Michael Biggs

This study compares the reproduction of Wittgenstein's diagrams in his published works in English and in German, with their sources in his manuscripts and typescripts. To facilitate this comparison, the relationship of the published works to Wittgenstein's Nachlaß is discussed. There are considerable limitations to the available microfilm records and they are compared to other records, such as Nedo's typographical Wiener Ausgabe. Particular reference is made to the forthcoming electronic publication of a colour facsimile edition and machine-readable transcription by The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen. The term ‘diagram’ is briefly described as a graphic element which cannot be entered from the normal keyboard. The diagrams' largely syntactic, as opposed to illustrative, function in Wittgenstein's works is discussed. The consequential difficulties posed by the requirement for computer graphic files in addition to text files is also described. This is placed in the general context of diagrammatics provided by Twyman and Richards. The study focuses on the use of colour in Wittgenstein's diagrams. The precedent for this use is sought in his Nachlaß, and in Waismann's notes. The use of colour is discussed in relation to Wittgenstein's general remarks on colour and colour theory, and its effect on the meaning of the text in Philosophical Investigations (§48). The study also examines in detail the use of diagrams in relation to Wittgenstein's remarks on ostensive definition and the use of samples. A catalogue of the 480 diagrams in Wittgenstein's published works is appended, together with their sources. A detailed bibliography of the published works is also appended. Approximately 10% of the diagrams in the published works are found to be infelicitously transcribed. No precedent for the use of colour in the published works is found, and its desirability in relation to the texts is questioned.

There are [at least] three distinct visual methods in play in Wittgenstein’s works: 1) explicit visual methods, such as the picture theory or ‘seeing-as’; 2) implicit visual methods, such as ambiguous figures, or analogies based on machines; and 3) embedded visual methods, such as picture-proofs or visual paradigms; and that the implicit and embedded methods have not received comparable attention in the critical literature as have the explicit methods. All three methods have as their target the way we use language, how we come to know the meaning of a word, and how it is the task of philosophy to show us how to escape from our entrapment by language. However, this paper does not focus on references to the visual world, art and aesthetics, despite this sometimes being a topic for Wittgenstein (e.g. Culture and Value), but on images as tools with which to do philosophy: ‘sometimes we understand a thing by translating into words – sometimes we understand a thing by drawing a picture’ (The Pink Book, in: Gibson and O’Mahony 2020, 124).

This paper uses structure-mapping to bridge the divide between the analytical and visual culture traditions of image interpretation. Wittgenstein’s analytic ‘picture theory of meaning’ from his early period, and his cultural theory of ‘meaning as use’ from his later period are used to show that the terms similarity, analogy and metaphor can be applied to both image and linguistic interpretation. As a result, by the mapping of similarity and analogy onto the analytic approach, and by the mapping of metaphor onto the visual culture approach, a common linguistic ground for the comparison of these two approaches to image interpretation can be established.

This paper reports on Wittgenstein’s use of pictures and diagrams undertaken through an analysis of the surrounding co-text in the published works. It is part of a larger project to develop tools for the integrated semantic analysis of images and text in Wittgenstein’s original manuscript and typescript sources. The textual analysis took keywords, phrases and punctuation as possible indicators of definitive samples and rules in propositions and non-propositions. For reasons argued in the paper we focused on non-propositions and differentiated those that functioned descriptively from those that functioned definitively. Finally, from the range of definitive statements we investigated those that functioned according to Wittgenstein’s concept of a rule. In all cases we focused on collocation of indicative text with images. We concluded that Wittgenstein’s practice accorded with his early statements about images needing accompanying words to activate their propositional status, but that images could function independently as non-propositional descriptive or definitive samples. As definitive samples, many images also had the capability to function as rules, or independently as proofs. Since the picture-sentences rely on iconicity to communicate rules that may otherwise he hidden in our language practice, we speculate that the iconic relationship may belong to hinge epistemology. This is proposed as a strand for future research.

