Michael Fuerstein

I argue that Rahel Jaeggi’s processual account of progress cannot support substantive judgments of progress without privileging liberal values and outcomes over their alternatives. To privilege those values is perhaps not to become a hegemon in the strongest sense, but it does nudge us uncomfortably in that direction. In this respect, I suggest, a comparison with a near cousin of Jaeggi’s approach – that of John Dewey – is informative. Dewey’s view also centers on a pluralistic model of ‘problems’ that yield diverse, context-sensitive improvements, and Jaeggi herself openly aligns herself with Dewey. But Dewey’s view depends on an open embrace of core liberal principles that seem to entail invidious cross-cultural judgments. Jaeggi thinks that she can avoid this prospect, but the comparison with Dewey presents a number of reasons to doubt this. On a speculative note, I conclude that the notion of progress itself, as a normative ideal, may be inextricably linked to certain core liberal commitments. In that respect the idea of progress may involve liberal hegemony by nature, in at least a weak sense of the idea.

Jay Barney explores two theories of profit—positioning theory and resource-based theory—and their implications for the relationship between profit and societal welfare. Positioning theory suggests that profits stem from a firm’s ability to exploit barriers to competition, often at the expense of social welfare. Resource-based theory, on the other hand, ties profits to a firm’s unique capabilities to deliver valued goods, which can align with enhancing societal welfare when consumers prioritize socially beneficial qualities. However, Barney’s analysis appears to assume that profit-driven organizations cannot or should not aim at social welfare independently of profit motives. This chapter challenges this assumption by presenting four counterexamples: the CSR officer leveraging societal contributions for regulatory support, the price-gouging heroin dealer whose monopoly inadvertently reduces societal harm, the humanitarian monopolist who uses profits for altruistic purposes, and the fair-trade branding guru whose competitive advantage is rooted in ethical practices. These examples highlight consumer irrationality and externalities, both conditions that complicate the alignment of profit and societal welfare. Ultimately, the critique argues that profit-seeking organizations can sometimes pursue societal welfare non-instrumentally, particularly in cases of monopolistic power or resource-based advantages. The analysis concludes that business strategy must reconsider its assumptions about the incompatibility of profit and social good, as real-world conditions often permit—and sometimes necessitate—pro-social behavior independent of profit motives.

This chapter critically examines the concept of “need” within the context of consumer behavior and marketing practices. It explores how consumer desires, often framed as needs, are influenced by societal norms, marketing strategies, and biological impulses. While marketers aim to fulfill customer needs, the chapter questions whether these needs truly contribute to customer well-being. It argues that the value proposition of marketing should shift from satisfying thin needs to promoting thick needs aligned with well-being. Moreover, it suggests that marketers can play a vital role in enhancing consumer understanding and promoting behaviors conducive to overall welfare, despite challenges posed by prevailing business objectives.

Over the past 70 years, the United States has undergone major moral shifts surrounding gender, sexual orientation, and race. These changes have been highly problematic and incomplete. But they appear as stunning improvements–progress–in the human condition nonetheless. Democracy plausibly has something to do with this. On its face, democratic governance embodies the promise of protest, voice, foment, and therefore social change. And yet, as a new crop of skeptics has pointed out, democratic citizens tend to be ignorant, irrational, and easily manipulated. Such anxieties have only grown with the recent surge of populism. From the standpoint of democratic theory, these observations present a critical challenge. What exactly is the role of democracy in social progress? What can this teach us about democracy’s definitive principles and ideals? And how can we reconcile democracy’s characteristic aspirations with the disappointing facts of real-world politics? This book offers a sustained answer to these questions, presenting a fresh philosophical account of social progress that focuses on democracy, and delivering an innovative rebuttal to skeptics inspired by the recent populist wave. Following in the tradition of John Dewey, the book argues that democracy enables progress through “experiments in living”: trying out new moral ideas and learning from the experience of acting on them. Drawing on research in social psychology and several detailed historical case studies–same-sex marriage, women’s integration into the workforce, and school desegregation–it illuminates the critical role of novel experience in building community: linkages of emotion and identity across a democratic public. And it shows how these linkages enable diverse citizens to flourish together. Technocratic skeptics suggest that the problems with democracy derive from citizens’ ignorance and incompetence. But, as the book argues, the remedy for democracy’s contemporary malaise must target failures of community more than failures of knowledge or skill. And that requires a new round of experimental innovations in social life.

In this essay I situate John Dewey’s pragmatist approach to democratic epistemology in relation to contemporary “epistemic democracy.” Like epistemic democrats, Dewey characterizes democracy as a form of social inquiry. But whereas epistemic democrats suggest that democracy aims to “track the truth,” Dewey rejects the notion of “tracking” or “corresponding” to truth in political and other domains. For Dewey, the measure of successful decision-making is not some fixed independent standard of truth or correctness but, instead, our own reflective satisfaction with the practical results. I argue that this approach better reconciles epistemic democracy with traditional models of popular authority (“the will of the people”) and bolsters the defenses of the epistemic democrat against elitist alternatives.

