Michael Gane

This volume covers the period between the 1890s and 1930s, a period that witnessed revolutions in the arts and society which set the agenda for the rest of the century. In philosophy, the period saw the birth of analytic philosophy, the development of new programmes and new modes of inquiry, the emergence of phenomenology as a new rigorous science, the birth of Freudian psychoanalysis, and the maturing of the discipline of sociology. This period saw the most influential work of a remarkable series of thinkers who reviewed, evaluated and transformed 19th-century thought. A generation of thinkers - among them, Henri Bergson, Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Karl Jaspers, Max Scheler, and Ludwig Wittgenstein - completed the disenchantment of the world and sought a new re-enchantment.

Le rôle crucial donné par Comte à un néo-fétichisme renaissant constitue un des aspects importants, voire surprenants, de l’élaboration utopiste de la politique positive. La combinaison du fétichisme et du positivisme se justifie par un certain nombre de raisons, pas seulement épistémologiques. L’article examine l’évolution du concept de fétichisme dans l’œuvre de Comte et la façon dont il pensait que ses différentes formes pouvaient être réconciliées. Le positivisme intégral aurait accès au monde à un double niveau, abstrait et concret, et selon deux modalités, objective et subjective. Un fétichisme apprivoisé et contrôlé serait un frein conservateur pour les changements sociaux à venir.One of the important if surprising aspects of Comte’s utopian elaboration of the ‘positive polity’ was the crucial role given to a renaissant neo-fetishism. The combination of fetishism and positivism was justified on a number of grounds, not only epistemologically. This article examines the evolution of the concept of fetishism in Comte’s work and in what way Comte thought there could be a reconciliation between them. The completed positive philosophy would have access to the world on two levels, abstract and concrete, and in two modalities, objective and subjective. A tamed and controlled fetishism would be a conservative brake on further social change

Auguste Comte is widely acknowledged as the founder of the science of sociology and the 'Religion of Humanity'. In this fascinating study, the first major reassessment of Comte’s sociology for many years, Mike Gane draws on recent scholarship and presents a new reading of this remarkable figure. Comte’s contributions to the history and philosophy of science have decisively influenced positive methodologies. He coined the term ‘sociology’ and gave it its first content, and he is renowned for having introduced the sociology of gender and emotion into sociology. What is less well known however, is that Comte contributed to ethics, and indeed coined the word ‘altruism’. In this important work Gane examines Comte's sociological vision and shows that, because he thought sociology could and should be reflexive, encyclopaedic and utopian, he considered topics such as fetishism, polytheism, fate, love, and the relations between sociology, science, theology and culture. This fascinating account of the birth of sociology is an unprecedented introductory text on Comte. Gane’s work is an essential read for all sociologists and students of the discipline.

No national tradition of social theory has been more seductive to Anglo-American readers than the French.There has been a long-standing fascination with French ideas and debates. This extraordinarily accomplished book, written by one of Britain's leading commentators on social theory, provides a peerless account of the French tradition.The book: provides a systematic account of French social theory from the aftermath of the French Revolution (St Simon, Bazard and Comte) to the contemporary scene dominated by Kristeva, Deleuze, Bourdieu and Baudrillard; divides French social theory into three logically coherent cycles: 1800-80 (positivist); 1880-1940 (anthropological); 1940-2000 (Marxist); provides a detailed guide to the three phases of postwar French social theory - existential, structural and post-structural; and situates the discussions of individuals and schools in the relevant social and political contexts. The book is a masterpiece of erudition and scholarship but is written throughout in an engaging and informative style. It will be required reading for anyone interested in social theory and sociology.