This paper investigates the role of visual experience in Wittgenstein's work. The specific thesis is that visual experience provides not only diverse illustrative examples of what could be an explanation of meaning, but that it also provides a recurrent metaphor for the whole process of meaning and understanding. Wittgenstein uses a great number of visual examples in his texts. Their diversity may be accounted for by the great diversity of ways in which he attempts to describe the relationship between a word and its meaning. The resultant variety of visual examples may be summarised by what I call the Visual Discontinuity Thesis. However, beneath this diversity there lies a thread of continuity. This is provided by the persistent use of visual experience in the description of the word-meaning relation. This use underlies the projection relationship of the Tractatus and the "seeing-as" relationship of the Investigations. This recurrent visual metaphor may be summarised by what I call the Visual Continuity Thesis. This paper presents the latter thesis in the context of a description of the former.

This monograph is a detailed comparison of the two published forms of Wittgenstein’s "Notes on Logic": the so-called Russell and Costello Versions. It also includes complete transcriptions of the two related typescripts and one manuscript in the collection of The Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University, and a transcription of a photocopy of a related typescript in the collection of The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, hitherto unpublished in their original form. From these comparisons, the majority of McGuinness’ description of the sequence of the production of the typescripts is confirmed. However, additional source material in the sequence is inferred. On the basis of the proposed identification of the Bergen typescript as the copy made by D. Schwayder, it is concluded that McGuinness was mistaken in asserting that the Costello Version was a rearrangement from this copy. Finally, it is proposed that the von Wright catalogue of Wittgenstein’s Nachlaß is misleading inasmuch as it gives a single reference to a pair of scripts generated at different times. In response, three Nachlaß items are differentiated within the classification for the Russell Version (catalogue item 201a). In support of the argument the monograph is supplemented by a phrase by phrase comparison of the Russell and Costello Versions, a list of phrases which are not common to both, and a detailed comparison of the various published issues including comments on the diagrams.

This paper aims to contribute a design-focused perspective on the ‘alternative paradigm research’ discussion. To clarify the aspect of ‘design-focus’ that we wish to refer to, we will use the term ‘areas of design practice’ to cover those activities that focus on the conception and production of artefacts, in contrast to the activities of theorizing and writing histories. The literature on academic research in areas of design practice encompasses a board range of subjects and terminology -- it refers to the creative and performing arts, the arts, design, etc., however what we take to be common in the literature is an interest in research involving the creation of original artefacts. In this paper, we cluster together the currently academicized, previously vocational areas. We claim that researchers in different disciplines operate in different research paradigms owing to different worldviews. A worldview is determined by a set of foundational beliefs that are taken on faith, and a research paradigm is defined by axioms and assumptions that are a consequence of that worldview. For example, the scientific view of the world is that it exists independently from the individual and the individual’s thoughts about it; and it is possible to find out objective facts about the world by following certain procedures. This worldview conditions a research paradigm with an ontology of a real external world; that methodologically the data that is collected in procedurally appropriate ways will yield objective facts about that world; and that epistemologically the researcher stands in a disengaged relation to the world that is being investigated. The procedures that are regarded as appropriate within a particular research paradigm form the research models that are acceptable in that paradigm, and these research models determine what one should do in order to extend knowledge in a particular subject. Of course, the scientific worldview is not the only one, and this paper will contrast it to the design worldview as indicating the emergence of a unique research paradigm. The relationship between a community’s worldview and the academic models that it adopts may be functional or dysfunctional. We claim that the relationship in the areas of design practice is often dysfunctional. This is because the academic model has not developed authentically in relation to its fundamental beliefs, but has done so in response to external forces for academicization. When pushed into the academy, areas of design practice did not possess their own academic models that were effectively linked to its worldview. We claim that, as a result, these areas simply co-opted research models from other disciplines. The paper proposes a rationalistic approach for investigating the relationship between worldview and research paradigm -- between fundamental beliefs, theoretical concepts and methodology in research models. The rationalistic approach enables a critique, which reveals that there are indeed problematic issues with adopting academic models from other research paradigms in an uncritical way, and concludes that areas of design practice should be investigated as an example of a distinct worldview.

