Michael Bratman

I sketch my general model of the roles of intentions in the planning of agents like us-agents with substantial resource limitations and with important needs for coordination. I then focus on the stability of prior intentions: their rational resistance to reconsideration. I emphasize the importance of cases in which one's nonreconsideration of a prior intention is nondeliberative and is grounded in relevant habits of reconsideration. Concerning such cases I argue for a limited form of two-tier consequentialism, one that is restricted in ways that aim at blocking an analogue of Smart's concerns about rule-worship. I contrast this with the unrestricted two-tier consequentialism suggested by McClennen. I argue that my restricted approach is superior for a theory of the practical rationality of reflective, planning agents like us. But I also conjecture that an unrestricted two-tier consequentialism may be more appropriate for the AI project of specifying a high level architecture for a resource-bounded planner.

This chapter begins with the use of the planning theory of individual temporally extended human action in a construction of shared intention. It then develops a series of further constructions that build on each other: of Hart-type, criticism/demand-involving social rules; of authority-augmented social rules of procedure involved in the rule-guided infrastructure of an organized institution; of institutional intentions as outputs of social rules of procedure (where these intentions require neither corresponding shared intention nor a dense, holistic institutional subject); and of institutional intentional agency. These constructions articulate inter-related roles of our capacity for planning agency in important forms of human practical organization: temporally extended, small-scale social, and institutional.

As normal adult human agents we have a remarkable trio of capacities. First, we are capable of acting over time in ways that involve important forms of intentional cross-temporal organization and coordination. Second, we are capable of acting together with others in ways that go significantly beyond standard forms of strategic interaction. Third, we are capable of self-governance. A theory of human agency should include an understanding of these capacities for temporally extended, for shared, and for self-governed intentional agency. In each case we have interrelated concerns that are conceptual, metaphysical, and normative. The response to these concerns is to seek to understand these three capacities as grounded in a common, core capacity for planning agency. This is the conjecture of the fecundity of planning agency.

Our agency is extended over time and socially interconnected. We seem to some extent to govern our own lives. And we are planning agents, where that involves, in part, guidance by norms of plan rationality. This essay takes some steps toward explaining the normative force of some of those norms and toward defending the conjecture that our capacity for planning agency in a way underlies our capacities for temporally extended, social, and self-governed agency. This essay also attempts to respond to discussions of these and related themes in the other essays in this volume.

Our human agency involves multiple and inter-related forms of mind-shaped practical organization. We act over time in ways that exhibit striking forms of cross-temporal organization. We act together in ways that exhibit stunning forms of small-scale social organization. Our social lives are shaped by a background of social rules. And much of what we do is embedded in and shaped by organized, rule-guided institutions. These multiple forms of mind-shaped practical organization, temporal and social, are deep and pervasive features of our lives. They should be a main target of philosophical reflection on our agency. I argue that a key idea in such an organizational and social turn in the philosophy of action is that we are planning agents. Our planning agency involves a fundamental form of practical thinking that underlies our mind-shaped practical organization over time. And the core capacity conjecture is that these planning structures also—and in part thereby—underlie basic forms of our human social organization.

Human beings act together in characteristic ways, and these forms of shared activity matter to us a great deal. Think of friendship and love, singing duets, dancing together, and the joys of conversation. And think about the usefulness of conversation and how we frequently manage to work together to achieve complex goals, from building buildings to putting on plays to establishing important results in the sciences.With Shared Agency, Michael E. Bratman seeks to answer questions about the conceptual, metaphysical and normative foundations of our sociality and to establish a framework for understanding basic forms of sociality. Bratman proposes that a rich account of individual planning agency facilitates the step to these forms of sociality.There is an independent reason - grounded in the diachronic organization of our temporally extended agency - to see planning structures as basic to our individual agency. Once these planning structures are on board, we can expect them to play central roles in our sociality. This planning theory of individual agency highlights distinctive roles and norms of intentions, understood as plan states. In Shared Agency Bratman argues that appeals to these planning structures enable us to provide adequate resources for an account of sufficient conditions for these basic forms of sociality. Shared agency emerges, both functionally and rationally, from structures of interconnected planning agency.

Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Fifth Edition, is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. Building on the exceptionally successful tradition of previous editions, the fifth edition presents seventy substantial selections from the best and most influential works in philosophy. Revised and updated to make it more pedagogical, this edition incorporates boldfaced key terms; a guide to writing philosophy papers; and a "Logical Toolkit," which lists and explains common terminology used in philosophical reasoning. This edition also features five new readings and a separate section on existential issues.

