M. A. Istvan Jr.

Some passages throughout Spinoza’s body of works suggest that an attribute in its absolute nature provides a sufficient condition for all of its modes, including the finite ones. Other passages suggest that an attribute in its absolute nature fails to provide a sufficient condition for its finite modes. My aim is to dispel this apparent tension. I argue that all finite modes are ultimately entailed by the absolute nature of their attribute. Furthermore, I explain how the Spinozistic positions that appear incompatible with this view are in fact compatible. As I see it, we should read those passages where Spinoza says that no finite mode ultimately follows from the absolute nature of its attribute as saying merely that no finite mode ultimately follows in one-by-one fashion, independent of an infinite series of other modes, from the absolute nature of its attribute.

This investigatory bibliographic project on Spinoza and the problem of universals draws four principal conclusions. (1) Spinoza is a realist concerning universals. Indeed, Spinoza endorses a radical form of realism known as universalism, the doctrine according to which every ontologically authentic entity is a universal. (2) Spinoza is a realist concerning universal species natures. He holds that a given species nature (such as human nature) is wholly instantiated in each species member. (3) Spinoza combines Aristotelian and Platonic realism. On the one hand, he holds that no universal is ontologically anterior to the one substance God. On the other hand, he holds that all universals with instantiations in the realm of modes are eternal forms ontologically anterior to those instantiations. (4) Spinoza’s pejorative remarks against universals are compatible with his realism. Such remarks are aimed merely at universals apprehendable by sense perception rather than pure intellect.

Integrating cosmological and ontological lines of reasoning, I argue that there is a self-necessary being that (a) serves as the sufficient condition for everything, that (b) has the most perfect collection of whatever attributes of perfection there might be, and that (c) is an independent, eternal, unique, simple, indivisible, immutable, all-actual, all-free, all-present, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, personal creator of every expression of itself that everything is. My cosmo-ontological case for such a being, an everything-maker with the core features ascribed to the God of classical theism, addresses the standard worries plaguing these lines of reasoning: (1) the richness required of such a being dissolves it into many beings; (2) the metaphysical possibility of such a being is assumed on insufficient grounds; (3) the features we ascribe to such a being are mere human-all-too-human projections.

Some passages throughout Spinoza’s body of works suggest that an attribute in its absolute nature provides a sufficient condition for all of its modes, including the finite ones. Other passages suggest that an attribute in its absolute nature fails to provide a sufficient condition for its finite modes. My aim is to dispel this apparent tension. I argue that all finite modes are ultimately entailed by the absolute nature of their attribute. Furthermore, I explain how the Spinozistic positions that appear incompatible with this view are in fact compatible. As I see it, we should read those passages where Spinoza says that no finite mode ultimately follows from the absolute nature of its attribute as saying merely that no finite mode ultimately follows in one-by-one fashion, independent of an infinite series of other modes, from the absolute nature of its attribute.

I have two main goals in this paper. First, I want to ward off the quite feasible interpretation that Tarzan, in his long speech towards the end of Edgar Rice Burroughs’ Tarzan of the Apes, is endorsing the view that black males are particularly ferocious. Second, I want to argue that Tarzan’s between-the-lines claim that he will continue to be on guard around black men is reasonable for his situation and not a function of racism. My additional hope is to show that if Tarzan of the Apes is a racist text, as it is widely believed to be, it undermines its own racism particularly through Tarzan’s speech, where he arguably endorses the view each person must be judged individually, case by case.

Commentators have suggested that Nella Larsen's Passing rejects the view that there is some sort of black essence. This article challenges this reading. Since Irene is the most vocal advocate of an essence in respect to which all blacks are homogenous, much of the evidence for thinking that Passing is skeptical about such an essence amounts to evidence for not trusting Irene's judgment in general, and for not trusting her judgment on this matter in particular. My arguments, then, will often involve explaining why Passing is not leading the reader to mistrust Irene's judgment on this matter. Now, what exactly is meant by a black essence is, explicitly in this book, mysterious. Nevertheless, this article intends to shed some light on how Passing understands the nature of this something, this je ne sais quoi, peculiar to blacks. My tentative interpretation is that this something is an intangible and indefinite manner of being that is neither a conscious choice nor an inborn fact of biology, but rather a given of culture. This article takes this, in effect, blackness manner to be, so Passing seems to indicate, a function of one's belief that one is black in a milieu of pervasive anti-black prejudice. Passing thus has something to offer those today who struggle to adjudicate between a pull towards essentialism and a pull towards constructionism. What Passing emphasizes in this discussion is the possibility that, in addition to biological and societal influences, one's mind state is a crucial ingredient to one's racial identity.

