents the first rigorous and systematic effort to apply Harris's seminal and innovative style of Hegel scholarship to a wide variety of philosophical and historical issues. It functions both as a study of Hegel's philosophy and as a commentary on Harris's vast contribution to Hegel scholarship.

In this excellent book, David James explains and critically examines the theories of property put forward by Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Marx.In the introduction, James distinguishes between concepts of property and forms of property, and argues that Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Marx share the same concept of property. According to this shared concept, property rights "consist in a [triadic] relation between persons that is mediated by things, rather than in a [dyadic] relation between a person and a thing" (11). There are, however, differences regarding the question of which form of property is most justifiable: Kant and Hegel seek to justify private property, while Fichte and Marx argue in favor of common or collective... Read More.

There is something puzzling about the notion of the “human person.” Do human persons possess dignity by virtue of their being human, or by virtue of their being persons, or by virtue of some combination of humanness and personhood? This paper offers some first steps towards reconciling or uniting “naturalistic” accounts of human personhood (accounts which focus on the human being as one among many members of a shared natural kind) with “personalist” accounts of human personhood (accounts which focus on the radical individuality and uniqueness of the human person). These accounts can be united, I suggest, if one develops an adequate metaphysics of the human being as an intellectual being; if one appreciates how human beings are capable of a “complete” and immaterial return-into-self (reditio ad seipsum), one will also be able to appreciate how the human being is also radically individual and radically unique.

As I hope to show in this paper, Fichte’s rejection of traditional social contractarian accounts of human social relations is related to his rejection of the search for a criterion, or external standard, by which we might measure our knowledge in epistemology. More specifically, Fichte’s account of the impossibility of a normative social contract (as traditionally construed) is related to his account of the impossibility of our knowing things as they might be “in themselves,” separate from and independent of our own activity in knowing them. Addressing the question of whether we finite human knowers can ever transcend the limits of our own consciousness, Fichte argues that Hume was not sufficiently critical: “…the Humean system holds open the possibility that we might someday be able to go beyond the boundary of the human mind, whereas the Critical system proves that such progress is absolutely impossible, and it shows that the thought of a thing possessing existence and specific properties in itself and apart from any faculty of representation is a piece of whimsy, a pipe dream, a nonthought.” In a very real sense, then, Fichte aims to “out-Hume” Hume on the question of whether we can ever know “things-in-themselves” or an external criterion for testing our knowledge. That is, Fichte goes beyond Hume and insists on the necessary – and not merely contingent – character of our ignorance of so-called things-in-themselves (i.e., things that supposedly exist antecedent to and independent of our consciousness of them). But unlike Hume, Fichte argues that radical skepticism regarding all possible knowledge of things-in-themselves does not undermine – but actually confirms and sustains – our belief in the emancipatory power of reason.

In spite of their lack of interest in traditional philosophy and their explicit disavowals about the deeper meaning of their songs, there are also good reasons to approach and interpret the Beatles and their work from a philosophical point of view. In his Playboy interview from September of 1980, John praised Paul for the philosophical significance of the song, “The End,” which appeared on the Abbey Road album: “That’s Paul again.... he had a line in it – “The love you take is equal to the love you make’ – which is a very cosmic, philosophical line. Which again proves that if [Paul] wants to, he can think” (Beatlesongs, p. 929). And in a similar vein, Paul revealed in an interview that Beatles songs are meant to be interpreted from different perspectives and on different levels: “You put your own meaning at your own level to our songs, and that’s what’s great about them” (Beatlesongs, p. 143). Of course, there are many things that are “great” about Beatles songs; but one of the great things – certainly for those who want to be thoughtful and reflective about popular culture – is that they can be interpreted philosophically and thus appreciated in light of philosophical ideas and theories. One such theory is what might be called “idealistic monism.”

In his 2009 encyclical letter Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict XVI calls for a deeper, theological and metaphysical evaluation of the category of “relation” to achieve a proper understanding of the human being’s “transcendent dignity.” For some contemporary thinkers, this position might seem to be hopelessly paradoxical or even incoherent. After all, many contemporary thinkers are apt to believe that the human creature can have “transcendent dignity” only if the being and goodness of the human creature is not conditioned by or dependent upon any relation or relatedness to anything else, including the natural environment. This chapter seeks to show that apparent paradoxes in Benedict XVI’s statement will begin to disappear if one resists the rather understandable temptation to interpret his thought by relying on presuppositions borrowed from contemporary ethical theories. More specifically, this chapter aims to show that Benedict XVI’s teachings— embedded as they are within a rich tradition of Catholic “natural law” thinking—are importantly distinguishable from contemporary utilitarian and deontological views. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to demonstrate that Benedict XVI’s “natural law” account offers an intellectually defensible alternative to contemporary modes of environmental thinking.

