Michael Pauen

Thema der Arbei sind gnostische Strukturen in der Philosophie und Ästhetik der Moderne. Nach einem in der Spätantike einsetzenden Überblick übder die Rezeptionsgeschichte der Gnosis zeigt der Autor, wie sich nach der Jahrhundertwende bei maßgeblichen Autoren wie dem jungen Bloch, bei Heidegger, Klages und später bei Adorno eine charakteristische Denkfigur durchsetzt, in der ein ausgeprägter Kulturpessimismus, die radikale Kritik an Wissenschaft und Öffentlichkeit, das Bewußtsein der Auserwähltheit und bis ins Eschatologische gesteigerte Zukunftshoffnungen aufeinander verweisen. Erkennbar werden dabei nicht nur überraschend deutliche Parallelen zu gnostischem Denken, sondern - trotz politischer und inhaltlicher Differenzen - auch bemerkenswerte Gemeinsamkeiten in den Problemen und Aporien, mit denen sich die Autoren auseinanderzusetzen haben. Wichtig ist, dass der hier artikulierte Pessimismus zur zum Teil als Reaktion auf soziale oder intellektuelle Krisensituationen begriffen werden kann: Es handelt sich vielmehr um einen "sekundären Pessimismus", in dem ästhetische und rhetorische Momente wirksam sind. Sie erlauben die Inszenierung der schrecklichen Realität ebenso wie die "Selbstermächtigung" desjenigen, der diese Schrecken entlarvt. Die Frage nach gnostischem Denken legt somit nicht nur bislang weitgehend ignorierte Traditionen frei, sie erlaubt es auch, Denkstrukturen zu entschlüsseln, die zum Teil noch in der Gegenwart fortbestehen.

It is commonly believed that there is a fundamental incompatibility between multiple realization and type identity in the philosophy of mind. This claim can be challenged, however, since a single neural type may be realized by different microphysical types. In this case, the identity statement would connect the psychological and the neural type, while the neural type, in turn, could be multiply realized by different microphysical types. Such a multiple realization of higher level types occurs quite frequently even within physics and it should be acceptable for physicalism in general.

Dissociation thought experiments like Zombie and Inverted Spectrum cases play an essential role in the qualia debate. Critics have long since argued that these cases raise serious epistemic issues, undermining first person access to phenomenal states also in normal subjects. Proponents have denied this because, due to their phenomenal experience, normal subjects have epistemic abilities that Zombies don’t have. Here I will present a modified version of these thought experiments: Part-time Zombies and Part-time Inverts switch between normal and abnormal states every now and then. Thus they provide insight into their epistemic situation showing that the mere possibility of Zombies and Inverts has consequences which undermine essential epistemic features of phenomenal properties even in normals. This line of reasoning will be corroborated by theoretical considerations on the epistemic requirements of phenomenal states. All this provides support for the “functional mapping hypothesis.” According to this hypothesis, any significant phenomenal difference can be mapped to a specific functional difference which is accessible from the third person perspective as well.

According to qualia-epiphenomenalism, phenomenal properties are causally inefficacious, they are metaphysically distinct from, and nomologically connected with certain physical properties. The present paper argues that the claim of causal inefficacy undermines any effort to establish the alleged nomological connection. Epiphenomenalists concede that variations of phenomenal properties in the absence of any variation of physical/functional properties are logically possible, however they deny that these variations are nomologically possible. But if such variations have neither causal nor functional consequences, there is no way to detect themanot only in scientific experiments, but also from the first-person perspective. Since neither third- nor first- person evidence can rule out the actual occurrence of such dissociations, the alleged nomological connection between phenomenal and physical properties cannot be established, in principle. As a consequence, the distinction between logical and nomological possibility breaks down and it cannot be ruled out that such dissociations occur in an unlimited number of cases.

An analysis of our commonsense concept of freedom yields two “minimal criteria”: Autonomy distinguishes freedom from compulsion; Authorship distinguishes freedom from chance. Translating freedom into “self-determination” can account for both criteria. Self-determination is understood as determination by “personal-preferences” which are constitutive for a person. Freedom and determinism are therefore compatible; the crucial question is not whether an action is determined at all but, rather, whether it is determined by personal preferences. This account can do justice to the most important intuitions concerning freedom, including the ability to do otherwise. Waiving determination, by contrast, would violate the minimal criteria rather than providing “more” freedom. It is concluded that self-determination provides everything that we can ask for if we ask for freedom