Michael Rohlf

In this paper, I interpret and evaluate Fichte's criticisms of Kant's methods of deriving and systematizing ethical duties in The System of Ethics (1798), as well as the alternatives that Fichte proposes to Kant's methods. In short, Kant derives ethical duties using his Formulas of Universal Law (FUL) and Humanity (FH), and he systematizes the resulting duties into four classes structured by the distinctions between duties to oneself and to others, on the one hand, and perfect and imperfect duties, on the other hand. Fichte, however, accepts FH as a principle for specifying some duties to others but denies that FH captures our duties to or toward ourselves, and he rejects FUL as a positive criterion of duty altogether. In place of Kant's methods, Fichte derives ethical duties through reflection on the conditions of being a self and a moral agent, where these conditions include continuous, reciprocal, and formally free interaction between one's intellect and body, the sensible world, and other rational beings; and he replaces Kant's system of classifying duties with two new distinctions between conditioned and unconditioned duties, on the one hand, and universal and particular duties, on the other. I argue that Fichte's alternative to Kant's approach to deriving and systematizing duties results in a more intuitive and streamlined way of specifying many of the same duties that Kant recognized, and that Fichte's departures from Kant are well-motivated from within Kant's own framework.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An Introduction to Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Issue of Religious Content in the Enlightenment and Romanticism by Jon StewartMichael RohlfAn Introduction to Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Issue of Religious Content in the Enlightenment and Romanticism. By Jon Stewart. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xi + 304. $100.00 (hardcover). ISBN: 978-0-19-284293-0.The interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of religion is notoriously controversial for several reasons. One such reason, indicated by Jon Stewart at the outset of his new introduction to the subject, is that while Hegel’s views on religion are intricately interwoven with the rest of his philosophical system, the political climate in Prussia at the time was such that “Hegel was guarded with respect to issues of religion and took some care to dissemble his true views” (2). A second reason is that although the texts Hegel published during his lifetime contain scattered discussions of religion, his only systematic treatment of religion occurs in his Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (LPR), which were published after his death in several editions, each of which drew upon different selections from student lecture notes and [End Page 688] Hegel’s own notes (he lectured on the philosophy of religion or proofs of God’s existence in five different semesters between 1821 and 1831), and each of which has been criticized for presenting only a partial picture of Hegel’s views on the subject. Stewart explains that the first edition of these lectures in particular, published in 1832 as part of the first complete edition of Hegel’s works, “was in many ways the key text that caused the split among... the schools of right and left Hegelianism” (15). Critics complained that this edition made Hegel look more orthodox than he actually was (16), but so-called right Hegelians defended Hegel’s philosophy as in fact consistent with orthodox Christian doctrines, while left Hegelians argued that Hegel’s philosophy “undermined or demystified Christianity” (202).Stewart’s book is an accessible and admirably neutral introduction to the philosophical context, content, and reception of Hegel’s LPR. Its scope and Stewart’s pellucid prose make it an excellent overview for readers coming to this material for the first time, while its detailed discussions of the publication history and reception of Hegel’s LPR and its thorough references make the book a valuable resource for more advanced students and scholars as well. Stewart’s approach is to frame Hegel’s philosophy of religion as a response to criticisms of religion in the Enlightenment and to Romanticism in Hegel’s own day. Accordingly, the book’s first two chapters provide context by discussing Enlightenment debates about religion in Voltaire, Reimarus, Lessing, Hume, and Kant, along with Hegel’s critical response to the Enlightenment. Chapter 3 then presents Rousseau as a forerunner, and Jacobi and Schleiermacher as representatives, of the Romantic approach to religion in Hegel’s own day. After discussing Hegel’s general method in LPR and the relation between philosophy and religion in chapter 4, Stewart turns to Hegel’s philosophical accounts of pre-Christian religions in chapter 5, of Christianity in chapter 6, and of Islam in chapter 7. Since Hegel’s account in LPR ends before the rise of Islam, Stewart draws primarily on Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History in chapter 7. Chapter 8 is, in this reviewer’s opinion, the most valuable part of the book, where Stewart summarizes and weighs in on debates in the 1830s and 1840s about the consistency or inconsistency of Hegel’s views with Christian doctrines of immortality, the personhood of God, and the divinity of Christ. The book then closes with a final chapter about the relevance of Hegel’s philosophy of religion today.Stewart indicates two distinctive features of his interpretation in the book’s introduction, where he references the tendency of scholars to assume that Hegel “kept secret his true views about religion” (13). On Stewart’s reading, there are really two related secrets concealed within Hegel’s texts about religion. First, while Hegel is quite explicit that “his...

We argue that some sports test athletes’ capacities to endure specific types of suffering, and in such cases the suffering is constitutive of the sport: the sporting contest would not be a good sporting contest if that capacity were not tested. We then argue that it is morally acceptable for athletes to experience pleasure (Schadenfreude) in response to the constitutive suffering of competitors insofar as that pleasure is compatible with pity or sympathy for non-constitutive suffering. We use the case of morally acceptable pleasure in the constitutive suffering of a competitor to clarify the sense of Schadenfreude. We defend a little recognised distinction of Aristotelian provenance between benign and malignant Schadenfreude, and, in contrast to the prevailing scholarly assessment, we show that Schadenfreude is not necessarily a passive emotion.

On one common reading of Kant, emotional states that he calls feelings, desires, and inclinations are thoroughly non-cognitive and play no positive role in the moral life, which is instead about subduing our sensible nature through a discipline of reason. Against this common reading, this paper argues that Kant actually holds a weak cognitivist view of at least some emotions, according to which emotions are responses to judgments – or to what Kant calls maxims – that are about what makes an action right or wrong. Moreover, this paper also argues that a full understanding of Kant’s view of emotions and their role in the moral life requires assessing their relation to his theory about the radical evil of human nature, because he holds that emotions can be responses to the fundamental maxim that reflects our propensity to prioritize self-love over the moral law. Even emotions that are not directly corrupted by evil in this way must be seen in the context of Kant’s view that the moral life is essentially a struggle against the propensity to evil in human nature. So rather than reading Kant as a non-cognitivist about emotion, this paper reads him as a weak cognitivist whose suspicion of emotion reflects the significance he assigns to the human propensity to evil

This paper argues that Kant agrees with the substance of Hume’s critique of induction but without following Hume in characterizing induction as non-rational. I begin in part one by situating the problem of induction within the context of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, and by comparing Hume’s view that inductive inferences are based on custom or habit with Kant’s view that they are based on reason’s assumption that nature is systematic. Part two examines Kant’s view of the mental process by which reason leads us to assume that nature is systematic—a process that involves, I argue, reflecting on conditions of experience and then extending this reflection to an unconditioned idea. Part three then turns to addressing why and in what sense Kant thinks that we are justified in assuming that nature is systematic. Finally, in part four I flesh out my interpretation by arguing that it makes sense of Kant’s description of reason’s principle of the systematicity of nature as both transcendental and regulative.

This paper develops an interpretation of the relationship between Kant's various formulations of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork that steers a middle course between the formal and substantive poles of the interpretive spectrum, represented by John Rawls and Barbara Herman, respectively. Accepting and rejecting key aspects of both Rawls's and Herman's interpretations, I argue that the first formulation, understood correctly, does suffice to determine all Kantian moral duties, but only if duties are regarded as situation-specific rather than standing obligations. I also argue, however, that the second and third formulations provide information that is necessary for understanding and applying the first formulation to determine one's duty correctly, and that the formulations are in a sense equivalent even though each plays a distinctive and important role.