Hegel’s most abiding aspiration was to be a volkserzieher (an educator of the people) in the tradition of thinkers of Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781), and Friedrich Schiller (159-1786). No doubt, he was also deeply interested in epistemology and metaphysics, but this interest stemmed at least in part from his belief (which Kant also shared) that human beings could become truly liberated to fulfill their vocations as human beings, only if they were also liberated from the illusions and contradictions that plagued uncritical thinking about self, world, and God. Thus to appreciate Hegel’s work in epistemology and metaphysics, one must first appreciate how he (following Kant) sought to think beyond the “special metaphysics” of self, world, and God as developed by Descartes and other pre-critical philosophers. The aim of this chapter is to analyze aspects of Hegel’s critical appropriation and transformation of Kantian thought, shedding light not only on Hegel’s own understanding of his move beyond Kant, but also on the philosophical reasons that might justify such a move.

As Richard Bernstein has suggested, there is a very rich and interesting story to be told about how the classical pragmatists (Dewey, Peirce, and James) understood G. W. R Hegel, made use of Hegel, and ultimately distanced themselves from Hegel. That story cannot be told here. Indeed, the story is so rich and complicated that even its beginnings cannot be told here. But what can be provided, perhaps, is a limited, though hopefully illuminating, perspective on a few salient aspects of the relationship between the classical pragmatists and Hegel. While the following reflections offer no definitive answers about this relationship, they might at least suggest some fruitful lines of enquiry for future discussion.

In the opening chapter of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke explains that the self-understanding or self-measure of the human mind includes an account of the mind’s limits, and so the mind’s self-understanding can provide adequate grounds for intellectual self-moderation or self-control: “If we can find out, how far the Understanding can extend its view; how far it has Faculties to attain Certainty; and in what Cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content our selves with what is attainable by us in this State.” Furthermore: “If we can find out those Measures, whereby a rational Creature put in that State, which Man is in, in this World, may, and ought to govern his Opinions, and Actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled, that some other things escape our Knowledge.” Compared to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre may appear to exemplify the very opposite of intellectual modesty and self-control. Unlike Locke, Fichte argues that a true system of knowledge should not seek to limit or moderate itself by reference to what is allegedly unknowable outside of it. A true system of knowledge, writes Fichte, “... only has to agree with itself. It can be explained only by itself, and it can be proven - or refuted - only on its own terms.” Furthermore, Fichte suggests that an appreciation of his system of knowledge requires not modesty in his readers, but rather an implicit sense of superiority: “I wish to have nothing to do with those who, as a result of protracted spiritual servitude, have lost their own selves and, along with this loss of themselves, have lost any feeling for their own conviction...” In this essay, I shall seek to show that, contrary to initial impressions, it is Fichtean idealism, and not Lockean (or any similar) realism, that is truly modest. According to my account, Locke’s explicit declarations concerning the modesty and limitedness of his own project exhibit a certain ignorance concerning the genuine problems at issue. In his claim to be modest, the realist Locke professes to know more than he actually does, and thus manifests his own immodesty. By contrast, the idealist Fichte must refrain from such direct claims to modesty and must appear to be immodest, precisely because he has a greater understanding of how radically limited human knowledge always is. Like Plato’s Charmides, Fichte realizes that any explicit claim to self-limitation and self-moderation would actually give lie to itself.

More than thirty-five years after its first release in 1971, Don McLean’s “American Pie” still resonates deeply with music listeners and consumers of popular culture. In a 2001 public poll sponsored by the National Endowment for the Arts and the Recording Industry Association of America, McLean’s eight-and-a-half-minute masterpiece was ranked number 5 among the 365 “most memorable” songs of the twentieth century. In 2002, the song was voted into the Grammy Hall of Fame. In 1997, Garth brooks performed “American Pie” at a concert in Central Park, and in 2000, pop icon Madonna performed her own version of “American Pie” on the soundtrack of her movie The Next Best Thing. In 1999, American Pie became the title of a popular – and irreverently comical – coming-of-age movie starring Jason Biggs (the movie American Pie was followed by American Pie 2 in 2001, American Wedding in 2003, and American Pie Present – Band Camp in 2005). Like the movie to which it lent its name, the song “American Pie” presents a coming-of-age narrative; and, also like the movie, the song appealed strongly and immediately to its contemporary audience. Three months after its release in November of 1971, the song reached the number one slot on the charts in January of 1972, and it remained in the Top 40 for a total of seventeen weeks (longer than any other single during the year of 1972). Unlike the movie, however, the song “American Pie” is highly nuanced and sophisticated, containing multiple allusions and layers of meaning which challenge and heighten our understanding of rock ’n’ roll music and the possibility of self-reflection and self-critique in popular culture.

