Michael Dufresne

Included here are translations of four essays by Wang Guowei, each representing a different stage in his intellectual development. The first, “Clarifying Delusions about Philosophy” (1903), defends the imported discipline of philosophy from its detractors by framing the issue in terms the Ruist notion of “rectifying names.” The second, “Autobiographical Notes at Thirty” (1907), recounts Wang’s intellectual career, from his youth to his later disillusionment with philosophy. The third, “Preface to Collected Writings on National Studies” (1911), proposes a view of learning as radically undifferentiated, rejecting distinctions like “Chinese” versus “Western.” The fourth, “Draft of an Imperial Memorial on Politics and Learning” (1923–1924), offers a polemic against Western theories and values. Together, these four essays paint a vivid picture of Wang’s evolving views on philosophy and learning, recounting his initial passion for and gradual disenchantment with Western thinking and what it could offer his own tradition.

As one of China’s first modern philosophers, Wang Guowei 王國維 produced many noteworthy theories. This essay aims to thoroughly examine his aesthetic theory of ancient elegance, which he developed as a supplement to Kant’s conceptions of the beautiful and the sublime. To accomplish this task, I have divided this essay into three sections. Following the introduction, the second section introduces Wang’s theory of ancient elegance, focusing on his distinction between “first forms” and “second forms.” In the context of art, first forms refer to the meanings expressed, while second forms refer to the mediums of expression. The third section expands on the role of effort in the production of ancient elegance and explains the significance of this theory to aesthetic education. Unlike genius, the capacity to produce and perceive ancient elegance can be cultivated by anyone through training. This is significant for Wang, because art gives people consolation by providing them with the means to express their feelings and make their lives meaningful. To explicate the contemporary relevance of Wang’s view of aesthetic education based on ancient elegance, I appeal to Hans Maes’s outline of “existential aesthetics.”

What matters in personal survival? What makes self-awareness possible? If there is no permanent self, should we be altruistic? These and other questions were tackled by the international participants in the 2018 Uehiro Graduate Student Philosophy Conference at University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa. Their responses explore the subject of subjecthood from interdisciplinary and comparative perspectives. Some approach it from an analytic point of view, others from a historical, and as many as five draw from non-Western traditions to argue their points. We have selected seven of the 21 papers presented at the conference. Given their comparative scope, they provide a slightly unusual sample of the discussions in philosophy of self and personhood today. The collection would be of interest not only to graduate students and professional philosophers, but also to anyone curious about the comparative methods used to investigate the self in philosophy.

Wang Guowei (1877–1927) was among the first Chinese thinkers to seriously engage with the Western philosophical tradition. He took a particular liking to Kantian aesthetics, specifically as it was taken up and criticized in the works of Schiller, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. This article centers on Wang’s theory of addiction, which he developed in response to the opium epidemic in late Qing China. In formulating this theory, Wang adopts the will-based language of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, presenting his view as an alternative to their opposing outlooks on life. This article consists of three sections. The first section outlines the concept of consolation, which Wang adopts as an alternative to Schopenhauerian resignation and Nietzschean overcoming. The second section introduces the concept of addiction, which encompasses everything from opium to philosophy. For Wang, addictions differ only in their degree of nobility. The third section connects the concepts of consolation and addiction to Wang’s vocal endorsement of aesthetic education. In his view, art is unique among the noblest addictions because it is accessible, giving everyone the means to express themselves in meaningful ways. By teaching people how to create and appreciate art, aesthetic education can alleviate their dependence on base addictions like opium.