Jean Baudrillard's apparently diverse oeuvre reveals a persistent attempt to think about what he calls the “object” (“that's what I was obsessed with from the start” – 1993a, p. 24). His first book was entitled Le Système des objets (1968), and in it he outlined a theory of the “object system”. He defined this as the conjunction of the system of commodities and the system of signs: what others have analyzed as the ontological process of reification and alienation became according to Baudrillard a general semiological process which marked the last phase of alienated society. His next book La Société de consommation (1970) provided a general account of the affluent society in which consumption, not production, is its dominant mechanism. But by La Gauche divine (1985) he thought that even a consumerism characterized by alienation and spectacular consumption had given way to a new glacial, non spectacular form dominated by information technology and fractal culture (1985, p. 144) in which the significance of the “object” had been radically transformed. Thus Baudrillard's writings seem to chart the evolution of modernity into postmo dernity, indeed he has been called “the author of postmodern culture and society” (Kroker and Cook 1988). Although he draws on sociology, his most important philosophical influence is Nietzsche. In 1987 he published a short intellectual autobiography, L'Autre par lui‐même, perhaps the best short introduction to his work to that date. He claims no longer to adopt the tragic vision entailed in the critique of modernity but rather a melancholy – “let us be stoics” – attitude (1988b, p. 101).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.4 (2002) 313-316 [Access article in PDF] Normativity and Pathology Mike Gane Keywords: positivism, sociology, pathology, normativity. THE STRENGTH OF VICTORIA MARGREE'S contribution to the examination of the thematic of pathology and its Nietzschean/Canguilhemian variation is that it reveals the challenging complexity of this theme. My comments on this contribution are developed from an interest in the ways that the concern with pathology was part of the initial program of the social sciences, particularly sociology, as it was inaugurated by Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim in its formative period. Margree touches on the importance of social analysis at the end of her paper; my comments work to some extent in the opposite direction—from the social to the psychological. My concerns lead me to contest a number of her epistemological positions, particularly those concerning the notion of positivism and "objective" analysis.For the first positivist philosophers, positivism was primarily a method; in fact it embraced the set of methods developed by the sciences to obtain the highest degree of objectivity. It was explicitly opposed to methodological reductionism, arguing that each science had specific methods applicable to its own domain. Canguilhem was certainly against methodological reductionism (Renard 1996, 127), but Margree's conception of positivism in psychology as biological reductionism is quite a different and is a later-derived variation of positivism. As such perhaps it should not be conflated with early notions of pathology. Sociological positivism as developed in Durkheim's methodology, although different in many aspects from that of Comte, retained the idea that scientific objectivity was to be the result of epistemological procedures, not what might be called ontological reduction to a physical level of the object. Durkheim tries to clarify the rules governing the analysis of abnormal forms and to define social dysfunction and teratology. The general field of abnormal forms or pathology in the analysis of social life fell into decline after Durkheim and was abandoned in favor of the study of social deviance. The very idea of a study of social pathology itself was critiqued by Szasz and Foucault in particular as a new form of power, which came into existence at the end of the eighteenth century as an essential component of the disciplinary society. Foucault was himself clearly indebted to Canguilhem, and he made this evident on several occasions, such as his lectures at the Collège de France Les Anormaux given in 1974 and 1975 (Foucault 1999). Thus, although the field of pathology and abnormal forms continues in psychology it has been abandoned in sociology, leaving only traces (such as the concept of anomie) in the works of some thinkers such as Baudrillard, whose usage may be ironic more than an attempt to revive the terrain. Could it be that Canguilhem and Foucault [End Page 313] have then more or less swept the field clear of such scientism, even though the reconceptualization in terms of normativity suggested by Canguilhem has not been widely taken on? Indeed there may be important differences between the conceptualization of Canguilhem and Foucault (after all, as Margree points out, Canguilhem can be read as attempting to invert the relation between normativity and normative, not to withdraw from the terrain altogether). Foucault seems to approach a position elaborated in sociology earlier by Max Weber in his rejection of the attempt to use the field of pathology as a way of evading moral choices. Canguilhem discusses responsibility in "Thérapeutique, expérimentation, responsibilité" (1983, 391), noting the importance of professionalization and legal controls on professional practice.The fundamental issues posed by the project of social science continue to be haunted by the same set of problems as established in analysis of pathological phenomena, whether it be conceived in terms of order and disorder (chaos), social breakdown, radical evil, "failed states," even deviation or noncompliance with "correct" forms of language or behavior (harassment, racism, child abuse) and so on, or pathology (perversion, dysfunction, disease, illness, abnormalities). The question in part is: is there anything lost by replacing pathology with more political, religious, moral, and legal terminologies? From Foucault's point...