El artículo describe las siete características que deben identificar a una universidad jesuita en la actualidad: 1) las prácticas pedagógicas en las universidades jesuitas deben promover el diálogo auténtico y la reconciliación; 2) las prácticas pedagógicas en las universidades jesuitas deben promover la excelencia humana en todas las esferas del quehacer humano; 3) las prácticas pedagógicas en las universidades jesuitas deben promover la exploración y el descubrimiento centrados en y entre las disciplinas; 4) los programas y prácticas de las universidades jesuitas deben promover la exploración y la apreciación intercultural; 5) las universidades jesuitas deben contribuir tanto en la teoría como en la práctica a la promoción de la justicia en la sociedad en su conjunto y en sus diversas instituciones; 6) el aula jesuita debe promover la construcción de una visión global en estudiantes y profesores; 7) las prácticas y los programas en las universidades jesuitas deben promover un auténtico crecimiento espiritual y el desarrollo de la fe. Con base en los planteamientos clave del Paradigma Pedagógico Ignaciano (ppi) y la visión de que éste no es un modelo prefabricado listo para ser aplicado, se contextualizan sus particularidades en la educación superior a partir de las reflexiones de los Superiores Generales de la Compañía. Las características o identificadores presentados motivan a las instituciones educativas a que construyan una identidad que responda a una larga tradición de la educación jesuita y a una constante renovación de su compromiso por formar líderes para sanar un mundo roto.

The article describes the seven characteristics that should identify a Jesuit university nowadays: 1) Pedagogical practices at Jesuit universities should promote authentic dialog and reconciliation; 2) Pedagogical practices at Jesuit universities should promote human excellence in every aspect of human life; 3) Pedagogical practices at Jesuit universities should promote exploration and discovery focused on and among disciplines; 4) Programs and practices at Jesuit universities should promote exploration and intercultural appreciation; 5) Jesuit universities should contribute both in theory and in practice to the promotion of justice in society as a whole and within society’s various institutions; 6) A Jesuit classroom should promote the construction of a global vision in students and professors; and 7) Internships and programs at Jesuit universities should promote authentic spiritual growth and faith development. Based on the key approaches of the Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm (ipp) and having in view that this is not a prefabricated model ready to be applied, its particularities in higher education are contextualized in light of the reflections of the Society General Superiors. The characteristics or identifiers presented motivate educational institutions to build an identity that responds to a long tradition of Jesuit education and a constant renewal of their commitment to form leaders to heal a broken world.

On September 11, 2001, Americans were painfully reminded of a truth that for years had been easy to overlook, namely, that terrorism can affect every person in the world – regardless of location, nationality, political conviction, or occupation – and that, in principle, nobody is beyond terrorism’s reach. However, our renewed awareness of the ubiquity of the terrorist threat has been accompanied by wide disagreement and confusion about the moral status of terrorism and how terrorism ought to be confronted. Much of the disagreement and confusion, I contend, is rooted in an inadequate understanding of just what it is that constitutes terrorism. In this paper, I offer the beginnings of a response to the challenge of terrorism by providing an account of what terrorism is and of some of the philosophical issues involved. My account is divided into two sections. In the first section I examine some of the difficulties involved in defining terrorism, and show that some of the most common “ordinary” understandings of terrorism are inadequate. In the second section I offer a working definition of terrorism that overcomes many of the difficulties outlined in the first section. I argue that terrorism consists in the use of “systematically unsystematic” violence (whether directed at combatants or noncombatants), and that the random or indiscriminate character of terroristic violence points us in the direction of seeing what is distinctively wrong with it. The fundamental problem is that terrorism is not committed to any rules of armed conflict or any principles that would facilitate the eventual containment or termination of the conflict.

