Michaela Fiserova

This introduction presents the rationale for the special issue and outlines the main motives discussed in the following essays. The special issue redefines the concept of ornamentation based on Gilles Deleuze's philosophy. It presents ornaments as potent instruments for forming social bonds through repetition and a ruminative mental mindset. Essays by various authors explore the connection between ornaments, social bonds and affective integration, drawing on Deleuze's concepts of repetition and folds. This reinterpretation offers new insights into the aesthetic and social attributes of ornamentation, shedding light on their role in shaping individual and communal becomings.

Based on Deleuze’s understanding of creative productivity as an expression of one’s mental desiring-machine, the paper proposes an innovative insight into the ambiguous – constructive and destructive – human need to repeat. To philosophically grasp the aesthetic and material results of such repetitive activity, I propose to complete the Deleuzian concept of assemblage with the concept of ornament, defined as a material result of a repetitive mindset generating arrangements of regularly returning acts and items. I argue that Deleuze’s immanent repetition generates two kinds of ornament: the individual one, such as a personal collection or an artistic style, and the social one, such as an avant-garde movement or subculture fashion. Both ornaments are explained through Deleuze’s concepts of negative and relational deterritorialisation and are further defined by a new reading of Deleuze’s revision of repetition in Freud and Nietzsche. Both kinds of immanent repetition produce ornamental compositions which are threatened by the danger of ornamental decomposition.

The paper invites us to revise the anthropocentric foundation of the philosophic distinction that is made between the concepts of human and animal. Following Derrida’s deconstruction, the author uncovers the systematic philosophic degradation of animals that helped to build modern humanism: human beings gave themselves the right to master non-human beings by comparing animal to man and defining it as an unequal, subordinated, and inferior being. The author suggests taking the concept of animal out of such an asymmetrically constructed binary opposition. By revising “animal” idioms burdened by the anthropocentric prejudice of human sovereignty, the author calls for a biocentric ethical position of interspecies mutuality. Firstly, she questions metaphysical presuppositions that make the philosophic conception of symbiosis between human and nonhuman beings impossible. Secondly, she suggests a philosophic solution, which opens inventive ways for an ethical approach to animals, both by means of a focus on nonverbal communication and by offering new idioms related to biocentric images of animality.

Event of Signature formulates a new philosophical problem which focuses on the handwritten signature as sign of legal identification. Author Michaela Fišerová works with three metaphysical expectations, which are shared in discourses of graphology and forensic analysis. The first expectation tends to reveal the signer's soul: a handwritten signature "naturally" mirrors the unique psychological qualities of the signer. The second expectation tends to guarantee the originality of the signer's trace: a handwritten signature proves physical contact between the signed document and the writing tool "authentically" moved by the signer's hand. The third expectation tends to recognize the signer's legal identity: a handwritten signature is expected to reproduce the signer's personal style, which enables identification by legal authorities. In a methodologically inventive and semiotically-based dialogue with Derrida's deconstruction, Fišerová situates this triple expectation in the interval between life and law. Challenging coverage of this topic finally shows that none of the metaphysical expectations will ever be fulfilled in the event of manual signing. Legal uses of handwritten signature are characterized by the complex aporia of repeating the unrepeatable.

The paper proposes to grasp handwritten signature as a metaphysical invention of the so-called “Western” civilization, where the signature is supposed to make possible juridical identification of the person who wrote it. However, despite this expectation of reliability, the Western handwritten signature is an aporetic sign, which is considered to be authentic (unrepeatable) and conventional (repeatable) at the same time. Because the signature is a sign of juridical identification and its authenticity can always be forged, Jacques Derrida tries to deconstruct the contradictory functioning of Western metaphysics, which leads to confusion in our expectations of authenticity and identity in our uses of signatures. By proposing a new reading of Derridean texts concerning writing, the paper focuses on the pragmatical paradox that grounds our contradictory legal politics of signing: because the exact manual reproduction of a line is impossible, no one can satisfy the legislative obligation to sign conformably to the model signature. That’s the aporia of trace’s recognition, which establishes the signature as a sign: on the one hand, the signature is supposed to represent the juridical identity of the person who traced it; on the other hand, the signature, which constantly changes its graphical form, makes every certain identification impossible. In order to question the juridical identity traditionally guaranteed by the signature, this paper invites to grasp the legal practice of signing as a subversive performativity, which is produced during the passage between recognition of juridical identity requested by the law and its simultaneous and inevitable transgression. Finally, the paper proposes a new approach to the signature as a visual performance of the self, based on a reevaluation of the altercation between Jacques Derrida and John Searle concerning the iterative character of traces and performatives.

The paper invites a rethink of the political conception of Jacques Rancière, a philosopher who devoted considerable reflexion to the problem of the sharing of the sensible. Rancière proposes considering the aesthetic regime without the concept of representation. According to the author, this leads him to a paradox: on the one hand, he states that the aesthetic regime takes images for art; on the other hand, he doesn’t pay attention to the fact that it shouldn’t be possible to conceive of any regime of sharing without the concept of representation. Therefore, the author proposes a deconstructive reading of Rancière’s critique of representation, demonstrating that if the contemporary image is conceived and produced in order to be shared, it can’t be freed from representation. Finally, the author puts forth the notion of meta-representation as a solution avoiding Rancière’s antinomies.

Through Deleuze’s conception of truth as becoming the paper discusses his relationship to Platonism. In his analysis Deleuze focuses on Plato’s Sophistes, in which Plato unwillingly subverts the very hierarchy of the world order, which he himself created. Deleuze sees the Platonic search for truth as taking place in the sphere of immanence. In the person of a sophist he goes after the simulacrum, i.e. an appearance, which subverts the rigorous hierarchy of the Platonic world. In his Logique du sens Deleuze suggests that following Plato the other searchers for truth are also traveling in the sphere of immanence. Thus the truth found in the “logic of surface” is their becoming others. The paper examines the reasons, why Deleuze attaches importance to this becoming, which subverts the hierarchy of the “logic of depth” inaugurated by Platonism

The paper deals with the problem of representation on the background of J. Rancière’s political philosophy, in which he rejects the concept of the unrepresentable. The resolution of the problem follows from the confronting of two conceptions of the unrepresentable: that of the esthetics of the sublime in Kant and Lyotard and of the politics of prohibition in Foucault on one hand and Rancière’s understanding of sharing the perceptible on the other hand. This discussion leads the author to the problem of visuality conceived as a set of visual representations, which in a historically given period are legitimately visible. This definition of visuality returns the representation and the unrepresentable back into the political conception of image