The first part of the article outlines three problems in the phenomenology of violence: the relation between violence and order, the desideratum for an integrative concept of violence, and the perspectivity of violence. This leads to the question of whether the eidetic reduction applies to the analysis of violence. The second part discusses the method of the epoché in the phenomenology of violence. Through the reconstruction of Husserl’s position, the distinction between the universal phenomenol…
Read moreThe first part of the article outlines three problems in the phenomenology of violence: the relation between violence and order, the desideratum for an integrative concept of violence, and the perspectivity of violence. This leads to the question of whether the eidetic reduction applies to the analysis of violence. The second part discusses the method of the epoché in the phenomenology of violence. Through the reconstruction of Husserl’s position, the distinction between the universal phenomenological epoché and the ethical epoché is presented. It is argued that the latter concept is taken up by Bernhard Waldenfels and developed through the lens of his responsive phenomenology. This interpretation can be applied to deal with the problem of the justification of violence as proposed by Michael Staudigl, which allows us to analyze violence as a violation.
