Brown University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1982
Notre Dame, Indiana, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Metaphilosophy
Meta-Ethics
  •  8
    The Highest Moral Knowledge And Internalism
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement): 161-165. 1991.
  •  1
    Minimal intuition
    with W. Ramsey
    In M. R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 1998.
  •  59
    A half dozen puzzles regarding intrinsic attitudinal hedonism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 629-635. 2002.
    I’m not sure one even needs to think a state of affairs is true for us to take attitudinal pleasure in it. We surely take pleasure in imagining states of affairs. In such a case, we are well aware that the state of affairs that is the object of our enjoyment does not obtain. What is the proper account of the pleasure we take from imagining? I am fairly sure this is not a type of sensory pleasure. Would it make sense to say that what S is attitudinally pleased by is the state of affairs consistin…Read more
  • Pyrrhonian moral skepticism and the problem of the criterion
    In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics, Wiley Periodicals. 2009.
  •  11
    Selected papers in honor of William P. Alston (edited book)
    with Thomas D. Senor and William P. Alston
    Philosophy Documentation Center. 2016.
    William P. Alston was the founding editor of the Philosophy Research Archives and a president of the American Philosophical Association. This special volume was prepared in honor and recognition of Alston's many contributions to philosophy as author, editor, teacher, and mentor. Publication of this volume was made possible by his colleagues and the philosophy department at Syracuse University.
  •  16
    Phenomenal Conservatism and Self‐Defeat
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1): 205-212. 2008.
  •  110
    Phenomenal conservatism and self-defeat (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1): 205-212. 2008.
    No Abstract
  •  39
    Linguistics is Not a Good Model for Philosophy
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1): 113-120. 2000.
  •  27
    Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3): 731-735. 1993.
  •  129
    The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Ethics
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1). 1988.
    One merit claimed for john rawls's coherence method, Wide reflective equilibrium, Is that it transcends the traditional two tiered approach to moral inquiry according to which one must choose as one's starting points either particular moral judgments or general moral principles. The two tiered conception of philosophical method is not limited to ethics. The most detailed exposition of the conception can be found in r m chisholm's various discussions of the problem of the criterion. While chishol…Read more
  •  6
    A Priorism in Moral Epistemology
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016.
  • Intuitionism, Reliability and Reflective Equilibrium
    Dissertation, Brown University. 1983.
    I seek to defend coherentist methods of theory construction in normative ethics, specifically J. Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium, on the basis of a naturalistic theory of epistemic justification. The dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter is essentially a taxonomic discussion of approaches which might be taken towards the construction of theories of such epistemological notions as justification, knowledge or rational belief and such moral notions as right action or jus…Read more
  •  26
    Does an Ugly Analysis Entail that the Target of the Analysis Lacks Value?
    In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 112--38. 2009.
  •  40
  •  7
    Preface
    with William Ramsey
    In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Rowman and Littlefield. 1998.
  •  38
    Brink's Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3): 731-735. 1993.
  • Coherentism
    In Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 1995.
  •  116
    Pyrrhonian moral skepticism and the problem of the criterion
    Philosophical Issues 19 (1): 38-56. 2009.
    No Abstract
  •  77
    Intuitions in moral inquiry
    In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford University Press. pp. 595--623. 2006.
    This chapter begins with a weak understanding of intuitions as beliefs that do not result from more familiar sources, but that the person currently holds simply because the proposition believed seems true to the person upon due consideration. Nearly all moral inquiry makes significant use of moral intuitions. Reflective equilibrium is perhaps the most sophisticated intuitionistic approach to moral inquiry. It modifies the usual understanding of reflective equilibrium by arguing that inquirers mu…Read more
  •  92
    We all have moral beliefs. But what if one beleif conflicts with another? DePaul argues that we have to make our beliefs cohere, but that the current coherence methods are seriously flawed. It is not just the arguments that need to be considered in moral enquiry. DePaul asserts that the ability to make sensitive moral judgements is vital to any philosophical inquiry into morality. The inquirer must consider how her life experiences and experiences with literature, film and theatre have influence…Read more
  •  69
    Sosa, Certainty and the Problem of the Criterion
    Philosophical Papers 40 (3): 287-304. 2011.
    Abstract In Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa continues his detailed and intriguing defense of his two level account of knowledge that recognizes both animal and reflective knowledge. The latter more impressive type of knowledge requires a coherent positive epistemic perspective defending the reliability of a source of belief. Viewing Sosa's discussion from the through the lens provided by R.M. Chisholm's treatments of the problem of the criterion, I worry that Sosa's approach is too far in the …Read more
  •  10
    Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3): 731-735. 1993.
  •  10
    Critical Notice
    Mind 99 (396). 1990.
  •  588
    Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (edited book)
    with William M. Ramsey
    Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1998.
    Ancients and moderns alike have constructed arguments and assessed theories on the basis of common sense and intuitive judgments. Yet, despite the important role intuitions play in philosophy, there has been little reflection on fundamental questions concerning the sort of data intuitions provide, how they are supposed to lead us to the truth, and why we should treat them as important. In addition, recent psychological research seems to pose serious challenges to traditional intuition-driven phi…Read more
  •  32
    The Rationality of Belief in God
    Religious Studies 17 (3). 1981.
    The major purpose of Hans Kung's SOO-page book entitled Does God Exist? is to show that belief in the Christian God is rationally justifiable. Given the title, purpose and size of the book, I was surprised by many of the things the book does not contain. It gives little attention and offers no solution to the problem of evil; it deals briefly with the traditional proofs for God, devoting at most one page each to the cosmological, teleological, ontological and moral arguments; and it contains no …Read more