Introduction to Philosophy, Fourth Edition, is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. Building on the exceptionally successful tradition of previous editions, this edition for the first time incorporates the insights of a new coeditor, John Martin Fischer, and has been updated and revised to make it more accessible. Ideal for introductory philosophy courses, the text includes sections on the meaning of life, God and evil, knowledge and reality, the philosophy of science, the mind/body problem, freedom of will, consciousness, ethics, and philosophical puzzles and paradoxes. It presents seventy substantial--and in some cases complete--selections from the best and most influential works in philosophy, offering a unique balance between classical and contemporary material. An extensive glossary of philosophical terms is also included. The fourth edition features fifteen new readings, including work by Albert Camus, Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel Dennett, Harry G. Frankfurt, William Paley, Derek Parfit, John Perry, Richard Taylor, Peter Van Inwagen, Bernard Williams, and Susan Wolf. Part III, Knowledge and Reality, has been restructured and now includes Plato's Thaetetus, selections by Edmund L. Gettier and Robert Nozick, and an essay by Christopher Grau that explores the philosophical concepts presented in the popular film The Matrix. Two new ethics puzzles--"The Trolley Problem" and "Ducking Harm and Sacrificing Others"--are also included. This edition incorporates Study Questions after each reading and is accompanied by an Instructor's CD and a Student Companion Website, both containing helpful resources

Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. Ideal for introductory philosophy courses, the text offers a broad range of readings and depth. The text includes sections on God and Evil, Knowledge and Reality, the Philosophy of Science, the Mind/Body problem, Freedom of Will, Consciousness, Ethics, Political Philosophy, Existential Issues, and philosophical Puzzles and Paradoxes. (The unique section on Puzzles and Paradoxes is often praised by both instructors and students.) Easy to use for both students and instructors alike, the book incorporates boldfaced key terms (listed after each reading and defined in the glossary); a guide to writing philosophy papers; and a “Logical Toolkit;” and study questions after each reading selection. These features have allowed more students to learn philosophy by using what is seen as the highest quality collection of philosophical readings available. The ninth edition will be revised based on reviewer suggestions, and will include more diversity and readings by female philosophers.

Introduction to Philosophy, 3/e is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. Ideal for introductory philosophy courses, the third edition of this classic text now includes a general introduction and features eighteen selections new to this volume and an expanded glossary of philosophical terms. A serious and challenging work, it includes sections on the meaning of life, God and evil, epistemology, philosophy of science, the mind/body problem, freedom of will, consciousness, ethics, and philosophical puzzles. This exceptionally successful anthology presents a large number of substantial--and in some cases complete--selections from major works, offering a unique balance between classical and contemporary readings.This third edition adds selections by Plato, Nelson Pike, J.L. Mackie, Elizabeth Anderson, David Lewis, Hilary Putnam, Frank Jackson, John Perry, Peter Strawson, Rosalind Hursthouse, G.A. Cohen, Samuel Scheffler, Debra Satz, and Kwame Anthony Appiah as well as Kavka's Toxin Puzzle and Quinn's Puzzle of the Self-Torturer.

In her 2021 Lebowitz Prize Lecture, ‘A Simple Theory of Acting Together’, Margaret Gilbert seeks to articulate the ‘idea’ of acting together that ‘animates’ our commonsense talk about this important phenomenon. I seek a model that provides illuminating sufficient conditions for this phenomenon. As I see it, these are not quite the same project. After all, our commonsense idea and talk may well have two interrelated faces: an inchoate understanding of what the phenomenon is; and an inchoate understanding of norms about, very roughly, what those who participate in this phenomenon normally thereby owe to each other. Gilbert develops a rich and complex articulation of this second element, one according to which the interpersonal obligations in question are not in general moral obligations. Broadly speaking, her strategy is then to take this web of interpersonal obligations and the like and directly build it into her account of what the phenomenon of acting together is. This leads her to say that that phenomenon involves a non-reducible phenomenon in whichAandBare ‘jointly committed to endorseGas a body’––where such joint commitments are constituted at least in part by the interpersonal obligations and the like to which our commonsense idea of acting together alludes.

We have the capacity to act together in shared intentional and shared cooperative ways. This lecture argues that our capacity for the plan-based, mind-supported cross-temporal organization of our individual activities, together with certain further elements, suffices for our capacity for the mind-supported, small-scale social organization characteristic of acting together. These two fundamental forms of human practical organization––diachronic and small-scale social––are for us grounded in a common core: our capacity for planning agency.