This study seeks to show how Hegel and Heidegger belong to the tradition of transcendental philosophy. ;In Chapter One, it is argued that the guiding question of transcendental philosophy concerns the relation between that which is apriori about our way of knowing and that which is apriori about the objects known. Kant answered this question by arguing that everything apriori in human knowledge comes from the knowing subject; however, because Kant continued to understand the finitude of the subject in terms of empirical determinations, his own pursuit of transcendental philosophy remained incomplete. Hegel seeks to overcome this incompleteness by arguing that knowing subjectivity must ultimately be conceived as infinite; against Hegel, Heidegger argues that the knowing subject is indeed finite, but that this finitude must be understood with reference to the ontological givenness of Being. ;Chapter Two shows how the Fichtean interpretation of Kant's doctrine of apperception provided the basis for Hegel's claim that all determinations of objects must be grounded in some kind of self-relatedness of the subject. Chapter Three illustrates how Hegel's chapter on "Force and the Understanding" constitutes the climax of his own "transcendental deduction". Chapter Four turns to Hegel's Science of Logic in order to show how the logical transition from Being to Essence can allow for the scientific and critical grounding of metaphysics. ;The discussion of Heidegger begins in Chapter Five, which illustrates how Heidegger's thought concerning the categorial givenness of Being emerges from his interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology. Chapter Six explicates Heidegger's argument that time constitutes the transcendental horizon which makes possible the givenness of Being. Chapter Seven traces Heidegger's attempt to conceive of the givenness of Being within the context of a scientific, yet non-Hegelian, transcendental philosophy. ;Chapter Eight highlights some of the crucial similarities and differences between Hegel and Heidegger, and considers the possible future direction of transcendental philosophy in the wake of Hegel and Heidegger.

This companion provides original, scholarly, and cutting-edge essays that cover the whole range of Hegel’s mature thought and his lasting influence. A comprehensive guide to one of the most important modern philosophers Essays are written in an accessible manner and draw on the most up-to-date Hegel research Contributions are drawn from across the world and from a wide variety of philosophical approaches and traditions Examines Hegel’s influence on a range of thinkers, from Kierkegaard and Marx to Heidegger, Adorno and Derrida Begins with a chronology of Hegel’s life and work and is then split into sections covering topics such as Philosophy of Nature, Aesthetics, and Philosophy of Religion.

This chapter explores how the non‐dualistic metaphysics endorsed by Star Wars and Spinoza provides an important lesson about what it means to have a true idea about something. According to the non‐dualistic metaphysics of the Jedi, power‐seeking ultimately isn't a matter of domination or destruction, but of “balance”. Living things are like all other things: they strive to maintain and increase their power. But they're unique because their manner of power‐ seeking demonstrates in an especially clear way how non‐dualistic metaphysics is true: how independence and dependence, activity and passivity, aren't simply opposed but in fact interpenetrate and codetermine one another. The non‐dualistic interplay of activity and passivity, self‐assertion and receptivity, independence and dependence, is further demonstrated through the psychological lives of human beings.

This conference will take place at Dartmouth College, August 27-30, 1995. The scheduled speakers are: Henry Allison, Manfred Baum, Jeffrey Edwards, Paul Guyer, Stephen Houlgate, Beatrice Longuenesse, Robert Pippin, Burkhard Tuschling, Allen Wood, and Guenter Zoeller. Some stipend money to support transportation and hotel costs will be available upon application. The primary sponsor is NEH. Those interested should write to Prof. Sally S. Sedgwick, either by e-mail or at the Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, 6035 Thornton Hall, Hanover, NH 03755-3592.

In this Essay, I examine some apparent difficulties with what I call the "actualization criterion" connected to Rawls's notion of public reason, that is, the criterion for determining when Rawlsian public reason is concretely actualized by citizens in their deliberating and deciding about constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. While these apparent difficulties have led some commentators to reject Rawlsian public reason altogether, I offer an interpretation that might allow Rawlsian public reason to escape the difficulties. My reading involves the claim that Rawlsian public reason is to be understood essentially as an imperative or an ideal, and as not necessarily grounded in any stock of existing beliefs or opinions. I make this claim on the basis of the seemingly counterintuitive observation that it is possible for citizen-interlocutors to know that public reason has been violated without necessarily knowing who the violator is (and thus without being able to foreclose the possibility that the violator may even be oneself). This observation is based in turn on my analysis of the necessary reciprocity and self-referentiality built in to the very concept of public reason as such.

This book is an extended reflection on a basic but far-reaching claim: "There are no 'bare' particulars". Because "individuals are necessarily individuals of a kind," Lowe argues, "realism with regard to particulars or individuals... implies realism with regard to sorts or kinds". A "sortal" concept is "a concept of a distinct sort or kind of individuals". Lowe's purpose in this book is to examine the meaning and implications of sortal concepts, and to challenge relativist conceptions of identity and reductivist strategies in metaphysics.