Michael Silberstein

Ever since the now infamous comments made by Hermann Minkowski in 1908 concerning the proper way to view space-time, the debate has raged as to whether or not the universe should be viewed as a four-dimensional, unified whole wherein the past, present, and future are equally real or whether the views espoused by the possibilists, historicists, and presentists regarding the unreality of the future (and, for presentists, the past) are best. Now, a century after Minkowski’s proposed blockworld first sparked debate, we seek a more conclusive argument in favor of the eternalist picture of space-time. Utilizing an argument based on the relativity of simultaneity in the tradition of Putnam and Rietdijk and novel but reasonable assumptions as to the nature of “reality”, we will show that the past, present, and future are equally real, thus ruling out presentism and other theories of time that bestow special ontological status to the past, present, or future as untenable. Finally, we will respond to our critics who would suggest that: 1) there is no metaphysical difference between the positions of eternalism and presentism, 2) the present must be defined as the “here” as well as the “now”, or 3) presentism is correct and our understanding of relativity is incomplete because it does not incorporate a preferred frame. We call eternalist response 1 deflationary since it purports to dissolve or deconstruct the age-old debate between the two views and response 2 compatibilist because it does nothing to alter special relativity (SR) arguing instead that SR unadorned has the resources to save presentism. Response 3 we will call incompatibilism because it adorns SR in some way in order to save presentism a la some sort of preferred frame. We will show that neither move 1 nor 2 can save presentism and move 3 is not well motivated at this juncture except as an ad hoc device to refute eternalism.

Science, philosophy of science, and metaphysics have long been concerned with the question of how order, stability, and novelty are possible and how they happen. How can order come out of disorder? This book introduces a new account, contextual emergence, seeking to answer these questions. The authors offer an alternative picture of the world with an alternative account of how novelty and order arise, and how both are possible. Contextual emergence is grounded primarily in the sciences as opposed to logic or metaphysics. It is both an explanatory and ontological account of emergence that gets beyond the impasse between “weak” and “strong” emergence in the emergence debates. It challenges the “foundationalist” or hierarchical picture of reality and emphasizes the ontological and explanatory fundamentality of multiscale stability conditions and their contextual constraints, often operating globally over interconnected, interdependent, and interacting entities and their multiscale relations. It also focuses on the conditions that make the existence, stability, and persistence of emergent systems and their states and observables possible. These conditions and constraints are irreducibly multiscale relations, so it is not surprising that scientific explanation is often multiscale. Such multiscale conditions act as gatekeepers for systems to access modal possibilities (e.g., reducing or enhancing a system's degrees of freedom). Using examples from across the sciences, ranging from physics to biology to neuroscience and beyond, this book demonstrates that there is an empirically well-grounded, viable alternative to ontological reductionism coupled with explanatory anti-reductionism (weak emergence) and ontological disunity coupled with the impossibility of robust scientific explanation (strong emergence). Central metaphysics of science concerns are also addressed. Emergence in Context: A Treatise in Twenty-First Century Natural Philosophy is written primarily for philosophers of science, but also professional scientists from multiple disciplines who are interested in emergence and particularly in the metaphysics of science.

In this talk, we defend extended cognition against several criticisms. We argue that extended cognition does not derive from armchair theorizing and that it neither ignores the results of the neural sciences, nor minimizes the importance of the brain in the production of intelligent behavior. We also argue that explanatory success in the cognitive sciences does not depend on localist or reductionist methodologies; part of our argument for this is a defense of what might be called ‘holistic science’

Several articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences. This claim is meant to hold both in principle and in practice. The basic claim is that any explanation of a particular feature of a biological system, including dynamical explanations, must ultimately be grounded in mechanistic explanation. There are several variations on this theme, some stronger and some weaker. In order to avoid equivocation and miscommunication, in section 1 we will argue that mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. In section 2 we will argue that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization and decomposition on any non-trivial construal of these concepts. Therefore, in section 3 we conclude the mechanistic model of explanation either needs to stretch to now include explanations wherein localization or decomposition fail, or acknowledge that there are counter-examples to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences. We will also consider consequences and possible replies on the part of the mechanist in section 3.

Several articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences (Kaplan and Bechtel; Kaplan and Craver). We argue that mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. We argue further that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization and decomposition. We conclude that the mechanistic model of explanation needs to either stretch to now include explanations wherein localization or decomposition fail or acknowledge that there are counterexamples to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences

The complex systems approach to cognitive science invites a new understanding of extended cognitive systems. According to this understanding, extended cognitive systems are heterogenous, composed of brain, body, and niche, non-linearly coupled to one another. This view of cognitive systems, as non-linearly coupled brain–body–niche systems, promises conceptual and methodological advances. In this article we focus on two of these. First, the fundamental interdependence among brain, body, and niche makes it possible to explain extended cognition without invoking representations or computation. Second, cognition and conscious experience can be understood as a single phenomenon, eliminating fruitless philosophical discussion of qualia and the so-called hard problem of consciousness. What we call “extended phenomenological-cognitive systems” are relational and dynamical entities, with interactions among heterogeneous parts at multiple spatial and temporal scales

We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal--environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist-mechanistic, inter-level mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting out the debates, we discuss the ways in which they are interconnected. Finally, we make some recommendations that we hope will help philosophers interested in the cognitive and neural sciences to avoid dead ends.

