Michal Sladecek

Analysis starts from Rawls’s disposition that in a liberal society autonomous persons should have two moral powers – the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity to establish, pursue and revise the concept of the good. Political or neutral liberalism advocates the justification of state intervention to improve the first type of capacity while declaring the interference with the second capacity illegitimate. The critique of this disposition is done by analysing the perspectives of Jonathan Quong and Martha Nussbaum, showing that they lead to allowing irrational and authoritarian perspectives in education, that is, neglecting the development of valuable capacities. Although institutional influence can be biased and paternalistic, in some cases it may be legitimate for the institution to create conditions that enhance people’s ability to evaluate, reevaluate, and revise their conceptions of the good.

The paper argues that Rawls’ critique of perfectionism from the standpoint of neutral liberalism scrutinizes the conceptions of the good without demarcation between them, that is, without distinguishing whether they are comprehensive religious or philosophical conceptions, or whether they are piecemeal comprehensions of local values, concepts and goods. In addition to the high contestability in the use of the concept of comprehensiveness, it is necessary to retain the concept of reasonableness, as comprehensions of the good have to be to some extent well-founded, consistent and coherent to be considered relevant in a political dispute. Considering these distinctions, it can be claimed that, in particular cases, the application of considerations of the good in disputes concerning constitutional essentials can be supported and, considering reasonable pluralism, morally justified. Nevertheless, moderate perfectionism has to specify whether political decisions create and support options, promote valuable goods or they discourage worthless goods. It is necessary to delineate the limits of perfectionistic measures accordingly.

The article deals with Hurka?s critique of Kymlicka and Arneson?s critique of Dworkin on endorsement constraint thesis, according to which a person cannot have a valuable life if values are imposed on her - primarily by state action - overriding her preferences and convictions on the good life. This thesis has often been identified with neutral liberalism and counterposed to perfectionism. The text argues against Hurka?s and Arneson?s argument that mild coercion and paternalistic reduction of trivial, bad or worthless options can indeed bring about a more valuable life. Their argument does not acknowledge adequately the difference between coercion from a person?s immediate social environment and state coercion, which are not equally legitimate. My critique, however, does not exclude the legitimacy of perfectionistic measures, as a person could accept as justified state intervention concerning the support of particular values or goods, while at the same time not endorsing those values and goods. Not all endorsed goods or activities should be treated equally, as more relevant and valuable ones can be legitimately supported by particular policy.

The article gives the reasons why a distinction between political morality and ethical conceptions needs to be drawn, as well as the reasons for which political liberalism is a substantial moral conception, and as such in tension with certain understandings of the neutrality. Further, the text analyzes the definition of personality through capacity for action. Recognition of this capacity is necessary, but not sufficient to attribute to a person a special status from the standpoint of political morality, since individuals also must be capable to coordinate their ethical actions with moral principles of others. Further, the text critiques Charles Larmore?s moral grounding of the theory of justice on respect of persons by arguing that the concept of respect should be considered as part of the complex interrelationships with other moral concepts, such as equality. In this way, neutrality regarding content of respect, as well as neutrality regarding capacity for ethical action turns out to be insufficient.

In this text the problem of legitimacy of democracy is considered through particular aspects of its crisis. On theoretical and philosophical level, the crisis of legitimacy of democracy is reflected as the primacy which some of the liberal thinkers give to judicial review in relation to self-determination and democratic will. On practical level, crisis as citizens’ distrust in democratic institutions, as well as diminished participation in bringing of political decisions are being discussed. In the text the legitimacy of democracy is considered together with analysis of concepts of citizenship, participation in political processes and deliberative democracy. In this context of distrust in democratic processes the text considers the problem of Serbia on its way of integration into European institutions

U ovom tekstu razmatra se Walzerova pozicija u odnosu na liberalisticka shvatanja pravde, nejednakosti, gradjanstva i etnokulturalne pripadnosti. Za razliku od liberala, Walzer pridaje znacaj nedobrovoljnim udruzenjima i duznostima proisteklim iz takvog udruzivanja, kao i socijalnoj nejednakosti koja je posledica pripadanja etnokulturalnoj grupi. Tekst takodje razmatra Walzerove odgovore na primedbe da njegova pozicija podrazumeva moralni relativizam. Na planu politike, iz Walzerove pozicije proistice da su eticki sistemi na kojima se zajednice u jednom liberalnom drustvu zasnivaju dovoljno liberalizovani, sa usvojenim principima nepristrasnosti tolerancije i medjugrupne pravde. Ovi sistemi odgovaraju politickom "liberalnom konsenzusu", koji se ne moze izvesti iz same pretpoliticke obicajnosti.