The Qing dynasty scholar Wang Guowei 王國維 (1877–1927) has received little recognition in the English-speaking world, and even less in the philosophical community. Raised to be a Ruist (or Confucian) scholar official, he gave up this path to pursue the study of the “new learning” (xīnxué 新學) from the West and became enamored with German aesthetic philosophy, especially the works of Kant, Schiller, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. However, by the start of the modern Republic period in China, Wang had denounced all his previous research interests and dedicated himself to “old learning” (jiùxué 舊學), fearing for the future of China’s traditions and cultures. Taking Wang Guowei as a case study, my dissertation functions as an exercise in decolonial philosophy, highlighting the impacts of coloniality on his thinking while attempting to revitalize his theories from the perspective of decoloniality. The Introduction sets up this case study by clarifying the points laid out in the title: Who is Wang Guowei, what is coloniality, and why is this case study “philosophical?” To begin, it details the specifics of Wang’s life and explaining his approach to comparative thinking, which became a target of criticism for later Chinese thinkers, including Qian Zhongshu. Next, it offers an overview of the concept of coloniality, referring to thinkers such as Aníbal Quijano, Maria Lugones, Walter Mignolo and Nelson Maldonado-Torres. From this point, this chapter moves into the literature on colonialism in China, emphasizing Anne Reinhart’s understanding of China’s situation as one of “semi-colonialism.” To end, it briefly outlines the earliest and latest periods of Wang’s life, in order to bookend my own discussion, which focuses on the period after he became invested in new learning and before he abandoned it for old learning. Part I centers on Wang’s philosophical essays, all of which were published in the journal Education World between 1903 and 1908. Chapter 1 focuses on Wang’s earliest writings on “philosophy” (zhéxué 哲學), wherein he aims to properly introduce this imported discipline to his peers and make them aware of its value. Chapter 2 concentrates on the earliest of Wang’s major philosophical influences: Kant and Schopenhauer. Although Wang was attracted to Kant’s demarcation of the limits of reason, he could not accept his reimagining of the demands of reason as regulative principles. And while he sympathized with Schopenhauer’s criticisms of Kantian philosophy, he eventually came to regard metaphysical pessimism and the will to life as flawed theories. Chapter 3 deals with the two thinkers who shaped Wang’s views the most in his later philosophical essays: Nietzsche and Schiller. After rejecting Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, Wang came under the influence of Nietzsche and adopted a psychophysiological worldview. However, even though he accepted Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power, he could not accept Nietzsche’s view of overcoming. For Wang, consolation is all we can hope for in this life, and the best means to attain it is through the creation and appreciation of art, which prompts him to look to Schiller and his doctrine of aesthetic education. Part II revolves around Wang’s mature aesthetic writings, specifically his Remarks on Lyrics in the Human World (1908–1909), a work in the “remarks on lyrics” (cíhuà 詞話) genre of literary criticism, which he published just before the Qing dynasty fell in 1911. Under the influence of decoloniality, Chapter 4 examines this work through the lens of praxis, highlighting the specifics of the traditional “remarks on lyrics” genre. After discussing the unique praxical features of this work, Chapter 5 analyzes it through the lens of theory, discussing its most significant ideas, such as its reimagining of the beautiful and the sublime, and the concept of “poetic worlds” (jìngjiè 境界). The Conclusion examines everything discussed in Chapters 1 through 5 from the perspective of coloniality. It begins by determining how, and to what extent, colonial modernity impacted Wang’s thinking, in terms of both theory and praxis. It then provides some ways in which Wang’s theories and practices can contribute to the development of intellectual “worlds otherwise.” Beyond this, it aims to demonstrate how investigating the scholarly endeavors of non-Western thinkers caught in confluence of tradition and modernity can give us glimpses of alternatives to our modern intellectual and ontological modalities, thereby furthering the movement of decoloniality.

Beginning with an anecdote from the Zhuangzi about a wheelwright who is unable to pass on his knack for wheel-making to his son, this article goes on to argue that the process of teaching and learning in this context should not be understood as one of transmitting knowledge but instead as one of cultivating habits. According to Zhuangzi, learning does not mean attaining truths given to one by another, but means familiarizing oneself with concepts by applying them in different situations. To clarify these arguments, I compare Zhuangzi’s position to that of Wittgenstein, who I attempt to show has similar views on teaching and learning. Most significantly, I argue that both Zhuangzi and Wittgenstein see language as logically and phenomenally groundless, and that this view influences their endorsement of exemplification and practice over explanation and definition with regard to meaning and understanding. Given their perspectives on language and practice, any pedagogical process developed from the philosophies of these two thinkers would not be concerned with imparting knowledge or principles but with cultivating skills through emulation and habituation. Consequentially, before teachers can actually teach efficiently, they must themselves possess habits appropriate to what they are teaching.

Beginning with an anecdote from the Zhuangzi about a wheelwright who is unable to pass on his knack for wheel-making to his son, this article goes on to argue that the process of teaching and learning in this context should not be understood as one of transmitting knowledge but instead as one of cultivating habits. According to Zhuangzi, learning does not mean attaining truths given to one by another, but means familiarizing oneself with concepts by applying them in different situations. To clarify these arguments, I compare Zhuangzi’s position to that of Wittgenstein, who I attempt to show has similar views on teaching and learning. Most significantly, I argue that both Zhuangzi and Wittgenstein see language as logically and phenomenally groundless, and that this view influences their endorsement of exemplification and practice over explanation and definition with regard to meaning and understanding. Given their perspectives on language and practice, any pedagogical process developed from the philosophies of these two thinkers would not be concerned with imparting knowledge or principles but with cultivating skills through emulation and habituation. Consequentially, before teachers can actually teach efficiently, they must themselves possess habits appropriate to what they are teaching.