Considered in its absolute nature, Spinoza’s God is nothing more than the total collection of self-sufficient attributes. God is nothing more than the total collection of self-sufficient attributes in the sense that no attribute is a function of anything ontologically prior to it, and whatever may be in excess to the attributes is entirely a function of the attributes themselves. My bundle interpretation of the substance-attribute relationship in Spinoza’s thought harmonizes, so I argue in this paper, with various Spinozistic positions said to be in tension with it: God’s simplicity and nonderivativeness, the «sameness» of God’s attributes, the unity of parallel modes of different attributes, our being able to know God by knowing just one of his attributes, and so on. Through the help of mapping out how God’s attributes relate to one another in terms of Suárez’s famous taxonomy of distinctions, I explain, moreover, how my interpretation provides solutions to certain famous criticisms of Spinoza’s philosophy, perhaps most importantly Leibniz’s objection to Spinoza’s ontological argument and Tschirnhaus’s puzzlement over Spinoza’s claim that Thought is the same as any other attribute even though it is more replete than any other attribute.

Against its prominent compatiblist and libertarian opponents, I defend Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility. Against John Martin Fischer, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that an agent can be responsible for an action only if he is responsible for every factor contributing to that action. Against Alfred Mele and Randolph Clarke, I argue that it is absurd to believe that an agent can be responsible for an action when no factor contributing to that action is up to that agent. Against Derk Pereboom and Clarke, I argue that the versions of agent-causal libertarianism they claim can immunize the agent to the Basic Argument actually fail to do so. Against Robert Kane, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that simply the presence of indeterministic factors in the process of bringing an action about is itself what rules out the agent’s chance for being responsible for that action.

Largely due to the popular allegation that contemporary science has uncovered indeterminism in the deepest known levels of physical reality, the debate as to whether humans have moral freedom, the sort of freedom on which moral responsibility depends, has put aside to some extent the traditional worry over whether determinism is true. As I argue in this paper, however, there are powerful proofs for both chronological determinism and necessitarianism, forms of determinism that pose the most penetrative threat to human moral freedom. My ultimate hope is to show that, despite the robust case against human moral freedom that can be made without even relying on them, chronological determinism and necessitarianism should be regarded with renewed urgency.

In this paper I attempt to show, against certain versions of trope theory, that properties with analyzable particularity cannot be merely exactly similar: such properties are either particularized properties (tropes) that are dissimilar to every any other trope, or else universalized properties (universals). I argue that each of the most viable standard and nonstandard particularizers that can be employed to secure the numerical difference between exactly similar properties can only succeed in grounding the particularity of properties, that is, in having properties be tropes, at the expense of ruling out the possibility of their exact similarity. Here are the four nonstandard particularizers that I examine: the genealogy of a property, the history of a property, the causal effects of a property, and the duration of a property. And here are the two standard particularizers that I examine: the bearer of a property, by which I mean either a bare particular or a spatiotemporal location, and the property itself, by which I mean that the property is self-particularized. In my concluding remarks, I explain that the only remaining hope for preserving the possibility of exactly similar tropes is regarding properties as primitively particular, and that this must mean not that properties are selfparticularized but that they are particularized due to nothing. I close by arguing that this may not help trope theory after all

The goal of this paper is to figure out whether Aristotle's response to the argument for fatalism in De Interpretatione 9 is a success. By "response" it is meant not simply the reasons Aristotle offers to highlight why fatalism does not accord with how we conduct our lives, but also the solution he devises to block the argument for fatalism. This paper finds that a) Aristotle's argument for fatalism is essentially bivalence plus that the truth of a proposition implies necessity, b) that Aristotle's solution is to restrict bivalence, c) that this solution is coherent, and d) that while this solution does not rule out the possibility of fatalism, it does succeed in blocking the argument for fatalism offered within chapter 9. El objetivo de este trabajo es esclarecer si la respuesta de Aristóteles al argumento a favor del fatalismo en De Interpretatione 9 resulta exitosa. Por "respuesta" se entienden no solo las razones que da Aristóteles para destacar porqué el fatalismo no concuerda con la manera en que llevamos nuestras vidas, sino también la solución que ofrece para bloquear el argumento a favor del fatalismo. El artículo plantea a) que el argumento de Aristóteles respecto del fatalismo consiste esencialmente en la bivalencia más el hecho de que la verdad de una proposición implica necesidad; b) que la solución de Aristóteles es restringir la bivalencia; c) que esta solución es coherente, y d) que si bien esta solución no elimina la posibilidad del fatalismo, sí logra bloquear el argumento a favor del fatalismo ofrecido en el capítulo 9. O objetivo deste trabalho é esclarecer se a resposta de Aristóteles ao argumento a favor do fatalismo em De Interpretatione 9 é bem-sucedida. Por "resposta" se entendem não somente as razões que Aristóteles dá para destacar por que o fatalismo não está de acordo com a maneira em que levamos nossas vidas, mas também a solução que oferece para bloquear o argumento a favor do fatalismo. Este artigo propõe que: a) o argumento de Aristóteles a respeito do fatalismo consiste essencialmente na bivalência mais o fato de que a verdade de uma proposição implica necessidade; b) a solução de Aristóteles é restringir a bivalência; c) essa solução é coerente, e d) embora essa solução não elimine a possiblidade do fatalismo, consegue bloquear o argumento a favor dele oferecido no capítulo 9

