Michael Hughes

One longstanding problem for glut theorists is the problem of ‘just true.’ On Beall's conservative version of glut theory advanced in Spandrels of Truth , he addresses the problem in two steps. The first is a rejection of the problem: he claims that the only general notion of ‘just true’ is just truth itself. On that view, the alleged problem of ‘just true’ is reduced to the problem of truth itself, which has a solution—glut theory. The second step is to acknowledge that there is a notion of ‘just true’ which is more limited but nonetheless meets all reasonable criteria demanded by those who advance the longstanding just-true objection. Marcus Rossberg disagrees. According to Rossberg, a just-true operator ought to iterate and be non-arbitrary in ways that Beall's proposed just-true operator is not. My aim in this paper is to construct a new conditional in terms of which a new just-true operator may be defined, a necessity operator, and to show that it meets all of the target desiderata of the debate. I then use that new operator to address the arbitrariness worries raised by Rossberg

Is logical consistency required for a set of beliefs or propositions to be categorically coherent? An affirmative answer is often assumed by mainstream epistemologists, and yet it is unclear why. Cases like the lottery and the preface call into question the assumption that beliefs must be consistent in order to be epistemically rational. And thus it is natural to wonder why all inconsistent sets of propositions are incoherent. On the other hand, Easwaran and Fitelson have shown that particular kinds of inconsistency entail the epistemically ‘irrationality’ of holding certain sets of beliefs. In cases of the latter kind of inconsistency, it seems more reasonable to insist that such sets of beliefs or propositions are categorically incoherent. What the precise relationship is between coherence and consistency depends on the nature of the coherence relation. We shall examine recent attempts to explicate the coherence relation in terms of probabilistic measures of confirmation or agreement to see what they can teach us about the relationship between coherence and consistency. We shall show that some probabilistic measures of coherence allow for inconsistent sets to be categorically coherent, while satisfying plausible epistemic rationality constraints. Other probabilistic measures of coherence impose very strong logical consistency requirements, and some measures are tolerant of most forms of inconsistency. As we try to understand what distinguishes coherence measures in this respect, we will also draw some important lessons about Bayesian confirmation measures and differences in the way that they treat contradictory propositions.

The standard contextualist solution to the skeptical paradox is intended to provide a way to retain epistemic closure while avoiding the excessive modesty of radical skepticism and the immodesty of Moorean dogmatism. However, contextualism’s opponents charge that its solution suffers from epistemic immodesty comparable to Moorean dogmatism. According to the standard contextualist solution, all contexts where an agent knows some ordinary proposition to be true are contexts where she also knows that the skeptical hypotheses are false. It has been hoped that contrastivist theories of knowledge can mirror the contextualist solution while avoiding this epistemic immodesty. I review the main problems for contrastive closure and argue that none of the arguments currently in the literature pose an insurmountable problem for the contrastivist solution. However, I argue that contrastivist theories of knowledge, like their contextualist rivals, are indeed committed to epistemic immodesty