This essay develops a model of democratic representation from the standpoint of epistemic theories of democracy. Such theories justify democracy in terms of its tendency to yield decisions that “track the truth” by integrating asymmetrically dispersed knowledge. From an epistemic point of view, I suggest, democratic representatives are best modeled as epistemic intermediaries who facilitate the vertical integration of knowledge between policy experts and non-experts, and the horizontal integration of knowledge among diverse non-experts. The primary analytical payoff of this model is that it provides a clear rationale for variation in the norms and institutionalization of representative behavior. Sometimes a delegate-like approach is the right one, and sometimes a trustee-like approach is better. The key determinant is the effect of these models on the epistemic quality of outcomes under different circumstances. Towards the end of the essay, I apply the model to the present revival of populism and consider its implications in that context.

Some interesting exceptions notwithstanding, the traditional logic of economic efficiency has long favored hierarchical forms of organization and disfavored democracy in business. What does the balance of arguments look like, however, when values besides efficient revenue production are brought into the picture? The question is not hypothetical: In recent years, an ever increasing number of corporations have developed and adopted socially responsible behaviors, thereby hybridizing aspects of corporate businesses and social organizations. We argue that the joint pursuit of financial and social objectives warrants significant rethinking of organizational democracy’s merits compared both to hierarchy and to non-democratic alternatives to hierarchy. In making this argument, we draw on an extensive literature review to document the relative lack of substantive discussion of organizational democracy since 1960. And we draw lessons from political theory, suggesting that the success of political democracy in integrating diverse values offers some grounds for asserting parallel virtues in the business case.

I argue that capitalism presents a threat to “democratic contestation”: the egalitarian, socially distributed capacity to affect how, why, and whether power is used. Markets are not susceptible to mechanisms of accountability, nor are they bearers of intentions in the way that political power-holders are. This makes them resistant to the kind of rational, intentional oversight that constitutes one of democracy’s social virtues. I identify four social costs associated with this problem: the vulnerability of citizens to arbitrary interference, the insensitivity of markets to relevant interests, failures of trust in the market system, and the inhibition of social deliberation about matters of public concern. I make general two suggestions about how we might ameliorate these problems: First, as a way of introducing some measure of intentionality to large-scale patterns of business activity, the reconceptualization of such activity as participation in larger group actions; second, the development of deliberative bodies that bring together business actors, policy experts, and diverse citizens in an effort to better characterize and transmit the public values that business should serve.

In this paper I offer a distinctive epistemic rationale for the liberal practice of constant and ostentatious reason-giving in the political context. Epistemic trust is essential to democratic governance because as citizens we can only make informed decisions by relying on the claims of moral, scientific, and practical authorities around us. Yet rational epistemic trust is also uniquely fragile in the political context in light of both the radical inclusiveness of the relevant epistemic community (i.e., everyone who participates in the political process) and the conflicting interests bound up in policy debate. I argue that liberal justification is a necessary condition for warranted epistemic trust in this context, and therefore a necessary condition for healthy public inquiry about politically significant questions.

I offer an interpretation and defense of John Dewey’s notion of “democratic experiments,” which involve testing moral beliefs through the experience of acting on them on a social scale. Such testing is crucial, I argue, because our social norms and institutions fundamentally shape the relationships through which we develop emotional responses that represent the morally significant concerns of others. Improving those responses therefore depends on deliberate alterations of our social environment. I consider deliberative and activist alternatives and argue that an experimentalist approach better models some prominent cases of social progress, such as the extension of marital rights to same-sex couples.

In this paper, I try to show that democratic consensus – one of the more prominent ideals in recent political thought – is an essential byproduct of epistemically warranted beliefs about political action and organization, at least in those cases where the issues under dispute are epistemic in nature. An essential byproduct (to borrow Jon Elster’s term) is a goal that can only be intentionally achieved by aiming at some other objective. In my usage, a political issue is epistemic when there is some right (or at least best) answer concerning how it ought to be resolved that is independent of people’s beliefs or desires about how it ought to be resolved. An important secondary claim, then, is that it is difficult to explain the presumptive value of political deliberation unless we understand a very large share of political issues as epistemic in nature. This view implies a considerably more contentious model of political deliberation but is not incompatible with familiar forms of conciliatory behavior in our public disputes.

How can democratic governments be relied upon to achieve adequate political knowledge when they turn over their authority to those of no epistemic distinction whatsoever? This deep and longstanding concern is one that any proponent of epistemic conceptions of democracy must take seriously. While Condorcetian responses have recently attracted substantial interest, they are largely undermined by a fundamental neglect of agenda-setting. I argue that the apparent intractability of the problem of epistemic adequacy in democracy stems in large part from a failure to appreciate the social character of political knowledge. A social point of view brings into focus a number of vital factors that bear on our understanding of democratic epistemology and our assessment of its prospects: the essential role of inclusive deliberation, the public's agenda-setting function, institutional provisions for policy feedback, the independence of expert communities, and the knowledge-pooling powers of markets