The introductory part of the article deals with general features of Brandom?s social pragmatic position. The central part considers Brandom?s interpretation of Kripke?s conception of social character of rules, as well as Habermas? critique of Brandom?s conception of I-thou and I-we types of intersubjectivity. In the final part the author is surveying Brandom?s interpretation of Wittgenstein?s understanding of intersubjectivity, as well as of norms and rules in general. According to the author, Brandom treats intersubjectivity as immediate communication, while neglecting the role of socially and historically shared norms. Also, Brandom rejected justification of rules by past application, and, by emphasizing the key role of inferential and practical consequences of accepted rules, he considered pragmatic attitudes and commitments as oriented towards future validation of meaning and rules. The author also claims that, from Wittgensteinian perspective, communication and intersubjectivity involve more a profound re-adjustment of interlocutors? perspectives rather than doxatic interchange of perspectives, as Brandom suggested.

This paper points to the relation between Wittgenstein's position and Kant's transcendental dialectics with regard to the nature of philosophical problems and their roots in language, thinking and affinities of humans. Related to this, there is the question of function of philosophy which involves the removal of these problems, according to both authors. The author supports the thesis that, when it comes to Wittgenstein, it cannot be discussed about the end of philosophy if he considers that there is the natural affinity towards philosophical errors, the cause of which is the complexity of language. Therefore, the author criticizes the view according to which Wittgenstein speaks about antiphilosophy, that is, about the negative meaning of philosophical thought. U ovom radu se pokazuje srodnost Vitgenstajnovih stavova sa Kantovom transcendentalnom dijalektikom u pogledu prirode filozofskih problema i njihove duboke ukorenjenosti u jeziku, misljenju i sklonostima ljudskih bica. Sa time je povezano i pitanje funkcije filozofiranja, koju prema obojici autora, cini otklanjanje ovih duboko usadjenih problema. Autor zastupa tezu da se kod Vitgenstajna ne moze govoriti o kraju filozofije ukoliko smatra da postoji prirodna sklonost ka filozofskim pogreskama ciji je uzrok u kompleksnosti jezika. Stoga autor kritikuje stanoviste prema kojem je kod Vitgenstajna rec o antifilozofiji, odnosno o negativnom odredjenju filozofskog misljenja.

This paper deals with Wright’s criticism of Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgeinstein and his understanding of the problem of following the rules, and particularly the understanding of a so called skeptical paradox. In the first part of the text, the author gives the basic points of Kripke’s position, whereas the second part examines Wright’s answer to the skeptical solution, that is, Wright’s defense of the objectivity of both the meaning and the connections of rules and their use. The third part discusses the range and certain weak points of Wright’s position which have to do with the issue of the constitutive question of rules and the nature of their normativity.

In the first part of this text, the author explains the arguments against partiality in moral decision-making, as well as the arguments advocating for partiality and indicating to limitations and possible unacceptable consequences of impartial position. The central part of the text concerns the moral status of personal projects and the issue of whet her and how relation ships and close ness between persons are relevant for moral decision-making. The final part discusses the importance of reflection regarding the limits of validity of moral reasons of partiality, while pointing at the crucial importance of nature of relations between people, the context and moral relevance or the significance of case to which moral assessment refers.

In the first part of the article author discusses some objections to Brian Barry’s interpretation of justice as impartiality, in particular those regarding freestanding position of principles of justice. In the second part author offers his own critique of Barry’s conception, according to which Barry does not distinguished two senses of impartiality adequately, conflating impartiality as non-discrimination and equal opportunity with impartiality as neutrality between conceptions of the good. Impartiality as the equal treatment of persons regardless of their characteristics or belonging to groups is compatible with neutrality in the sense of equal respect and acknowledgement of the right of persons to form and pursue their own conceptions of the good. However, it is also compatible with non-neutrality as the unequal treatment of conceptions of the good, insofar as some of them are unreasonable, that is, only reasonable conceptions are considered as relevant in public deliberation.

