Michael Schwartz

Normalization and Totalization By the early 1980s, after more than two decades of producing provocative studies on topics ranging from madness to biopower, Michel Foucault came to the conclusion that modernity is marked by an increasingly efficient integration of normalized individuals into totalizing networks. “Never, I think, in the history of human societies—even in the old Chinese society—has there been such a tricky combination in the same political structures of individualization techniques, and of totalization processes.”3 There no longer seemed to be a substantial “exterior” to modernity, and traditional political critique was already caught within and could only further the

The Continental tradition has always placed great emphasis on the Logos. The Gift of Logos: Essays in Continental Philosophy celebrates and situates this emphasis in the genre of the gift and its giving. The process of receiving, or giving, of the gift overcomes the existential alienation and separation that is so present in the human condition. To ritualize giving and its gifting is to provide a syntax of solidarity that bespeaks our desire for cohesion and need for identities beyond our own. To give a gift is to befriend. The gift of logos is more than a gift from the gods and goddesses; it is an act of giving for those friends of wisdom for those philosophers who give to each other and to their worlds and receive the blessings of logos from each other. The increasing objectification of human being has mobilized a regressive narcissism that shows the ego's reassertion in the light of the meaningless quantifying forces from without. By not reflecting deeply enough upon its conditions of existence in the modern world and on its orginary moments, philosophy itself has not been immune from this besotted sense of self. Although not an invective against thinking nor against modern and contemporary philosophy's genuine advances, The Gift of Logos portends to shed the delusion that theoretical re-description is somehow the same as transforming who we are. This transformation is our greatest gift to each other. To give it voice is the gift of Logos and what this collection of essays commemorates.

This paper argues that intuition plays a role in the diagnosis of schizophrenia and presents its phenomenological rationale. A discussion of self-assessment questionnaires and empirical studies in the clinical setting provides evidence that despite the prevalence of operational diagnosis, the intuitive judgment of schizophrenia continues to take place. Two related notions of intuitive diagnosis are presented: Minkowski’s diagnostic by penetration and Rümke’s praecox feeling. Further on, the paper explores and clarifies the phenomenology behind the praecox feeling. First, it is argued, intuitive diagnosis is neither a feeling nor an experience, but a typification operating at an implicit level. Second, it is not simply subjective as spatially it takes place in the in-between of the clinical interaction. Finally, it is not just momentary, but temporally extended, and, hence, partly reflective. The paper suggests that intuitive diagnosis requires critical testing on the side of the psychiatrist to either confirm or falsify it through reflective operations. In conclusion, the merits and shortcomings of intuitive vs. operational diagnosis are presented.

This article by Louis Sass, Josef Parnas, and Dan Zahavi takes us into the midst of a debate over recent developments in phenomenological psychiatry. In "Phenomenological Psychopathology and Schizophrenia: Contemporary Approaches and Misunderstandings" (Sass et al. 2011), Sass et al. are responding to criticisms of their position lodged by Aaron L. Mishara in "Missing Links in Phenomenological Clinical Neuroscience: Why We Are Still Not There Yet" (Mishara 2007). In their reply, Sass et al. offer several helpful clarifications and justifications of their position, a position they have advanced in numerous important articles and books in the past. We are grateful for these clarifications and additional ..

Karl Jaspers' phenomenology remains important today, not solely because of its continuing influence in some areas of psychiatry, but because, if fully understood, it can provide a method and set of concepts for making new progress in the science of psychopathology. In order to understand this method and set of concepts, it helps to recognize the significant influence that Edmund Husserl's early work, Logical investigations, exercised on Jaspers' formulation of them. We trace the Husserlian influence while clarifying the main components of Jaspers' method. Jaspers adopted Husserl's notions of intuition, description, and presuppositionlessness, transforming them when necessary in order to serve the investigations of the psychopathologist. Jaspers also took over from Wilhelm Dilthey and others the tools of understanding (Verstehen) and self-transposal. The Diltheyian procedures were integrated into the Husserlian ones to produce a method that enables psychiatrists to define the basic kinds of psychopathological mental states.

