Michael Losonsky

In his Two Treatises of Government John Locke declared that all men are naturally free, but that they can consent with others to form a civil society under government. In fact, what “actually constitutes any Political Society, is nothing but the consent of any number of Freemen.” There are competing views about what socially defined groups Locke had in mind for the domains that are naturally free and those who consent to form a civil society, whether they are, for example, adult males with property or all adults. But I argue for a different approach. Depending on the context, Locke either referred to human beings who by nature have the disposition to be free when they reach maturity, or to those who in fact are actually free. Locke reserved the term “Freemen” to those that are in fact free, and not just dispositionally free. Locke believed that all human beings are born with dispositional freedom, which for Locke was an important normative feature that all human beings have at birth. Nevertheless, there are various conditions in which human beings, while born with the disposition to be free, are not in fact free, specifically, criminals, slaves, servants, children, most wives, and the mentally disabled.

Leibniz’s work on language left a lasting impression on 18th-century philosophical thinking about language. His two major works that discussed natural language were both published in the 18th century and in these works Leibniz focused on the sound symbolism, phonology, and etymology of language, topics that played a major role for 18th-century philosophers of language. These topics belonged to what Leibniz considered the material aspects of language and were tied to the expressive powers of language. Herder acknowledged Leibniz’s influence and developed these ideas in his account of language as a forceful expression of human feeling. However, Herder ignored the formal components of language. The philosopher who developed the synthesis of the material and the formal features of language was Wilhelm von Humboldt, who drew from 18th-century thinkers that saw natural language as a unity of force and form, for example Sulzer and Harris. Humboldt was especially influenced by his tutor, Johann Jakob Engel, whose lectures drew on Leibniz as well as works in the Leibniz-Wolff tradition.

This paper explores the relationships between perception, representation and appetition in Leibniz's later metaphysics, and defends four theses. First, for Leibniz perceptions are not the carriers of content, but they are identical to representational content. Second, Leibniz's appetitions are the carriers of content and he should be taken at his word when he declares, "Thought consists in conatus". Third, while it is true that for Leibniz representational content is determined by a species of mapping or function from representation to what is represented, this is not the only component that determines representational content for Leibniz. The correspondence in terms of which Leibniz characterizes representation includes an ontological component, namely a lineage or trace from representation to represented object via God's creation, and appetitions constitute this trace. Finally, Leibniz's account of how ideas represent and how perceptions represent are distinct, and derivation plays a key role in how ideas represent.

In this comprehensive study of Leibniz’s mature metaphysics, Donald Rutherford attempts to recover Leibniz’s theodicy as an essential part of his philosophy. Although Rutherford does not succeed in showing that the theodicy is essential to Leibniz’s metaphysics, he effectively uses the theodicy as an entry into Leibniz’s metaphysics and he highlights the many links between them. Of course, there are other significant ways of entering Leibniz’s philosophy—he wanted to “do justice to theology as to physics”—but Rutherford reminds us that Leibniz ties all areas, even his dynamics, to the view that this is the best of all possible worlds.

At a crucial point in the final section 12 of Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding he refers to "the whimsical condition of mankind".1 This occurs in his concluding remarks about the untenability of what he calls "Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism" that set the stage for "mitigated scepticism, or ACADEMICAL philosophy", which then culminates in the famous agitated final paragraph of the first Enquiry that advocates "havoc" and committing certain kinds of books "to the flames".I wish to examine the content, context, and significance of Hume's characterization of the human condition as whimsical because I believe that it sheds light on the...

According to an idealist theory of reference for proper names the reference of proper names is fixed by what name users express in their beliefs, intentions, thoughts, and so forth. My task is to show that an idealist can defend himself against the proponent of the causal theory of reference, who claims that reference cannot be fixed solely by what is expressed in name users' minds. An idealist can handle certain facts of reference the causal theorist believes idealists cannot handle. Moreover, there are possible tales that undermine the causal theory and motivate an idealist one. The idealist can also gather the material he needs for his defense--essences--from the distinction between a theory of reference and a theory of meaning that causal theorists like to draw. Finally, unlike the causal theorist, the idealist does not leave ontology in the lurch

This is an anthology of landmark essays in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and cognitive science since 1950. It includes essays that aim to reflect the fact that philosophy and the science of mind and language have close historical and conceptual ties. Each section begins with a brief and simple overview highlighting the issues and recommending other readings. The combination of this editorial material with a selection of classic essays makes this anthology a very flexible tool for introductory courses in cognitive science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology as well as courses devoted to contemporary analytic philosophy. However, the book also contains significant advanced and recent material, making it suitable for more advanced stud, including beginning graduate courses.

In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke maintains that ?Reason must be our last Judge and Guide in every Thing,? including matters of religious faith, and this commitment to the primacy of reason is not abandoned in his later religious writings. This essay argues that with regard to the relation between reason and religious faith, Locke is primarily concerned not with evidence, but with consistency, meaning, and how human beings ought to respond to their inclinations, including their inclinations to believe. Leibniz, on the other hand, stakes out an alternative conception of the relationship between faith and reason that assigns to faith the role of a primary truth. For Leibniz, some religious propositions can be believed immediately and without an additional examination and evaluation by reason. The essay maintains that the differences between the two regarding faith and reason are tied to a broader disagreement about how much of the human understanding is due, in Locke's words, to ?Labour, Attention and Industry?