The text considers points of view of theoreticians of the radical pluralism : Connolly, Mouffe and Tully with regard to the status and the nature of concepts in the political discourse, as well as the consequences of these conceptual presumptions to understanding democracy. The three authors emphasize the essential contestability of political concepts, the paradox of liberal democracy and the need to revise standard rational consensus theories of democracy. Also, the three authors take over the specific interpretation of Vittgenstein to the direction of political theory the centre of which consists of everyday contingent practices of politics as well as dissent about their assessment. The text analyzes the extent to which this reading is compatible to Wittgenstein's position. The author defends the opinion that the essential contestability does not imply agonism and denial of the significance of rules and tries to indicate to the points of illegitimate transition from antiessentialism to unconsensus rules. Also, the text underlines the flaws of dissent conception of democracy and social integration. U tekstu se razmatraju stanovista Konolija, Mufove i Tjulija u pogledu statusa i prirode pojmova u politickom diskursu, kao i posledice ovih konceptualnih pretpostavki na shvatanje demokratije. Sva tri autora isticu esencijalnu spornost politickih pojmova, paradoksalnosti liberalne demokratije i neophodnost revidiranja standardnih racionalno-konsenzusnih teorija demokratije. Takodje, sva tri autora preuzimaju specificno tumacenje Vitgenstajna u pravcu politicke teorije u cijem su sredistu svakodnevne kontingentne prakse politike, kao i disenzus oko njihovog razumevanja i vrednovanja. Autor brani stav da esencijalna spornost pojmova ne podrazumeva agonizam i negiranje znacaja pravila i pokusava da ukaze na tacke nelegitimog prelaza od antiesencijalizma ka nekonsenzusnosti pravila. Takodje, u tekstu se ukazuje na nedostatke radikalne-disenzusne koncepcije demokratije i drustvene integracije.

In the first part of the text the distinction between first- and second-order impartiality, along with Brian Barry?s thorough elaboration of their characteristics and the differences between them, is examined. While the former impartiality is related to non-favoring fellow-persons in everyday occasions, the latter is manifested in the institutional structure of society and its political and public morality. In the second part of the article, the concept of public impartiality is introduced through analysis of two examples. In the first example, a Caledonian Club with its exclusive membership is considered as a form of association which is partial, but nevertheless morally acceptable. In the second example, the so-called Heinz dilemma has been reconsidered and the author points to some flaws in Barry?s interpretation, arguing that Heinz?s right of giving advantage to his wife?s life over property rights can be recognized through mitigating circum-stances, and this partiality can be appreciated in the public sphere. Thus, public impartiality imposes limits to the restrictiveness and rigidity of political impartiality implied in second-order morality.

In first chapters of this article MacIntyre?s view of ethics is analyzed, together with his critics of liberalism as philosophical and political theory, as well as dominant ideological conception. In last chapters MacIntyre?s view of the relation between politics and ethics is considered, along with the critical review of his theoretical positions. Macintyre?s conception is regarded on the one hand as very broad, because the entire morality is identified with ethical life, while on the other hand it is regarded as too narrow since it excludes certain essential aspects of deliberation which refers to the sphere of individual rights, the relations between communities, as well as distribution of goods within the state. U prvim poglavljima ovog rada analizira se MacIntyreova shvatanje etike, zajedno sa njegovom kritikom liberalizma kao filozofske i politicke teorije i kao dominantne ideoloske koncepcije. U poslednjim poglavljima se razmatra MacIntyreovo shvatanje odnosa politike i etike, uz kriticki osvrt na njegova pojedina stanovista. MacIntyreovo se polaziste pokazuje s jedne strane kao veoma siroko, posto celokupni moralitet poistovecuje sa etickim zivotom, dok je, s druge strane, preusko posto iz politike iskljucuje pojedine bitne aspekte odlucivanja, koje se odnose na sferu individualnih prava, odnosa izmedju zajednica, kao i raspodele dobara u okviru drzave.