The clinical ethics propounded by Richard Zaner is unique. Partly because of his phenomenological orientation and partly because of his own daily practice as a clinical ethicist in a large university hospital, Zaner focuses on the particular concrete situations in which patients and their families confront illness and injury and struggle toward workable ways for dealing with them. He locates ethical reality in the clinical encounter. This encounter encompasses not only patient and physician but also the patients family and friends and indeed the entire lifeworld in which the patient is still striving to live. In order to illuminate the central moral constituents of such human predicaments, Zaner discusses the often-overlooked features of disruption and crisis, the changed self, the patients dependence and the physicians power, the violation of personal boundaries and their necessary reconfiguring, and the art of listening.

Dans cet article méthodologique, les auteurs reviennent sur la manière dont ils ont conduit une recherche qualitative multilingue consistant à explorer les barrières rencontrées par les personnes Sourdes en Ireland du Nord lorsqu’elles cherchent à avoir accès au système judiciaire. Dans la mesure du possible, les pratiques de recherche des auteurs ont respecté les principes d’une recherche participative prenant appui sur la communauté (CBPR). Ils explorent les défis d’une recherche réalisée en langue des signes américaine (ASL), britannique (BSL) et irlandaise (ISL), en anglais parlé ou avec l’aide d’interprètes ayant la maîtrise de la langue des signes britannique et irlandaise. Centrant la recherche sur les expériences des Sourds qui apprennent à circuler dans le système judiciaire, les auteurs ont mis en place des méthodes de recherche participatives et prenant appui sur la communauté. Celles-ci ont conduit à une discussion soutenue et une action conjointe avec les auteurs et les membres de la communauté Sourde d’Irlande du Nord visant à lever les barrières auxquelles les personnes Sourdes font face lorsqu’elles interagissent avec le système judiciaire. En présentant l’approche méthodologique adoptée en Ireland du Nord, les auteurs souhaitent présenter de manière transparente leur démarche dans l’espoir que d’autres chercheurs pourront reproduire ce qui a le mieux fonctionné et éviter les obstacles qui ont été rencontrés dans la conduite d’un travail en partenariat avec les membres de la communauté Sourde dans d’autres pays.

The goal of this paper is to introduce Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences’ thematic issue on disordered temporalities. The authors begin by discussing the main reason for the neglect of temporal experience in present-day psychiatric nosologies, mainly, its reduction to clock time. Methodological challenges facing research on temporal experience include addressing the felt sense of time, its structure, and its pre-reflective aspects in the life-world setting. In the second part, the paper covers the contributions to the thematic issue concerning temporal experience in anxiety, depression, mania, addiction, post-traumatic stress disorder, autism, and in recovery from psychosis. The authors argue in favor of integrative and cross-disciplinary approaches. In conclusion, they present time as a significant aspect of human suffering.

The paper examines both the phenomenology of the manic self as well as critical aspects of manic neurobiology, focusing, with respect to both domains, on manic temporality. We argue that the distortions of lived time in mania exceed mere acceleration and are fundamental for manic affectivity. Mania involves radical acceleration and radical asynchronicity, which result in an instantaneous existence. People with mania rebel against the facticity of reality and suffer from an existential leap towards the future, in which the self abandons normal temporal boundaries. Excerpts from the interviews with persons with mania who experienced psychosis illustrate this phenomenon. Commenting upon disrupted circadian rhythms in mania and the role of lithium in its treatment the paper posits manic temporality as the link through which manic phenomenology and manic neurobiology intertwine.

Understanding the mental life of persons with psychosis/schizophrenia has been the crucial challenge of psychiatry since its origins, both for scientific models as well as for every therapeutic encounter between persons with and without psychosis/schizophrenia. Nonetheless, a preliminary understanding is always the first step of phenomenological as well as other qualitative research methods addressing persons with psychotic experiences in their life-world. In contrast to Rashed's assertions, in order to achieve such understanding, phenomenological psychopathologists need not necessarily adopt the transcendental-phenomenological attitude, which, however, is often required if performing phenomenological philosophy. Additionally, in the course of these scientific endeavors, differences between persons with psychosis/schizophrenia and so-called normal people seem to have a methodological function and value driving the scientist in her enterprise. Yet, these differences do not extend to ethical dimensions, and therefore, do not by any means touch ethical equality