In this paper I attempt to show, against certain versions of trope theory, that properties with analyzable particularity cannot be merely exactly similar: such properties are either particularized properties (tropes) that are dissimilar to every any other trope, or else universalized properties (universals). I argue that each of the most viable standard and nonstandard particularizers that can be employed to secure the numerical difference between exactly similar properties can only succeed in grounding the particularity of properties, that is, in having properties be tropes, at the expense of ruling out the possibility of their exact similarity. Here are the four nonstandard particularizers that I examine: the genealogy of a property, the history of a property, the causal effects of a property, and the duration of a property. And here are the two standard particularizers that I examine: the bearer of a property, by which I mean either a bare particular or a spatiotemporal location, and the property itself, by which I mean that the property is self-particularized. In my concluding remarks, I explain that the only remaining hope for preserving the possibility of exactly similar tropes is regarding properties as primitively particular, and that this must mean not that properties are self-particularized but that they are particularized due to nothing. I close by arguing that this may not help trope theory after all.

EXCERPT.--With exception to early essays by George von Glahn and Mark Sanders, serious critical scholarship on the writings of Ted Kooser began after the 1980 release of the now-classic Sure Signs, Kooser’s fifth major collection of poems. Looking back over the thirty-plus years since then, only about a dozen or so significant studies—none of which book-length—currently boulder out against the relative flatscape of secondary materials constituted mostly by quick and dirty reviews. Aside from the essays by Wes Mantooth, Allan Benn, and Mary K. Stillwell in this special issue of Midwestern Miscellany, the following works particularly stand out and, in my view, must be consulted by the Kooser scholar: David Baker’s “Ted’s Box”; William Barillas’s Chapter 7 of The Midwestern Pastoral; Victor Contoski’s “Words and Raincoats”; Dana Gioia’s “The Anonymity of the Regional Poet”; Jeff Gundy’s “Among the Erratics”; Jonathan Holden’s “The Chekov of American Poetry”; Denise Low’s “Sight in Motion”; David Mason’s “Introducing Ted Kooser”; and both Mary K. Stillwell’s “The ‘In Between’” and her “When a Walk is a Poem.”

This paper engages the controversy as to whether there is a link between Berkeley’s refutation of abstraction and his refutation of materialism. I argue that there is a strong link. In the opening paragraph I show that materialism being true requires and is required by the possibility of abstraction, and that the obviousness of this fact suggests that the real controversy is whether there is a link between Berkeley’s refutation of materialism and his refutation of the possibility of framing abstract incomplete ideas and abstract general ideas. Although Berkeley can still defeat materialism without relying on his arguments that directly refute the possibility of framing abstract incomplete ideas and abstract general ideas, I contend that there is still a strong link between his refutation of materialism and his refutation of the possibility of framing these ideas. First, I show that the truth of the canonic version of materialism, according to which primary qualities are mindindependent and inhere in material substances, requires the possibility of the mind framing both of these ideas. Second, I show that there is a sense in which the truth of materialism is required by the possibility of either of these ideas.

My aim is to figure out whether Aristotle’s response to the argument for fatalism in De Interpretatione 9 is successful. By “response” here I mean not simply the reasons he offers to highlight why fatalism does not accord with how we conduct our lives, but also the solution he devises to block the argument he provides for it. Achieving my aim hence demands that I figure out what exactly is the argument for fatalism he voices, what exactly is his solution, whether his solution is coherent, and whether it does indeed succeed. I find that the argument is essentially bivalence plus that the truth of a proposition stating that an event will happen in the future entails that this event will necessarily happen, that Aristotle’s solution is to restrict bivalence when it comes to propositions about contingent future events, that this solution is coherent, and that while it does not rule out the possibility of fatalism, it does succeed in blocking the argument for fatalism offered within chapter 9.

My general aim is to clarify the foundational difference between Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins concerning what biological entities are the units of selection in the process of evolution by natural selection. First, I recapitulate Gould’s central objection to Dawkins’s view that genes are the exclusive units of selection. According to Gould, it is absurd for Dawkins to think that genes are the exclusive units of selection when, after all, genes are not the exclusive interactors: those agents directly engaged with, directly impacted by, environmental pressures. Second, I argue that Gould’s objection still goes through even when we take into consideration Sterelny and Kitcher’s defense of gene selectionism in their admirable paper “The Return of the Gene.” Third, I propose a strategy for defending Dawkins that I believe obviates Gould’s objection. Drawing upon Elisabeth Lloyd’s careful taxonomy of the various understandings of the unit of selection at play in the philosophy of biology literature, my proposal involves realizing that Dawkins endorses a different understanding of the unit of selection than Gould holds him to, an understanding that does not require genes to be the exclusive interactors.