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11The Highest Moral Knowledge And InternalismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement): 161-165. 1991.
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1Minimal intuitionIn M. R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 1998.
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162Review essay on Jonathan Kvanvig's the value of knowledge and the pursuit of understandingPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2). 2007.
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68A half dozen puzzles regarding intrinsic attitudinal hedonismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 629-635. 2002.I’m not sure one even needs to think a state of affairs is true for us to take attitudinal pleasure in it. We surely take pleasure in imagining states of affairs. In such a case, we are well aware that the state of affairs that is the object of our enjoyment does not obtain. What is the proper account of the pleasure we take from imagining? I am fairly sure this is not a type of sensory pleasure. Would it make sense to say that what S is attitudinally pleased by is the state of affairs consistin…Read more
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Pyrrhonian moral skepticism and the problem of the criterionIn Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics, Wiley Periodicals. 2009.
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14Selected papers in honor of William P. Alston (edited book)Philosophy Documentation Center. 2016.William P. Alston was the founding editor of the Philosophy Research Archives and a president of the American Philosophical Association. This special volume was prepared in honor and recognition of Alston's many contributions to philosophy as author, editor, teacher, and mentor. Publication of this volume was made possible by his colleagues and the philosophy department at Syracuse University.
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121Phenomenal conservatism and self-defeat (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1): 205-212. 2008.No Abstract
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21Phenomenal Conservatism and Self‐DefeatPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1): 205-212. 2008.
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43Linguistics is Not a Good Model for PhilosophySouthern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1): 113-120. 2000.
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30Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3): 731-735. 1993.
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135The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in EthicsCanadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1). 1988.One merit claimed for john rawls's coherence method, Wide reflective equilibrium, Is that it transcends the traditional two tiered approach to moral inquiry according to which one must choose as one's starting points either particular moral judgments or general moral principles. The two tiered conception of philosophical method is not limited to ethics. The most detailed exposition of the conception can be found in r m chisholm's various discussions of the problem of the criterion. While chishol…Read more
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Intuitionism, Reliability and Reflective EquilibriumDissertation, Brown University. 1983.I seek to defend coherentist methods of theory construction in normative ethics, specifically J. Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium, on the basis of a naturalistic theory of epistemic justification. The dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter is essentially a taxonomic discussion of approaches which might be taken towards the construction of theories of such epistemological notions as justification, knowledge or rational belief and such moral notions as right action or jus…Read more
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29Agent Centeredness, Agent Neutrality, Disagreement, and Truth ConducivenessIn Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 202. 2013.
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1Methodological issues. Reflective equilibriumIn Christian Miller (ed.), Continuum Companion to Ethics, Continuum. 2011.
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26Does an Ugly Analysis Entail that the Target of the Analysis Lacks Value?In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 112--38. 2009.
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48Do Heuristics Provide a Good Model for Moral Intuition or Moral Perception?Modern Schoolman 86 (3-4): 349-362. 2009.
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7PrefaceIn Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Rowman and Littlefield. 1998.
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85Character Traits, Virtues, and VicesThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9 141-157. 2000.Recently, Gilbert Harman has used empirical results obtained by social psychologists to argue that there are no character traits of the type presupposed by virtue ethics—no honesty or dishonesty, no courage or cowardice, in short, no virtue or vice. In this paper, I critically assess his argument as well as that of the social psychologists he appeals to. I suggest that the experimental results recounted by Harman would not much concern such classical virtue theorists as Plato—particularly the Pl…Read more
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12Comments on Two of Depaul’s PuzzlesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 636-639. 2002.I’m not sure one even needs to think a state of affairs is true for us to take attitudinal pleasure in it. We surely take pleasure in imagining states of affairs. In such a case, we are well aware that the state of affairs that is the object of our enjoyment does not obtain. What is the proper account of the pleasure we take from imagining? I am fairly sure this is not a type of sensory pleasure. Would it make sense to say that what S is attitudinally pleased by is the state of affairs consistin…Read more
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4Ugly Analyses and ValueIn Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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109Supervenience and moral dependencePhilosophical Studies 51 (3). 1987.One aim philosophers have in constructing moral theories is to identify the natural or non-Moral characteristics that make actions right or obligatory, Things good, Or persons virtuous. Yet we have no clear understanding of what it is for certain of a thing's non-Moral properties to be responsible for its moral properties. Given the recent interest in the concept of supervenience one might think that the dependence of moral on natural properties could be explained in terms of it. Unfortunately, …Read more
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42Brink's Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3): 731-735. 1993.
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CoherentismIn Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 1995.
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42The highest moral knowledge and the truth behind internalismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1): 137-160. 1991.
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122Pyrrhonian moral skepticism and the problem of the criterionPhilosophical Issues 19 (1): 38-56. 2009.No Abstract
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81Intuitions in moral inquiryIn David Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory, Oxford University Press. pp. 595--623. 2006.This chapter begins with a weak understanding of intuitions as beliefs that do not result from more familiar sources, but that the person currently holds simply because the proposition believed seems true to the person upon due consideration. Nearly all moral inquiry makes significant use of moral intuitions. Reflective equilibrium is perhaps the most sophisticated intuitionistic approach to moral inquiry. It modifies the usual understanding of reflective equilibrium by arguing that inquirers mu…Read more
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94Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral InquiryRoutledge. 1993.We all have moral beliefs. But what if one beleif conflicts with another? DePaul argues that we have to make our beliefs cohere, but that the current coherence methods are seriously flawed. It is not just the arguments that need to be considered in moral enquiry. DePaul asserts that the ability to make sensitive moral judgements is vital to any philosophical inquiry into morality. The inquirer must consider how her life experiences and experiences with literature, film and theatre have influence…Read more
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1Wiggins, D. "Needs Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value" (review)Mind 99 (n/a): 619. 1990.
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73Sosa, Certainty and the Problem of the CriterionPhilosophical Papers 40 (3): 287-304. 2011.Abstract In Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa continues his detailed and intriguing defense of his two level account of knowledge that recognizes both animal and reflective knowledge. The latter more impressive type of knowledge requires a coherent positive epistemic perspective defending the reliability of a source of belief. Viewing Sosa's discussion from the through the lens provided by R.M. Chisholm's treatments of the problem of the criterion, I worry that Sosa's approach is too far in the …Read more
Notre Dame, Indiana, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
Meta-Ethics |