We agree with critics that enactive, sensorimotor, and ecological accounts of conscious experience do not in and of themselves fully deflate the hard problem of consciousness. As we noted in our earlier work, even if an extended account of cognition and intentionality allows us to be rid of qualia by deflating the dualism between intentionality and phenomenal experience, the heart of the hard problem, namely subjectivity, still remains. We argue that in order to resolve or deflate the hard problem the hypothesis of extended consciousness needs to be understood as an expression of neutral monism and can quite naturally be understood that way.

We propose a new path integral based interpretation of quantum field theory. In our interpretation, QFT is the continuous approximation of a more fundamental, discrete graph theory whereby the transition amplitude Z is not viewed as a sum over all paths in configuration space, but measures the symmetry of the differential operator and source vector of the discrete graphical action. We propose that the differential operator and source vector of theory X are related via a self-consistency criterion based on the identity that underwrites divergence-free sources in classical field theory, i.e., the boundary of a boundary principle. In this approach, the SCC ensures the source vector is divergence-free and resides in the row space of the differential operator. Accordingly, the differential operator will necessarily have a non-trivial eigenvector with eigenvalue zero, so the SCC is the origin of gauge invariance. Factors of infinity associated with gauge groups of infinite volume are excluded in our approach, since Z is restricted to the row space of the differential operator and source vector. We show it is possible that the underlying theory X, despite being discrete, is the basis for exact Poincaré invariance. Using this formalism, we obtain the two-source transition amplitude over a -dimensional graph with N vertices fundamental to the scalar Gaussian theory and interpret it in the context of the twin-slit experiment to provide a unified account of the Aharonov-Bohm effect and quantum non-separability that illustrates our ontic structural realist alternative to problematic particle and field ontologies. Our account also explains the need for regularization and renormalization, explains gauge invariance and largely discharges the problems of inequivalent representations and Haag’s theorem. This view suggests corrections to general relativity via modifications to its graphical counterpart, Regge calculus. We conclude by presenting the results of our modified Regge calculus approach to Einsteinde Sitter cosmology where we produced a fit to the Union2 Compilation data for type Ia supernovae rivaling that of the concordance model, but without having to invoke dark energy or accelerated expansion.

Nonreductive physicalism is the conjunction of the following three statements. Firstly, mental properties are real. Secondly, mental properties are neither reducible to nor identifiable with physical properties, and thirdly, mental properties are causally efficacious with respect to physical properties. Nonreductive physicalists hold these assumptions to be true not only for mental properties but all special science and macrophysical properties. I will defend the following three theses: first, if certain widely held assumptions are true e.g., no downward causation, microdetermination or, the doctrine that motivates these assumptions is true namely, microphysical determinism then nonreductive physicalism must fail i.e., the three statements can not jointly be true. Therefore, we must accept that reductionism, epiphenomenalism or eliminativism is unavoidable not only for mental properties, but for all but the most basic physical properties. Second, certain quantum mechanical phenomena show that in fact all the trouble making assumptions are false. Thirdly, a true picture of the physical world not only opens up the possibility of mental causation and higher-order causation in general, but also offers an empirical example of a kind of "emergentism" or holism that could provide us with a model for explaining the nature of the mental and its causal role.

In this paper two different approaches to unification will be compared, Relational Blockworld (RBW) and Hiley’s implicate order. Both approaches are monistic in that they attempt to derive matter and spacetime geometry ‘at once’ in an interdependent and background independent fashion from something underneath both quantum theory and relativity. Hiley’s monism resides in the implicate order via Clifford algebras and is based on process as fundamental while RBW’s monism resides in spacetimematter via path integrals over graphs whereby space, time and matter are co-constructed per a global constraint equation. RBW’s monism therefore resides in being (relational blockworld) while that of Hiley’s resides in becoming (elementary processes). Regarding the derivation of quantum theory and relativity, the promises and pitfalls of both approaches will be elaborated. Finally, special attention will be paid as to how Hiley’s process account might avoid the blockworld implications of relativity and the frozen time problem of canonical quantum gravity

We survey and clarify some recent appearances of the term ‘emergence’. We distinguish epistemological emergence, which is merely a limitation of descriptive apparatus, from ontological emergence, which should involve causal features of a whole system not reducible to the properties of its parts, thus implying the failure of part/whole reductionism and of mereological supervenience for that system. Are there actually any plausible cases of the latter among the numerous and various mentions of ‘emergence’ in the recent literature? Quantum mechanics seems to offer one, in the Bell properties of entangled particles, but other apparently promising candidates, such as non‐linear dynamical systems investigated by complexity studies and chaos theory, seem on careful analysis to display only epistemological emergence. We examine the consequences for physicalism of admitting ontological emergence in the micro‐physical.