Michael Pakaluk

It can be shown that, if we assume 'substance dualism', or the real distinctness of the soul from the body, then the standard objections to the Cyclical Argument in the "Phaedo" fail. So charity would presumably require that we take substance dualism to be presupposed by that argument. To do so would not beg any question, since substance dualism is a significantly weaker thesis than the immortality of the soul. Moreover, there is good textual evidence in favor of this presumption. A closer look at the immediately preceding passage, viz. "Socrates' Defense", reveals an argument for a real distinction between soul and body, not unlike Descartes' famous argument, based on the identification of an activity in which the soul can in principle engage on its own, without assistance from the body. The argumentative project of the "Phaedo," on this reading, becomes: given that the soul is really distinct, show that it is immortal. And Plato aims to do this in two stages. The three initial arguments are meant to establish merely the minimal claim that the continued existence of the soul across cycles of reincarnation is the most plausible view to take, given substance dualism; and it is left to the Final Argument to argue for something that we might regard as immortality, that is, the imperishability of the soul, come what may

This is intended to be a foundational study in what the author claims is a new branch of ethics, "genethics," which has as its distinctive subject matter three sorts of questions: Should some human being or group of human beings come into existence? If so, how many? Of these, what should they be like? Heyd maintains that these questions are posed for the first time, or in a distinctive way, because of developments in biotechnology, and that they cannot be resolved within any of the major types of ethical theory. Contractarian theory is useless, for either we include future generations as parties to the contract or not: if we do, we suppose their existence and beg the question; if we do not, then we are bound to appeal to noncontractarian considerations. Kantian theory obliges us to treat persons as ends, but genethics is concerned with the prior question of whether there should be persons to treat thus. Moreover, principles of respect and autonomy, as well as the categorical imperative, seem to have no natural application to genethic cases. Utilitarianism both in its total- and average-welfare maximizing forms is beset with familiar difficulties. Heyd mentions Aristotelian virtue ethics only to dismiss it as a viewpoint "which cannot be of much help in the direct analysis of procreation". This is odd, however, since Aristotle gives ample attention to issues of justice and friendship across generations.

In Books VIII and IX of his masterpiece of moral philosophy, the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle gives perhaps the most famous of all philosophical discussions of friendship. Michael Pakaluk presents the first systematic study in English of these books, showing how important Aristotle's treatment of friendship is to his ethics as a whole. Pakaluk's fresh and scrupulously accurate translation is accompanied by a detailed philosophical commentary which reveals the remarkably coherent structure of the books and unfolds with lucidity the various arguments contained within Aristotle's terse and compressed text. Pakaluk looks at the logical form of Aristotle's analysis of friendship, at his subtle view of the relationship between friendship and justice, at the role of reciprocity in friendship, at civic friendship and its relation to the family, and at the development of friendship out of self-love and reflexive consciousness. This volume will be a valuable tool for anyone studying Aristotle's ethics, especially readers with no Greek.

The author aims to write intellectual history in a traditional cast of a particular idea, the idea of progress, among a particular elite, the educated class of Britain roughly between 1730 and 1789. He describes the idea of progress as "belief in the movement over time of some aspect or aspects of human existence, within a social setting, toward a better condition". This admittedly broad definition is adopted in order to encompass belief in various sorts of progress. One might wonder why every variety of belief in progress ought to be studied as expressions of a single idea of progress, for what sort of unity would one's subject matter have? In fact Spadafora effectively resolves this problem in an Aristotelian manner by implicitly adopting something like a focal-meaning approach to the subject: he identifies two central conceptions of progress and relates other notions of progress to these. The central conceptions are: the Christian understanding of history as eschatological, and Baconian confidence in the advancement of learning. Although these two conceptions are frequently unified in English Puritanism between the accession of Charles I and the Restoration, Spadafora describes how they were largely independent and even at odds in the eighteenth century.

Through a careful discussion of the relevant texts in De Regno and the Summa Theologiae, the author argues that Aquinas understands the political common good to include the full virtue and complete happiness of all of the citizens, as related to one another by bonds of justice and civic friendship. It is not something limited and instrument, as John Finnis has recently argued. Yet that the common good has this character for Aquinas does not imply that he regards political authority as in principle unlimited, on account of a variety of resources available to Aquinas from Aristotelian political theory

In Books VIII and IX of his masterpiece of moral philosophy, the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle gives perhaps the most famous of all philosophical discussions of friendship. Michael Pakaluk presents the first systematic study in English of these books, showing how important Aristotle's treatment of friendship is to his ethics as a whole. Pakaluk's fresh and scrupulously accurate translation is accompanied by a detailed philosophical commentary which reveals the remarkably coherent structure of the books and unfolds with lucidity the various arguments contained within Aristotle's terse and compressed text. Pakaluk looks at the logical form of Aristotle's analysis of friendship, at his subtle view of the relationship between friendship and justice, at the role of reciprocity in friendship, at civic friendship and its relation to the family, and at the development of friendship out of self-love and reflexive consciousness. This volume will be a valuable tool for anyone studying Aristotle's ethics, especially readers with no Greek.

This thesis is an investigation of Aristotle's theory of friendship, as found in books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics. It has two major concerns: first, Aristotle's theory of goodness; second, Aristotle's view of the relationship between self-love and love of another. Aristotle's theory of goodness is important, because friendship consists of love, and love is always on account of some good. Thus, Aristotle's distinctions among various goods underlie his theory of the various sorts of friendships and their nature. Aristotle's views on the relationship between self-love and friendship are examined to discover a theory different from contemporary theories of morality, which are vexed by the problem of the relationship between egoism and altruism. The first chapter examines the Platonic background of Aristotle's theory of friendship. The Lysis is given special attention, and then Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic theory of the good in EN I.6 is examined as giving us Aristotle's positive theory of goodness. This positive theory is used in the second chapter to understand Aristotle's division of friendship into three forms. It is argued that, according to Aristotle, just as being varies categorically, so goodness varies categorically; thus love and friendship also vary categorically. The third chapter examines Aristotle's thesis that friendship 'comes from' self-love. It is claimed that this is intended to show that self-love is social, not that sociability is selfish. Aristotle's saying that a 'friend is another self' is interpreted as a qualified metaphor based on an unanalyzeable analogy. It is claimed that Aristotle's understanding of analogy enables him to take a position on the relationship between self-love and love of another unavailable to moderns. The final chapter attempts an interpretation of the difficult argument in EN IX.9, 1170b13ff. It is argued that Aristotle is trying to explain how a person's own life is good for him and pleasant to him, and that Aristotle is claiming that this is how a friend is good for and pleasant to a good person.