Michail Theodosiadis

This study explores Machiavelli’s perspective on the interplay between religion and political rule. Rather than being an enemy of religion itself, we argue that the Florentine thinker was critical of its particular interpretations and applications. Specifically, Machiavelli highlights the detrimental effects of certain religions and denominations (particularly Catholic Christianity) on virtue and political engagement, which (in his perspective) foster passivity and fatalism. On the other hand, Machiavelli sees religion as a tool for rulers to serve and defend their power. By dissecting Machiavelli’s views, we unveil his nuanced approach to the political value of religion. In short, we will argue that Machiavelli diverged from classical Greek and Roman philosophical systems; his view of Christianity as a tool for civil obedience marks an important shift towards modern political thought.

This study reflects on aspects of the Pythagorean political philosophy and compares them to those of Abu Nasr Muhammad al-Fārābī’s thought. Both share a key assumption: excellent rulers must be political scientists who seek divine guidance to ensure the prevalence of reason over passions in public life while reconciling society with the harmony and wisdom of the cosmos. By imitating God’s perfection and incorporating divine wisdom into governance, virtuous rulers promote felicity, prosperity and peace within a city. We highlight al-Fārābī’s emphasis on the role of religion in enabling citizens to internalize the wisdom of the cosmos, thereby minimising the need for coercion in the pursuit of order and social concord. In addition, the populace leverages the superior knowledge of each governor while observing their behaviour. Thus, the people have a share in the exercise of political power. This insistence on the involvement of the populace in politics aligns with the concept of ‘political Prometheism’.

This article reinterprets Homer’s epics through the lens of “political Prometheanism,” a theoretical concept grounded in Aeschylean and Protagorean thought, symbolising political participation without placing unlimited trust in the human capacity for moral judgment on the other hand. While Homeric society lacks formal democratic institutions, it incorporates core features of participatory politics, most notably in the presence of synaxes (assemblies of public deliberation). Drawing on Hammer, Feldman, Castoriadis and Arendt, I argue that Homer prefigures the democratic concept of the human being as a political animal (zoon politikon), endowed with the capacity for speech, judgment, and collective responsibility. These traits are symbolically represented by the Promethean gift of fire. Through close readings of The Iliad and The Odyssey, I examine how characters such as Achilles, Thersites and Telemachus dramatise both the potential and the limits of public agency. Particular attention is given to the notions of aidōs, aischynē, and themis (or dike, in Protagoras’ terms), which are central to the Promethean emphasis on self-limitation in the wake of the limits of human judgments. Ultimately, this paper presents Homer not merely as a mythmaker but mainly as a political and moral thinker, engaged in an early critique of power and injustice.

Ancient Greek Democracy and American Republicanism explores the archetype of Prometheus in political theory, representing faith in human agency and self-governance. It borrows perspectives from Hannah Arendt and Christopher Lasch, tracing Promethean elements in the philosophy behind the ancient Athenian polis as well as in early American republican thought, which laid the foundations of the American Revolution and also of the Populist Movement during the nineteenth century. The second principle of Prometheanism revolves around a 'tragic vision' of life and human nature; Prometheanism questions optimistic ideologies advocating human perfection or endless improvement. Ancient Greek democracy and early American republicanism maintain a balanced – else called melioristic – approach to human agency and potential. They value the importance of action, without promising endless betterment and assured happiness. Finally, cultural heritage and identity are seen as crucial for participatory (Promethean) politics. With this in mind, the book criticises mainstream liberal trends and questions the ardent optimism and cultural nihilism of the republicanism of the French Revolution.

This article offers a philosophical reinterpretation of Homeric ethics by bringing into debate the opposing views of Peter J. Ahrensdorf, Richard Ruderman, and Darrell Dobbs. Ahrensdorf and Ruderman highlight the whimsical, capricious, selfish, and morally indifferent behavior of the Homeric gods. Given these divine flaws, humans lack perfect safeguards against calamities caused by fate (Moîra) and necessity or by their flawed judgments. For both authors, rational judgment serves as the most reliable antidote to suffering and destruction. Ruderman, in particular, interprets Homer as a defender of “enlightenment,” grounded in the rejection of false hopes on divine providence, which in the Homeric context is considered unreliable and untrustworthy. Blind faith in gods, he argued, indulges thymos, the most self-assertive innermost human longing that incites rampant anger, often culminating in hubris (extreme moral transgression). In contrast, Dobbs focuses on Homer’s Odyssey and defends a vision of reverence as morally stabilising. For him, rational action cannot guarantee morality and justice. More importantly, the instrumentality of rationalism can lead to recklessness and hubris. Reverence for divine powers, on the other hand, encourages moral resilience, even in the face of suffering imposed by the gods themselves or Moîra. This article evaluates both positions and argues that neither rational autonomy nor reverence alone suffices to secure justice and well-being. It another another aspect of Ahrensdorf’s interpretation of the Iliad: the virtue of friendship (or philotês), which (in the author’s view) is best exemplified by the character of Achilles. Drawing on Plato, Aristotle, and Empedocles, I explain that since philotês is grounded in a sense of chreos (moral necessity), it lays the foundations for a stable community of solidarity anchored in mutual recognition and respect. Thus, chreos and philotês emerge as the twin foundations of Homeric ethics.