Gliederung Übersicht zu den Ausgaben mit Quellen im Nachlass ... 2 „Titel“-Ausgaben ... 2 Helsinki-Ausgabe ... 3 Teil-Ausgaben ... 3 Wiener Ausgabe ... 4 Bergen Electronic Edition (CD-ROM) ... 4 Bergen Web-Ausgaben ... 4 1 Bibliographie der Sammelausgaben... 5 1.1 Nachlass-Faksimile ... 5 1.2 Bergen Nachlass-Textausgaben ... 5 1.3 Suhrkamp-Schriften ... 6 1.4 Suhrkamp-Werkausgabe ... 6 1.5 Intelex-Ressource ... 7 1.6 Wiener Ausgabe ... 7 1.7 Helsinki-Ausgabe ... 8 1.8 Sammelbände ... 8 1.9 Korrespondenz-Sammelausgaben ... 8 2 Bibliographie der Einzelausgaben... 9 2.1 Veröffentlichungen mit Erstveröffentlichung zu Lebzeiten (außer Logisch- philosophische Abhandlung / Tractatus logico-philosophicus) ... 9 2.2 Veröffentlichungen mit Quellen in den Manuskripten 101– und Typoskripten 201–... 10 2.3 Veröffentlichungen mit Quellen in den Diktaten 301–... 20 2.4 Veröffentlichungen von Erinnerungen und Vorlesungs- und Gesprächsaufzeichnungen (Auswahl) ... 21 2.5 Veröffentlichungen von Korrespondenz (Auswahl) ... 25 3 Bibliographie der Veröffentlichungen von Waismanns „Wittgenstein-Arbeiten“ (Auswahl)... 29

This is a piece of experimental multi-perspectival writing in which four different personae adopt different methods and intellectual relationships to writing as a means of research, by using the topics of fiction, counterfactual history and not-being. The narrative line is provided by a novelist who retells Saramago’s The History of the Siege of Lisbon. In Saramago’s novel a wayward proof-reader mischievously adds the word “not” to the historical account, creating a fictional, counterfactual history. This “bringing into being” of a fiction – of what didn’t actually happen – sets in train a series of perspectives or thought experiments by the four personae of the present text on the nature of “not-being”. They deploy methods from fictional writing and phenomenological practice informed by Saramago and Sartre, and phenomenological theory informed by Husserl and Meinong, thereby investigating the topic from four different perspectives. As a result, it is proposed that the legitimacy gap suffered by fiction-as-research may be bridged by so-called Meinongian objects, and the problem of whether such inexistent objects are facts, is less important than deciding whether they are useful. The conclusion is that artistic research methods offer techniques and a space to discuss the agency of not-being, of what-if, and of omission, through the legitimate deployment of fiction and falsehoods; and the benefits of so doing outweigh the existential discomfort that such ideas usually induce in researchers.

This article is an account of an electronic discussion which took place between November 1995 and June 1996. A number of specialists in relevant research areas had been invited to take part in the discussion from the very beginning, and some were added later. Altogether 30 individuals subscribed to the list. The “target paper,” written by Allen Renear, was sent to the list on November 27, 1995. The target paper alone comprised 8,500 words. The ensuing discussion, to which 9 of the members on the list made one or more individual contributions, comprises 30 entries of altogether 37,000 words. It is the function of this printed article to provide a brief summary and a key to the full electronic discussion which accompanies it.

There are no established conventions for, and few examples of, indexing visual material on the basis of its form. Most image databases use keywords to describe the form or function, and access data by text-based retrieval of these keywords. An image-based approach would order the data by appearance, e.g. Shepherd (1971) and Dreyfuss (1972). A taxonomy must be created in order to apply this technique to a new data set. Previous applications have been aided by certain limiting factors on the possible range of images indexed thus providing the key to a taxonomy, e.g. international pictorial signs in Dreyfuss. A fundamental principle which may be inferred from these studies is that the taxonomy needs to be related to the needs of the user, and not solely to abstract features of design. This is reflected in guidelines issued by the UK organisation The Society of Indexers. The studies also suggest the need for several approaches to classification within the same data set, e.g Dreyfuss, in which signs are located under more than one heading.