The central question concerning the future of masculinity is whether the current matrix of distributions of roles and status, praxes and practices, will remain intact or whether a shift to a new configuration will occur. This essay briefly examines thinking on masculinity in two French attempts to theorize the future of relations between men and women: that of Auguste Comte, at the beginning of sociology, and Jean Baudrillard at the end of sociology. Both have, in their time, predicted radical gender futures. The essay considers these theories against changes in social structures and the effectivity social movements.

Watts Miller’s book on Durkheim joins a growing number of recent reassessments of Durkheim’s significance as a radical thinker rather than the naïvely positivistic sociologist he is sometimes taken for. The newer interpretations suggest that he can be read as a late-modern or even a postmodern thinker who imaginatively combined social science with a political and ethical vision. Watts Miller argues that Durkheim should be read as making a key contribution to liberal socialist ethics, to a “communitarian defence of individualism” within a significant continuation of the “enlightenment project.” The perspective followed is to separate Durkheim from Comte and the Comtean tradition, and to read Durkheim on ethics as engaged principally in a debate with Kant. Watts Miller argues that Durkheim is concerned with the “rational deliberation of ends,” and “not only to identify, clarify and rework ideals, but also to adjudicate on them”. Watts Miller proposes to look again at the fundamental problem of any engaged social science—how to argue both for individual autonomy of thought and action and for a science which adjudicates and legislates social values. In Watts Miller’s view, it is Durkheim who brings this off.

The work of Michel Foucault, one of the most influential of modern French social theorists and philosophers, has had a dramatic and far-reaching effect on many disciplines. The essays in this reissued collection, originally published in 1986, present Foucault's work as an important contribution to the theoretical analysis of history, language and power. They also represent a critical response to this contribution, encouraging readers not only to read Foucault for themselves, but to think about some new problems in a new way.

Auguste Comte’s work contrasts positivism with metaphysics and suggests that the former will replace the latter as both the dominant epistemological regime and the dominant political form. His well known law of the three states stipulates that cultures evolve from theology, through a metaphysical stage, towards positivity, and he dated the arrival of the latter to the middle of the nineteenth century. The two methods of positivism, objective and subjective are usually thought to be opposed to one another. Here it is suggested that the earlier objective positivism of Comte had already incorporated subjective elements. This article suggests that Comte’s terms still retain some interest if the concept of the metaphysical phase is seen to have developed into to a stable formation in its own right, and the positive polity remains an unrealised ideal formation. It examines some of the specificities of the Comtean notion of metaphysics and metaphysical domains, including the metaphysical self, metaphysical sciences such as political economy, and metaphysical government. It is suggested that Comte’s concept of the metaphysical state is a major contribution to social philosophy alongside his notion of positivism.

Foucault announced that his lectures of 1977—78 would be on `biopolitics'; in the end, they were on governmentality: from the pastoral of souls to the raison d'état. He announced his lectures of 1978—79 would also be on `biopolitics', but then presented lectures based on textual analysis, examining the way Smith and Ferguson invented a distinctive conception of civil society from that of Hobbes, Rousseau or Montesquieu, one that opened a site of civil society. These latter lectures continued by examining the birth of neo-liberalism in the very specific conjuncture of Germany at the end of the 1930s; it subsequently migrated, in a further mutation of `anarchocapitalism', to Chicago. Foucault adopted radically opposed methods in these two lecture courses.