Michael Beebe

The Concept of the whole utterance, we are inclined to to believe, is basic in meaning-theory. But any theory which locates a conceptual base must show how items in the super-structure relate to that base, and so for theories of meaning. There are units of meaning both larger and smaller than whole utterances: narrative, in which several whole utterances follow one another in some organized fashion, seems relatively unproblematic, but the relations of meaningful parts of utterances to the utterances themselves remains unclear. Grice's theory of meaning secures the logical priority of whole utterances, and in addition, lends itself to an attractive and theoretically fruitful view of the relations between whole utterances and their meaningful parts; or so I shall try to demonstrate.

I propose to analyse referring, the typical function of proper names and definite descriptions, in terms of speakers' intentions rather than in terms of the meanings of words. Grice's theory of meaning explains how a speaker can mean something simply by making an utterance with the proper sort of intention, and I attempt to apply this theory of meaning to referring. I see two related reasons for thinking a Gricean theory of reference correct. First, I try to show that our speech practice is such as to demand a Gricean-type theory; we simply do depend rather often on hearers' recognition of speakers' intentions to achieve reference. Second, the causal theory of proper names, which I investigate in Chapter 5. seems to demand a Gricean theory of reference. In Chapter 1, I am concerned with whole utterance meaning, and with the problem of going from occasional meaning to conventional meaning. Lewis' analysis of convention is deployed in a way which I think vindicates Grice's hope that conventional or timeless meaning may be analyzed in terms of occasional meaning. In Chapter 2, I attempt to extend the Gricean program to parts of utterances. That is, I argue that an utterance may have meaningful parts and grammatical structure entirely without benefit of convention. Primitive cases of referring and predicating can arise at this pre-conventional level, and here certainly referring is to be explained by a Gricean theory. Chapter 3 contains the body of my argument for a Gricean theory of reference. I try to show that our referring practice is in fact one which depends on the characteristic form of the Gricean intention: the speaker, by his utterance, intends that the hearer shall be affected in some way, intending this to come about at least in part by hearers' recognition of speakers' intentions. The first three section of Chapter 3 are devoted to arguing for the Gricean character of reference, and the remaining two to developing suitable epistemic foundations for such a theory. If a speaker's intention is primary, the meanings of the words he uses are secondary, so we must be able to explain how a speaker is connected with the object of his reference in some way which does not essentially involve his being able to say something true about that object. I use Kaplan's theory of relational belief, with.its emphasis on the causal element in a belief, to provide this connection. Having a relational belief about an object connects one with it, and allows one to have an intention directed towards it. Chapter ^ is a criticism of the standard theory of reference with Searle and Strawson cast as its defenders. Chapter 5 is a presentation and elaboration of the 'causal' or the 'historical explanation' theory of names, the new theory of names which, I claim, requires a Gricean theory of reference.

A theory is developed explaining how beliefs, and derivatively intentions and perhaps the other propositional attitudes, find their objects. Beliefs about particular objects are divided into two kinds. Attributive beliefs find their objects purely through the mediation of contained descriptive content, while referential beliefs connect directly with their objects via a causal connection. This distinction is explicated in terms of complementing semantic and epistemic differences, and details of the causal connection are explored.

Donnellan has introduced a distinction between two uses of referring terms, the referential and the attributive. A referentially used term is said to pick out that object the speaker has in mind, the one he meant or intended to refer to, while a term used attributively is said to pick out whichever object it names or denotes. While it is generally agreed that Donnellan has discovered a real difference in the way referring terms work, it has by no means been dear how the distinction could or should be handled theoretically. That has two consequences. First, intuitions diverge over difficult or marginal cases and, with no theory to appeal to, the taxonomic part of the enterprise is threatened. Second, the referential/attributive distinction has not become an accepted, relatively uncontroversial tool for solving problems about the semantics of utterances; and this is a least partly because of a lack of theory. But the distinction, so one feels, really is more important than it has thus far shown itself to be.

In this paper I develop a theory of 'function' and function as a deontic modal word and phenomenon. Kratzer’s account of the semantics for the deontic modals is invoked and using her approach a formal schema for the semantics of 'function'-sentences is proposed. My account of function is a modalized and extended version of Cummins’ systems-type account of function. In the biological and physical sciences, on this account, function is a complex empirical deontic modal property. It is built on the property of X’s doing Y well enough to enable Z, which is implicitly deontic because of the evaluative but nonetheless empirical in its biological and physical applications. This account of function resolves many of the traditional puzzles about biological and physical function, and extends naturally to include the other types of function. With a variant treatment of the semantics, this account is argued also to apply to mathematical function, where it is shown to be interestingly related to Frege’s account of function.

Kratzer’s semantics for the deontic modals ought, must, etc., is criticized and improvements are suggested. Specifically, a solution is offered for the strong/weak, must/ought contrast, based on connecting must to right and ought to good as their respective ordering norms. A formal treatment of the semantics of must is proposed. For the semantics of ought it is argued that good enough should replace best in the formula giving truth conditions. A semantics for supposed to slightly different from that for ought is proposed that connects interestingly with the “normative judgement internalism” problem. An extended analysis of the workings of the ordering source in Kratzer semantics reveals several problems and related possible solutions. And finally, it is argued that ‘We must do the right things” and “We ought to pursue good things” are provably necessary in Kratzer semantics, which is, I think, a welcome result, although, since formal, does not tell what are the right and good things.