Michael Vollmer

Over the past years, proponents of pragmatic encroachment have been challenged to provide a plausible demarcation of the kind of practical factors that are supposed to encroach on the epistemic assessment of one’s belief formation. In this paper, I provide a defence of pragmatic encroachment against these challenges by relying on the following principle: the practical factors of a situation relevant for pragmatic encroachment are those which, on their own, rationalise the subject asking the question, ‘What if I am wrong in believing p?’. This principle follows from an independently motivated account of how the mechanism underlying the phenomenon of pragmatic encroachment might work. That is, the principle tracks the practical factors that enable epistemic reasons to suspend judgement on whether p rather than to believe p. While this question is rationalised by Pascalian factors, an extension of encroachment to direct threats and incentives to believe is unwarranted. Furthermore, I show that even if one assumes that not only the downsides of falsely believing but also the upsides of truly believing can be epistemically significant, one can retain a limited set of encroaching factors.

Many scholars maintain that the kind of ‘ought’ which the subject is after in deliberation is constrained by the subject’s perspective or by what is feasible for that subject. One principle invoked in support of this position refers to a special guidance-giving feature of the deliberative ought. While being a promising way to support the perspectivist and feasibilist verdicts, this appeal to guidance has been subject to detrimental counterexamples: cases in which the subject is ignorant of their own inability to intend the best-looking course of action. This paper provides a novel response in defence of the guidance thesis, which builds on the connection of the deliberative ought and deliberative questions. An overlooked issue in the literature concerns the presuppositions raised by the central deliberative question. I provide the first attempt at analysing these presuppositions and argue that, in cases in which these presuppositions are not satisfied, there is no particular option the subject deliberatively ought to do. Finally, I show that the supposed counterexamples are such instances of presupposition failure.

As scholars have commonly observed, a central difference between epistemic and practical normativity is the fact that the reasons of the former kind balance prohibitively, while reasons of the latter kind do so permissively. To explain the prohibition to believe or disbelieve in the face of tied evidence, several scholars have appealed to normative reasons in favour of a third doxastic option, the suspension of judgement. However, the question remains as to what happens if these latter reasons are defeated. In such cases, one seems to be stuck in an impasse: either one is forced into an epistemic dilemma– where neither of one’s doxastic options seems permissible– or one must relax the prohibitive balancing principle– where there might be, after all, situations in which believing in the face of tied evidence is rationally permissible. In this paper, I discuss different ways to derive this puzzle of defeated suspension, as well as the most common strategy in responding to it. I argue that an appeal to undefeated reasons to suspend judgement comes with significant downsides and, thus, one should seek a different response: in extreme forms of the puzzle of defeated suspension, a form of higher-order suspension becomes rational. If one treats higher-order suspension as an additional doxastic option, one can avoid the puzzle in its entirety. Furthermore, an analogue puzzle of higher-order doubt merits the same treatment.

Proponents of zetetic encroachment claim that certain zetetic or inquiry-related considerations can have a bearing on the epistemic rationality of one’s belief formation. Since facts about the interestingness or importance of a topic can be the right kind of reasons for inquisitive attitudes, such as curiosity, and inquisitive attitudes are ways to suspend judgement, these facts also amount to reasons against believing. This mechanism is said to explain several contentious phenomena in epistemology, such as the occurrence of pragmatic encroachment. In this paper, I provide two lines of reasoning against zetetic encroachment. First, on any contrastivist understanding of epistemic reasons, the case in favour of zetetic encroachment loses all its motivational force. Second, the thesis of zetetic encroachment is incompatible with the most promising way to understand degrees of inquisitive attitudes.

One recurrent objection to the idea that the right kind of reasons for or against an attitude are object-given reasons for or against that attitude is that object-given reasons for or against belief and disbelief are incapable of explaining certain features of epistemic normativity. Prohibitive balancing, the behaviour of bare statistical evidence, information about future or easily available evidence, pragmatic and moral encroachment, as well as higher-order defeaters, are all said to be inexplicable in terms of those object-given reasons. In this paper, I provide a rebuttal to all these challenges by drawing attention to the object-given reasons for and against the third doxastic state, namely the suspension of judgement. First, I introduce an original picture of how suspension relates to belief and disbelief – as ways of being decided – which yields a novel weighing model of the corresponding reasons. Second, I demonstrate that this new take on doxastic deliberation can accommodate all five features of epistemic normativity. Finally, I extend the weighing model to cover practical deliberation and the suspension of intentions. The resulting theory provides an explanation of why epistemic and practical normativity differ in certain respects in terms of a significant difference between doxastic and conative suspension.

According to insulationism, a common take on epistemic value, being of epistemic value does not entail being of value simpliciter. In this paper, I explore one version of insulationism which has so far received little attention in the literature. On this view, epistemic value does not entail value simpliciter because it is a form of attributive goodness, that is, being good as a member of a particular kind. While having a significant advantage over some other formulations of insulationism, I argue that the attributive goodness view of epistemic value should be rejected. On the one hand, shifting to a discussion of attributive goodness comes with several contentious commitments, as well as implausible upshots for epistemic axiology. On the other hand, I demonstrate that one can strengthen other forms of insulationism in such a way that the supposed advantage of the attributive goodness view diminishes.

This paper defends three theses on the normativity of the suspension of judgment. First, even if beliefs have to fit the truth and disbelief the false, suspension can still have satisfiable fittingness conditions. Second, combining this view with specific theses on the link between fittingness and normative reasons in favour of attitudes commits one to the existence of reasons to suspend judgement, which are neither reasons to believe nor reasons to disbelieve. These independent reasons, in turn, generate a form of epistemic permissivism. Finally, I argue that there are different routes to derive this commitment to independent reasons for suspending judgement. Not only fittingness-centred approaches to epistemic normativity but also many analyses in terms of reasons are committed to this form of epistemic permissivism.