In the first part of the article the concept of associative duties and their justification as distinctive from general moral duties are analyzed. The second part considers associative duties to fellow citizens and distinguishing features of those duties such as reciprocity, mutuality and equal status. In the final part the author deals with specific cases concerning refugees and stresses arguments as to why the associative duties of cocitizens should overcome duties to refugees, as well as the failures of those arguments. It is argued that the status of refugees is different from the status of other non-citizens, such as immigrants, due to the lack of institutional representation and protection.

The text begins with the analysis of two terms regarding life crucial to both Wittgenstein's early and late philosophy. These are life form and nature, specifically, human nature. Wittgenstein treats both concepts in a very specific manner, different from the traditional approach of philosophy. He also criticized philosophical attempts to attribute special characteristics to human intellectual abilities which would separate them from natural processes. A particular 'spiritual' status of epistemic and other rational powers disappears when there is an insight into their dependence on discursive practices and specific forms of life on which these powers are based. Concepts such as certainty, knowledge, or explanations do not rest on a rational foundation, that is, they do not refer to processes with particular un-natural properties. Nor can they be reduced to neuro-physiological processes, either. Instead, it is a specific grammar of their usage that makes them different from other concepts describing physical or biological processes. In that sense, Wittgenstein develops a non-reductionist version of naturalism which preserves the diversity of human relations in the world.

This text reflects on the book written by Milorad Stupar, Political Philosophy. Based on the perspectives given in Stupar?s book, the author?s intention is to illustrate the problems regarding certain topics such as: citizenship, the dispute about the nature of Hobbes?s philosophy, as well as social, political and historical background of Kant?s political philosophy. The article points at dilemmas related to the meaning of citizenship in modern states, to the compatibility between absolutism and certain elements of liberalism in Hobbes?s work, and to the possible reconstruction of the context within which Kant produced his last works. Ovaj tekst predstavlja osvrt na knjigu Milorada Stupara Politicka filozofija. Oslanjajuci se na stavove izlozene u ovoj knjizi, autor teksta nastoji da problematizuje pojedine teme kao sto su pripadnost drzavi, spor oko karaktera Hobsove filozofije, kao i drustvena, politicka i istorijska pozadina Kantove politicke filozofije. U clanku se ukazuje na dileme oko znacenja gradjanstva u savremenim drzavama, na kompatibilnost apsolutizma i pojedinih elemenata liberalizma kod Hobsa, kao i na mogucu rekonstrukciju konteksta u kojem su nastali Kantovi poslednji spisi.

Pojam politicke zajednice spada medju nedovoljno tematizovane pojmove u tradiciji politicke filozofije, a narocito liberalisticke teorije. Ovaj teorijski nedostatak nadoknadjivanja u poslednje dve decenije, kada su u sirokom opsegu istrazivani problemi odredjenja, znacaja, konstituisanja i mogucnosti politicke zajednice. U prvom delu ovog rada pokusao sam da ukazem na razloge za tematizovanje ovog pojma, kao i njegovu relevantnost u analizi savremenih zbivanja na ovim prostorima. U drugom delu nastojao sam da blize odredim pojam politicke zajednice. Treci deo posvecen je sporovima koji su se vodili oko ovog pojma u okviru razlicitih teorija, a koji su ostali do danas aktuelni. U cetvrtom delu ovog rada pokusao sam da razmotrim perspektive politicke zajednice u savremenim uslovima pluralizma posebnih zajednica i etnokulturne heterogenosti.

U ovom radu izlaze se kratak pregled Vincovog poimanja drustvenih nauka kao neodvojivih od filozofije i Vitgenstajnovog uticaja na ovakvo shvatanje. Autor ukazuje da su brojne primedbe kriticara za subjektivizam i relativizam uzrokovane nedovoljnom razradom i generalizacijama koje nalazimo u ranim Vincovim tekstovima, a koji su bili predmet njegove samokritike u kasnijem periodu. Osim tematizovanja standardno prihvacenog znacaja Vitgenstajnovih pojmova jezickih igara, zivotnih formi i sledjenja pravila po drustvenu teoriju, u tekstu se naglasava znacaj manje tematizovanih koncepata preglednog prikaza i aspektnog sagledavanja po Vincovo poimanje mogucnosti razumevanja drugih kultura.