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The limits of the state's power to control crimeAustralian Journal of Legal Philosophy 46 (2): 126-131. 2021.
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6Review of Freedom and Determinism, ed. Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier (review)Essays in Philosophy 10 (2): 223-231. 2009.
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31Disability and Nationality: Martha Nussbaum on JusticeEssays in Philosophy 9 (1): 129-143. 2008.
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Hodgson on retributionIn Allan McCay & Michael Sevel (eds.), Free Will and the Law: New Perspectives, Routledge. 2019.
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Fichte and psychopathy : criminal justice turned upside downIn Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice, Cambridge University Press. 2019.
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37Criminal Quarantine and the Burden of ProofPhilosophia 47 (4): 1095-1110. 2019.In the recent literature a number of free will skeptics, skeptics who believe that punishment is justified only if deserved, have argued for these two points: first, that the free will realist who would justify punishment has the burden of establishing to a high level of certainty - perhaps beyond a reasonable doubt, but certainly at least by clear and convincing evidence - that any person to be punished acted freely in breaking the law; and, second, that that level of evidence is simply not the…Read more
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7Review of Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation, by Scott Sehon (review)Essays in Philosophy 11 (2): 231-237. 2010.
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47Free will fallibilism and the “two-standpoints” account of freedomSynthese 198 (3): 1967-1982. 2019.In this paper I propose a form of free will fallibilism. Unlike the free will realist who is fully persuaded that we have sufficient evidence of freedom to justify holding individuals morally responsible for what they do and imposing punishment, and unlike the free will skeptic who is fully persuaded that we do not have enough evidence to believe that we face a future of open alternatives, the free will fallibilist will believe that we have enough evidence to justify a belief in freedom for some…Read more
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44Free Will, Punishment, and the Burden of ProofCriminal Justice Ethics 37 (1): 55-71. 2018.Justifying state punishment presents a difficulty for those who deny that human actions are free in the sense required by moral responsibility. The argument I make in this article, following work d...
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22Moral Responsibility and Intentional Action: Sehon on Freedom and PurposeCriminal Justice Ethics 36 (2): 246-264. 2017.Scott Sehon is someone who takes the philosophy of criminal justice seriously, who believes that if we are going to condemn people to prison we should have pretty good grounds...
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12The Logic of Intentional ActionPhilosophy Research Archives 5 554-575. 1979.Five purposive relations are investigated: endeavoring, endeavoring for a certain purpose, bringing something about in a certain endeavor, bringing something about for a certain purpose, and bringing something about intentionally. No satisfactory analysis of these terms has yet been proposed, either in mentalistic -- belief, desire, intending -- or in action terms. While bringing something about for a certain purpose may seem too obscure to be taken as a primitive, there are at least two argumen…Read more
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63Crime and culpability: A theory of criminal law * by Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler ferzan, with Stephen MorseAnalysis 70 (2): 403-405. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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32Proper names and necessary propertiesPhilosophical Studies 24 (2). 1973.It has been proposed that, Under the restriction of singular terms to proper names, Singular de re propositions would be equivalent to certain de dicto propositions. But that is so only if a certain thesis--A thesis which is itself irreducibly de re--Is true of proper names. The conclusion is that the restriction to proper names is not, By itself, Sufficient to render the de re and de dicto equivalent
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62Egalitarianism and the Problem of Tort LiabilityNoûs 35 (s1): 388-419. 2001.Is the negligence standard in accident law acceptable to the egalitarian? The egalitarian - the egalitarian who would compensate only losses for which the actor was not responsible - cannot accept either a system of strict liability for all accidents or a system of social insurance for all accidents. A system of tort law acceptable to the responsibility - egalitarian must be a system based on negligence. But what will negligence mean? A negligence system in which the notion of reasonableness is …Read more
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8Consequences, Dispositions, and the Burden of ProofCriminal Justice Ethics 33 (3): 236-245. 2014.Kadri Vihvelin is one of the more important writers in the area of free will studies, and in this book she proposes to vindicate full-fledged compatibilism in the face of the apparent failure of th...
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8The analytic tradition in philosophy: background and issuesAmerican Library Association. 1975.An introduction to the history of analytic philosophy, up to about 1975, together with discussion of the analytic treatment of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and logical theory.
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9A Bibliography of Italian Logical PragmatismPhilosophy Research Archives 6 75-89. 1980.The writings of the Italian philosophers Giovanni Vailati and Mario Calderoni, sometimes called logical pragmatists, are not well-known in the English-speaking countries. A recent revival of interest is due in part to the reflection in the works of these men of later developments in analytic and pragmatic philosophy. This bibliography has three parts; In Part I are listed English and French translations of some of Vailati's writings, and commentaries in English and French on his work. Part II in…Read more
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34How to do things on purpose: R. A. duff'sintention, agency, and criminal liability (review)Law and Philosophy 11 (3). 1992.There is a lot of material in this book, and Duff handles most of it very well. It is unfortunate that he felt the need to tie his discussion of serious philosophical questions in the criminal law to larger overarching questions of philosophy. It is possible that current conceptions of intentional action implicate dualism (or Dualism), I suppose, but that would be a book-length discussion all of its own. It would begin with a careful discussion of just what dualism is, and would track down the v…Read more
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University of North Carolina (System)Regular Faculty
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Law |
20th Century Philosophy |