Michael Haiden

I defend my analysis of Kenneth Waltz’s position against two points of criticism. First, my view that Waltz proposes a “hybrid account” of moral agency applies to fewer phenomena than a human-centered explanation. However, I show that this is by design. Waltz exclusively writes about international relations, which, as a special field of inquiry, requires distinct explanations. Second, even though technological artifacts shape human moral agency, they are not moral agents themselves. I agree with this point, but note that we should not underestimate how drastically the mere existence of nuclear weapons has shaped human moral responsibility.

We examine people’s attitudes toward AI-based algorithms as a means to allocate scarce resources. Through a vignette experiment, we confront respondents with five scenarios in which an AI-based algorithm allocates various goods and ask them if they find this morally desirable. We compare people’s moral attitudes toward AI with their attitudes toward a friend, a waiting list, a lottery, and the market. Our results show that people rank allocations through AI as morally clearly less desirable than most alternatives. This is especially true for goods that are nonessential to a person’s survival. One potential explanation for the identified algorithm aversion is that AI is considered more opaque than its alternatives, and that an allocation mechanism’s moral rejection increases if its working is less well understood. Together, our results suggest that using AI to allocate resources, especially nonessential ones, is likely to meet substantial social resistances. To understand the reasons, researchers should systematically study laypeople’s moral intuitions about algorithms, a field we call folk algorithmics.

Kenneth Waltz argued that more states should have nuclear weapons. This remains a controversial position in international relations theory, while in philosophy of technology, it is largely unknown. This is regrettable, because Waltz offers interesting arguments for why nuclear weapons have a positive influence on the world. In short, he implies that nuclear weapons contain morally desirable values. Because of this, Waltz should be a more prominent voice in philosophy of technology, especially in the debate on the values embedded in technological artifacts. Waltz offers a convincing account for why nuclear weapons are not value-neutral, and I argue that his works imply a strong version of this position: that nuclear weapons co-act together with humans. The paper will outline and defend this position. However, I note that Waltz’s analysis is narrowly focused on international relations. For him, nuclear weapons are good because they foster peace. Philosophy of technology should expand on this thesis. To integrate Waltz into the field, scholars should interrogate the benefits and drawbacks of nuclear weapons based on a variety of values – including, but not limited to, those that Waltz proposes. Value neutrality thesis; nuclear weapons: international relations; history of ideas; ethics of technology.

The development of autonomous weapons systems (AWSs), which would make decisions on the battlefield without direct input from humans, has the potential to dramatically change the nature of war. Due to the revolutionary potential of these technologies, it is essential to discuss their moral implications. While the academic literature often highlights their morally problematic nature, with some proposing outright banning them, this paper highlights an important benefit of AWSs: protecting the lives, as well as the mental and physical health of soldiers. If militaries can avoid sending humans into dangerous situations or relieve drone operators from tasks that lead to lifelong trauma, this obviously appears morally desirable – especially in a world where many soldiers are still drafted against their will. Nonetheless, there are many arguments against AWSs. However, we show that although AWSs are potentially dangerous, criticisms apply equally to human soldiers and weapons steered by them. The combination of both claims makes a strong case against a ban on AWSs where it is possible. Instead, researchers should focus on mitigating their drawbacks and refining their benefits.

Jürgen Habermas has defended Germany’s cautious support for Ukraine against the ongoing Russian invasion. Instead of trying to defeat Russia on the battlefield, he argued that Western nations should seek a compromise with the attacker. Critics worried that this would lead to more suffering than the war, encourage further Russian aggression, and ignore the concerns of the Ukrainian population. However, one question that has not been addressed is if Habermas’s pleas are part of a wider pacifist commitment—and if so, what kind of pacifist he is. Examining Habermas’s writings on the Ukraine War, his cosmopolitan views and his idea of a “constitutionalization of international law,” I argue that Habermas can be called a political pacifist—someone who seeks to abolish the institutions that provide the ultimate causes of war. While one can still criticize his vision, it deserves to be taken seriously as a pacifist account.

Bertrand Russell wrote widely on international relations, especially on preventing war and creating a sustainable peace. However, it is an open question whether his works should be taken seriously by professionals in the field. This paper says "yes" and argues that Russell made two important contributions to international relations theory. First, he uniquely combines different levels of inquiry, connecting insights into the structure of international politics with detailed analyses of human agents. Second, he does not just analyze international relations; he also advances normative goals—something international relations theory is often reluctant to do. The two contributions are connected: Russell's normative goals are nurtured by how he combines his insights into both individuals and the structure of international relations. As a result, his particular understanding of international politics creates a unique vision for how we can improve the field—and the real world.

Jürgen Habermas has defended Germany’s cautious support for Ukraine against the ongoing Russian invasion. Instead of trying to defeat Russia on the battlefield, he argued that Western nations should seek a compromise with the attacker. Critics worried that this would lead to more suffering than the war, encourage further Russian aggression, and ignore the concerns of the Ukrainian population. However, one question that has not been addressed is if Habermas’s pleas are part of a wider pacifist commitment—and if so, what kind of pacifist he is. Examining Habermas’s writings on the Ukraine War, his cosmopolitan views and his idea of a “constitutionalization of international law,” I argue that Habermas can be called a political pacifist—someone who seeks to abolish the institutions that provide the ultimate causes of war. While one can still criticize his vision, it deserves to be taken seriously as a pacifist account.

Abstract:When confronted with moral dilemmas, Charles S. Peirce would recommend that we trust our sentiments, not our reasoning. A scientific exploration of ethics may affect our daily conduct but should only do so gradually. Some modern approaches take the opposite stance and deny the significance of moral sentiments. Considering both Peirce and his opponents, I aim to contribute to the discussion of a radical moral theory: effective altruism. Stating that we should strive to do the most objective good we can, effective altruism regularly conflicts with our moral sentiments. In response, effective altruists claim that our sentiments are misguided and should be overcome. Which side is right? Using Peirce's work to answer this question reveals that effective altruism cannot clearly define how it aims to affect our daily conduct. In addition, it seeks to change our sentiments, but may alter them for the worse. Taking Peirce's insights seriously leads us to conclude that we should be cautious of how we adopt effective altruism in our lives—and that while we deliberate this, we should instead trust our sentiments.