Michał Dobrzański

Today we view the majority vote as an obvious procedure in free societies. However, that has not always been the case. A standout example is the procedure of liberum veto and the conceptual framework behind it developed by thinkers of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569–1795). While due to the failure of that state in the 18th c. their ideas have since been predominantly viewed as unreasonable, some of their arguments seem philosophically compelling. In this chapter, I reconstruct the key philosophical arguments in the Polish–Lithuanian debate in the 16–18th c. which favored unanimity and the right of veto in the enactment of laws, specifically those which refer to the concept of reason. I then juxtapose them with the paradigm of reason established by Rousseau and Kant and argue that even though they understand reason differently, there are significant overlaps in argumentation about law and freedom between them and representatives of the Polish–Lithuanian tradition.

Reism or concretism are the labels for a position in ontology and semantics that is represented by various philosophers. As Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Jan Woleński have shown, there are two dimensions with which the abstract expression of reism can be made concrete: The ontological dimension of reism says that only things exist; the semantic dimension of reism says that all concepts must be reduced to concrete terms in order to be meaningful. In this paper we argue for the following two theses: (1) Arthur Schopenhauer has advocated a reistic philosophy of language which says that all concepts must ultimately be based on concrete intuition in order to be meaningful. (2) In his semantics, Schopenhauer developed a theory of logic diagrams that can be interpreted by modern means in order to concretize the abstract position of reism. Thus we are not only enhancing Jan Woleński’s list of well-known reists, but we are also adding a diagrammatic dimension to concretism, represented by Schopenhauer.

In his Berlin Lectures of the 1820s, the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) used spatial logic diagrams for philosophy of language. These logic diagrams were applied to many areas of semantics and pragmatics, such as theories of concept formation, concept development, translation theory, clarification of conceptual disputes, etc. In this paper we first introduce the basic principles of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of language and his diagrammatic method. Since Schopenhauer often gives little information about how the individual diagrams are to be understood, we then make the attempt to reconstruct, specify and further develop one diagram type for the field of conceptual analysis.

In his Berlin Lectures of the 1820s, the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) used spatial logic diagrams for philosophy of language. These logic diagrams were applied to many areas of semantics and pragmatics, such as theories of concept formation, concept development, translation theory, clarification of conceptual disputes, etc. In this paper we first introduce the basic principles of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of language and his diagrammatic method. Since Schopenhauer often gives little information about how the individual diagrams are to be understood, we then make the attempt to reconstruct, specify and further develop one diagram type for the field of conceptual analysis.

The article contributes to the discussion of Schopenhauer’s possible anticipation of both the representational theory of language and the use theory of meaning and the reception of his philosophy by early and late Wittgenstein. Schopenhauer’s theory of language is presented and brought into the context of these two theories. His use of the terms “word,” “concept,” and “meaning” is analyzed and it is shown that he applies them ambivalently. The article’s main findings include a demonstration of how Schopenhauer’s ambivalent terminology enables the twofold interpretation of meaning: as representation-based and use-based.

In der modernen Forschung zu Schopenhauer rükken methodologische und systematische Fragen immer mehr in den Vordergrund, mit besonderem Fokus auf perspektivistische und hermeneutische Momente seiner Philosophie. Michal Dobrzanski geht in seinen Untersuchungen einem Problem nach, welches eine wichtige Grundlage für solche Deutungen verschafft – Schopenhauers Begriffslehre. In dem Buch wird sie aus zerstreuten Aussagen des Philosophen rekonstruiert, ausgewertet und dann um die Erörterung seines Philosophiekonzepts ergänzt. Dies bildet die Grundlage zur anschließenden vielseitigen Untersuchung von jenen Aspekten seiner Philosophie, in denen die Thesen seiner Begriffslehre besonders zum Tragen kommen. Spezielles Augenmerk wird hier auf Schopenhauers Methode gelegt, zu deren vollem Bild sein rekonstruiertes Begriffsverständnis einen gehaltvollen Beitrag leistet. Der Autor Michal Dobrzanski studierte Angewandte Linguistik und Philosophie. Er promovierte in Philosophie im Rahmen einer Doppelpromotion an der Universität Warschau und der Johannes Gutenberg-Universität in Mainz. Für sein Forschungsprojekt erhielt er ein Stipendium des DAAD.