•  11
    A new justification of induction
    Metascience 1-2. forthcoming.
  •  9
    On the Possibility of Testimonial Justice
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1-15. forthcoming.
    Recent impossibility theorems for fair risk assessment extend to the domain of epistemic justice. We translate the relevant model, demonstrating that the problems of fair risk assessment and just credibility assessment are structurally the same. We motivate the fairness criteria involved in the theorems as appropriate in the setting of testimonial justice. Any account of testimonial justice that implies the fairness/justice criteria must be abandoned on pain of triviality.
  •  78
    Speed-optimal Induction and Dynamic Coherence
    with Eric Wofsey
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. forthcoming.
    A standard way to challenge convergence-based accounts of inductive success is to claim that they are too weak to constrain inductive inferences in the short run. We respond to such a challenge by answering some questions raised by Juhl (1994). When it comes to predicting limiting relative frequencies in the framework of Reichenbach, we show that speed-optimal convergence—a long-run success condition—induces dynamic coherence in the short run.
  •  104
    Counterexamples to Some Characterizations of Dilation
    with Rush T. Stewart
    Erkenntnis 1-12. 2019.
    Pedersen and Wheeler (2014) and Pedersen and Wheeler (2015) offer a wide-ranging and in-depth exploration of the phenomenon of dilation. We find that these studies raise many interesting and important points. However, purportedly general characterizations of dilation are reported in them that, unfortunately, admit counterexamples. The purpose of this note is to show in some detail that these characterization results are false.
  •  13
    We discuss Herzberg’s :319–337, 2015) treatment of linear aggregation for profiles of infinitely many finitely additive probabilities and suggest a natural alternative to his definition of linear continuous aggregation functions. We then prove generalizations of well-known characterization results due to :410–414, 1981). We also characterize linear aggregation of probabilities in terms of a Pareto condition, de Finetti’s notion of coherence, and convexity.
  •  301
    Obligation, Permission, and Bayesian Orgulity
    with Rush T. Stewart
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6. 2019.
    This essay has two aims. The first is to correct an increasingly popular way of misunderstanding Belot's Orgulity Argument. The Orgulity Argument charges Bayesianism with defect as a normative epistemology. For concreteness, our argument focuses on Cisewski et al.'s recent rejoinder to Belot. The conditions that underwrite their version of the argument are too strong and Belot does not endorse them on our reading. A more compelling version of the Orgulity Argument than Cisewski et al. present is…Read more
  •  15
    Deterministic Convergence and Strong Regularity
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. forthcoming.
    Bayesians since Savage (1972) have appealed to asymptotic results to counter charges of excessive subjectivity. Their claim is that objectionable differences in prior probability judgments will vanish as agents learn from evidence, and individual agents will converge to the truth. Glymour (1980), Earman (1992) and others have voiced the complaint that the theorems used to support these claims tell us, not how probabilities updated on evidence will actually}behave in the limit, but merely how Bay…Read more
  •  261
    Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. forthcoming.
    For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No.
  •  214
    Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence
    with Rush T. Stewart
    Philosophy of Science (2): 236-254. 2018.
    Merging of opinions results underwrite Bayesian rejoinders to complaints about the subjective nature of personal probability. Such results establish that sufficiently similar priors achieve consensus in the long run when fed the same increasing stream of evidence. Initial subjectivity, the line goes, is of mere transient significance, giving way to intersubjective agreement eventually. Here, we establish a merging result for sets of probability measures that are updated by Jeffrey conditioning. …Read more
  •  62
    Voodoo dolls and angry lions: how emotions explain arational actions
    with Andrea Scarantino
    Philosophical Studies 172 (11): 2975-2998. 2015.
    Hursthouse :57–68, 1991) argues that arational actions—e.g. kicking a door out of anger—cannot be explained by belief–desire pairs. The Humean Response to Hursthouse :25–38, 2000b) defends the Humean model from Hursthouse’s challenge. We argue that the Humean Response fails because belief–desire pairs are neither necessary nor sufficient for causing emotional actions. The Emotionist Response is to embrace Hursthouse’s conclusion that emotions provide an independent source of explanation for inte…Read more