Michael Martin

Mindfulness is frequently invoked as a virtue in discussions of technology, whether in using specific technologies such as cellphones, in creating technologies as new and valuable devices and knowledge, in responsibly developing technologies as “social experiments,” or in participating responsibly as citizens in technological societies. In each of these contexts, mindfulness can have myriad meanings that reflect moral ideals or popular psychological concepts. To explore these meanings, I develop a working definition of mindfulness as paying attention to what matters, in light of relevant values. When those values are sound and applied with good judgment, mindfulness is a virtue.

What sense can we make of Hume’s notorious distinction between impressions and ideas? We look at two sense-datum theories of experience that offer competing accounts of the contrast between sensation and imagination. John Foster’s two-level account of experience presented in The Case for Idealism and The Nature of Perception is contrasted with Bertrand Russell’s discussion of sensation, imagination, and memory in The Theory of Knowledge. The key elements of both approaches are sketched. Foster’s appeal simply to a ‘subjectively manifest’ difference is rejected as inadequate. A problem with Russell’s conception of experience of past is canvassed, and then further elaborated in relation to previous awareness condition on personal memories. The contrasting views of memory are extended to the case of imagination. The chapter concludes with more general morals to be drawn about the relation between the first-person perspective on experience and the underlying psychological properties which explain experience’s being so.

Book description: Much contemporary philosophical debate centres on the topics of logic, thought and language, and on the connections between these topics. This collection of articles is based on the Royal Institute of Philosophy’s annual lecture series for 2000–2001. Its contributors include a number of those working at the forefront of the field, and in their papers they reflect their own current pre-occupations. As such, the volume will be of interest to all philosophers, whether their own work is within the areas of language and thought or not

The UK launch of the Science Enterprise Challenge in 1999 has stimulated interest in the evolutions of science-based firms and this paper argues that Poppers seminal diverse contributions to philosophy are directly relevant to them. It begins by commenting on the applications of both Kuhns and Poppers concepts to technological (as against) scientific evolutions. It then suggests how Poppers approaches are applicable to the development and assessment of new technology within the framework of Freemans stakeholders approach. Monsanto s development of GMOs is used as an illustrative case.

At their best, mottos help us cope by crystallizing attitudes, eliciting resolve, and guiding conduct. Mottos have moral significance when they allude to the virtues and reflect the character of individuals and groups. As such, they function in the moral space between abstract ethical theory and contextual moral judgment. I discuss personal mottos such as those of Isak Dinesen (“I will answer”) and group mottos such as found in social movements (“Think globally, act locally”), professions (“Above all, do no harm”), philosophy (“The personal is political”), and therapeutic groups like Alcoholics Anonymous (“One day at a time”).

Moral creativity consists in identifying, interpreting, and implementing moral values in ways that bring about new and morally valuable results, often in response to an unprecedented situation. It does not mean inventing values subjectively, as Sartre and Nietzsche suggested. Moral creativity plays a significant role in meeting role responsibilities, exercising leadership, developing social policies, and living authentically in light of moral ideals. Kenneth R. Feinberg’s service in compensating the victims of 9/11 provides a paradigm instance.

Creativity in science and engineering has moral significance and deserves attention within professional ethics, in at least three areas. First, much scientific and technological creativity constitutes moral creativity because it generates moral benefits, is motivated by moral concern, and manifests virtues such as beneficence, courage, and perseverance. Second, creativity contributes to the meaning that scientists and engineers derive from their work, thereby connecting with virtues such as authenticity and also faults arising from Faustian trade-offs. Third, morally creative leadership is important at all levels of science and engineering.