Michael Von Grundherr

According to the order ethics approach to business ethics, moral rules must be im-plemented by institutions that provide incentives for following the rules. As a minimal (normative) condition, these institutions must be able to motivate the homo eco-nomicus. But even if an institution passes this test, it will only motivate actual people (i.e. the homo psychologicus) to follow moral rules, if they have the relevant compe-tences and self-efficacy beliefs. Consequently, good institutional design includes com-prehensive change management. At this point applied order ethics can draw on find-ings of psychology and experimental economics. It turns out, that role models can support self-efficacy beliefs and are thus more important for order ethics than has traditionally been assumed.

Much recent research on moral judgment making has focused on quick one-shot judgments. Explicit reasoning has been shown to play a minor role in these cases. However, these results do not generalize to real moral conduct that often includes the iterative adaptation of long-term behavioral strategies. I suggest using school bullying as an ecologically valid model for moral conduct and refer to studies that show that moral reasoning competence is negatively correlated to immoral aggressive behavior. Taken together, these results suggest a rather strict division of labor between reasoning on the one hand and automatic processes on the other hand. I suggest that moral reasoning is part of a long-term learning process, which sets the parameters for quick intuitive deci- sion making. Philosophical ethics can play an important role by systematizing and reflecting this learning process.

To examine whether high moral reasoning competence of adolescents is associated with low levels of bullying, and to understand whether moral disengagement mediates or moderates this relationship, 925 German children ranging from 11 to 17 years of age (M = 14.18, S = 1.21) completed questionnaires on moral reasoning competence and moral disengagement in surveys at three different schools. The children were classified according to their bullying role, based on a peer- nomination procedure. Multinomial logistic regression analyses showed that moral reasoning competence negatively predicted whether a student took an aggressive role. Moral disengagement partially mediated this relationship. Corresponding effects for defenders and outsiders were not found. These results extend previous findings about the effect of moral reasoning on bullying in primary school. The implications for the prevention of bullying are discussed.

Interessenbasierte Vertragstheorien sollten moralische Gefühle als Sanktionen betrachten und sich der Frage ihrer Rechtfertigung widmen. Als moralische Sanktionen gelten nach einer üblichen Auffassung Instanzen von selbst etablierten und zuverlässigen Reaktionsmustern einer Gemeinschaft, die einen Regelbruch unvorteilhaft machen. Nur weil sie nicht naturgegeben sind, stellt sich die Frage ihrer Rechtfertigung. Ich argumentiere dafür, dass moralische Gefühle eine Art von Wahrnehmungen sind und sich daher in genau dem Sinn kontrollieren lassen, der für Sanktionen wesentlich ist. Wir erlernen sie im Prozess der Sozialisation und passen sie im Normalfall langfristig so an, dass sie im Einklang mit der gesellschaftlichen Meinung stehen. Daher sind sie durch die Gemeinschaft selbst etabliert. Aber kurzfristig gesehen treten sie in bestimmten Situationen automatisch ein und liefern so zuverlässige Anreize für regelkonformes Verhalten. Ich wende mich damit explizit gegen eine These Peter Stemmers, der moralischen Gefühlen den Status von Sanktionen abspricht, weil sie nicht hinreichend unter unserer Kontrolle seien