Michael M. Shaw

“Architecture and Eternity: Physis in Nietzsche and Empedocles” argues that Empedocles’ vision of nature stands at the juncture between the archaic conception of nature as sublime force, and the classical Greek notion of self-replicating substance. The essay first traces the Homeric notions of phyein (“to bring forth or produce”) and physis (“the entirety of a thing, all of its capacities and hidden parts”). It proceeds to argue that Empedocles attributes ontological primacy exclusively to the four roots and the forces of love and strife, whose constant mixture and separation produces all things. When compared to the classical Aristotelian notion of nature, Empedocles allows for internal force and creativity, but rejects an Aristotelian telos. He instead prioritizes physis in terms of persistent principles that cause continuous coming to be and passing away through mixture, without divine purpose beyond their own motions. For Empedocles, the cosmos dances from limit to opposed limit, while leaving a wondrous trail of temporary beings in its wake. Finally, the essay relates Empedocles’ view of nature to Nietzsche’s, arguing that Nietzsche’s philosophy echoes Empedocles’ rejection of functionalism and teleology, embracing his emphasis on existence as lived. Since for Empedocles nature and culture are at one with the roots, a Nietzschean philosophy of the city that embraces existence and the union of self, others, rocks, and plants becomes possible.

This project reframes the four roots (or elements) in Empedocles in order to challenge the Aristotelian account of the One as undifferentiated sameness. Aristotle credits Empedocles with developing both the theory of four material elements and introducing the conception of dualistic moving causes into philosophy through Love and Strife. Aristotle’s interpretation maintains a singular moment in the evolution of the cosmos when Love dominates the whole and unifies all things into a perfectly spherical One, which he describes as an undifferentiated, qualityless substratum. Based on Fragments B17, B62, and B110, this paper argues that a rhizomatic motion in which each root tends towards its own kind emerges from the roots independently of Love and Strife. Thus, Empedocles actually maintains three different sorts of motion: (1) the motion of unlike towards unlike, motivated by Love, (2) the motion of unlike away from unlike, motivated by Strife, and (3) a rhizomatic motion of like to like. The presence of six sources of motion challenges Aristotle’s assumption that, as the One, the universe enjoys a moment of identity without difference. The presence of rhizomatic motion makes the blending or mixing of the roots impossible in the Σφαῖρος. The paper begins by developing Aristotle’s paradox of Strife in the Metaphysics and his paradox of alteration in On Generation and Corruption, followed by Empedocles’ account of mixture and separation in Fragments B8 and B35. Section three examines the precise functions of Love and Strife in Fragments B17 and B21. The last section considers the Empedoclean Σφαῖρος under these different conditions, arguing that the cosmic sphere should not be viewed as an inconsistent disappearance of the roots, but as god understood as a singular community of difference.

This paper examines parataxis and ring composition in Anaxagoras Fragment B4a, arguing that this ostensibly prose philosopher employs these poetic techniques to capture his thought. Comparing the fragment with Homeric similes and his description of Achilles’s Shield from Ililad XVIII reveals an immanent poetics within the Anaxagorean text. Lying between two instances of "πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα" (many things of all kinds) most of fragment constitutes a single sentence. Such ring composition advises that no part of the paratactic clause should be read independently from any other. This supports reading the discussion of "seeds" (σπέρματα) and "compacted" (συμπαγῆναι) human beings in B4a as yielding a conception of infinitely proliferating microcosmic worlds each undergoing its own separation within a single cosmos.

This paper surveys the meaning of aither in Empedocles. Since Aristotle, Empedoclean aither has been generally considered synonymous with air and understood anachronistically in terms of its Aristotelian conception as hot and wet. In critiquing this interpretation, the paper first examines the meaning of “air” in Empedocles, revealing scant and insignificant use of the term. Next, the ancient controversy of Empedocles’ “four roots” is recast from the perspective that aither, rather than air, designates the fourth root. Finally, the nineteen instances of aither in Empedocles’ fragments are considered, revealing a bright and energetic root closely related to the force of life.

This paper examines the relationship between participation and motion with respect to the natural philosophy of the "Phaedo". Aristotle’s criticism of participation and its failure to account for motion shows the relevance of the dialogue to this problem. Challenging Aristotle’s critique, I interpret the "Phaedo" as offering a possible solution to the question of how forms cause motion in material beings. The verb ὀρέγεσθαι at 65c8, 75a2, and 75b1, together with the active ὀρέγειν at 117b2, ground an account of ontological striving as a solution to the difficulties inherent in participation within the literary context of the dialogue.

This paper examines the divergent accounts of generation in Physics I and On Generation and Corruption. While the former concerns an unqualified and absolute generation of substance from not-substance, the latter describes the unqualified and simple generation of the elements from each other. In each of these texts, an unusual instance of ὀρέγεσθαι appears in Aristotle’s analysis, regarding the unqualified generation of substance at Phys. I 9, 192a18 and 19, and the cyclical transformation of the elements at GC II 10, 336b28. These passages employ the verb consistently, suggesting that generation involves an ambiguous ontological desire. Such orectic striving differs greatly from human or other animal striving for some good. The accounts of generation in these texts are developed in order to emphasize both the distinction between the two processes and the significance of ontological desire to unqualified generation in its strongest sense