Michał Wagner

This chapter provides a historical overview of the “eclipse” period in evolutionary biology, covering early pre-Darwinian theories and then Charles Darwin’s theory, influenced by T. R. Malthus, C. Lyell, and A. von Humboldt. Other Darwinists such as A. R. Wallace and A. Weismann are also discussed. The chapter examines three strands of anti-Darwinian theory. The first, neo-Lamarckism, is divided into teleological creationism, orthogenetic evolution, and environmentalism. The second, orthogenesis, is examined through the theories of C. von Nägeli, T. Eimer, H. F. Osborn, and L. Berg. The third, Mendelism, includes mutationism and saltationism and discusses the views of H. de Vries, T. H. Morgan, W. Bateson, and J. Lotsy. The chapter concludes by tracing how these theories were superseded by the synthetic theory of evolution. The chapter concludes with an examination of the modern synthesis, highlighting T. Dobzhansky’s work in Genetics and the Origin of Species. The contributions of the naturalists G. G. Simpson, G. Ledyard Stebbins, E. Mayr, and J. Huxley, who adopted Dobzhansky’s ideas, are also discussed.

This chapter examines historical and philosophical interpretations of the “eclipse of Darwinism.” Ernst Mayr’s classic interpretation suggests that Darwin’s theory underwent a gradual acceptance, with the first Darwinian revolution occurring through the acceptance of the evolution of life and a common ancestor, while the synthetic theory of evolution constituted the second revolution. Mayr attributes delays in acceptance to non-scientific factors that led to the development of anti-Darwinian theories. Peter Bowler’s concept of a “non-Darwinian revolution” challenges Darwin’s position of dominance in evolutionary biology, suggesting that its rise was due not to the Darwinian revolution but to a “non-Darwinian revolution.” This interpretation reassesses the period of “eclipse” and the emergence of the modern synthesis. Modern interpretations include Mark Largent’s “interphase of Darwinism,” which suggests that Darwinism was still popular during the “eclipse,” leading to the modern synthesis. The chapter also examines the philosophy of David Hull and the “extended synthesis” of Massimo Pigliucci and Gerd B. Müller. It considers modern critical approaches to the “eclipse” and the modern synthesis, challenging the idea of the latter as a scientific revolution. The chapter explores how these considerations reshape the understanding of the “eclipse of Darwinism.”

This chapter critically analyzes interpretations of the “eclipse of Darwinism.” Ernst Mayr’s philosophy, influenced by Darwinian epistemology, reveals a Whiggish historiography that emphasizes the centrality of Darwinism and dismisses non-Darwinian theories as unscientific. Peter Bowler’s interpretation follows Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy by assuming the existence of a single dominant paradigm. This leads to the view that Darwinism was considered unscientific, which contradicts historical data. It is also revealed that P. Bowler, like E. Mayr, attributes non-Darwinian theories to psychologism and ideological factors. Modern proposals include Marck Largent’s triumphalist perspective, which treats the “eclipse” as a mere preparation for the modern synthesis. Critical analysis of M. Largent’s interpretation raises questions about the study of the “eclipse” independently of modern science and highlights problems of presentism. The chapter concludes with a summary proposing a non-presentist historiography, based on Hasok Chang’s pluralism, to study the “eclipse” as a distinct period in the history of science and to recognize its relations with the emerging modern synthesis.

This chapter explores a new interpretation of the “eclipse of Darwinism” using Larry Laudan’s reticulated model of scientific rationality. L. Laudan rejects permanent universal principles and demarcation lines and emphasizes the interplay of ontology, methodology, and axiology in scientific theories. This model is used to analyze the disputes between Darwinists and non-Darwinians during the “eclipse.” In the analysis that follows, the theories from Chap. 2 are reinterpreted using the reticulated model, highlighting non-purely scientific arguments against Darwin. Laudan’s framework emphasizes that scientific criticism justifies the need for a counter-theory, taking into account the philosophical impact on theory building. The research hypothesis posits that non-Darwinian theories have sought to address the contradiction at the meta-level of Darwin’s theory by correcting the inappropriate use of essentialist terms. The structure of the modern synthesis is then analyzed, focusing on the concept of species proposed by the architects. It is shown that they adopted a nominalist stance in order to circumvent the problem of species in evolutionism, explicitly addressing what had been an implicit problem since Darwin, without finding a definitive solution.

This book focuses on a critical reexamination of two prominent categories used in modern historiography of biology – “the eclipse of Darwinism” and the “modern synthesis”. The main objective is to critically analyze the main existing interpretations of the “eclipse of Darwinism” and emergence of the “modern synthesis”, with particular emphasis on the philosophical assumptions adopted in these interpretations. Thus, interpretations by Ernst Mayr, Peter Bowler, Mark Largent and modern historians who challenge these perspectives are discussed and critically evaluated The analysis of the above interpretations makes it possible to determine how the philosophy of science limits the interpretation of the history of a given field, and also serves as a starting point for proposing an original interpretation of the above period in the history of evolutionary biology. The ultimate goal will therefore be a proposal of a new interpretative perspective to answer following questions: Why did the “eclipse of the Darwinism” occur? How should its origins to be understood? Why did it end (and why did the “modern synthesis” emerge)? Main thesis of this book is that the “eclipse” was a direct response to inconsistent ontology upon which Darwin built his theory of evolution. Darwin referred to terms and concepts rooted in the philosophy of essentialism, which was problematic, because he tried to apply these essentialist concepts to his vision of the ever-changing nature. Therefore, all of the anti-Darwinian theories characteristic to the “eclipse of Darwinism” and later to the “modern synthesis” were produced in an attempt to reconcile essentialism with evolution and thus to correct Darwin's philosophical “error.” The book will appeal to biologists, philosophers and historians alike.

This article aims to deconstruct the division between typological and population thinking used by modern Darwinists, with a focus on examining the methodology employed to establish a connection between essentialism and typology. Specifically, the study analyzes the methods of two major proponents of this thesis: Ernst Mayr and David Hull. The typology/population dichotomy, initially proposed by Mayr, has significantly influenced the historical narrative surrounding the rise of non-Darwinian theories in the nineteenth century. However, this narrative oversimplifies the concept of species in non-Darwinian theories and reinforces the perceived link between Darwinism and the modern synthesis. By scrutinizing the methodology used by Hull and Mayr, it is crucial to assess the soundness of the methods employed to identify the influence of essentialism on nineteenth-century biology. This chapter’s aim is to examine the rationale behind their claims and the adequacy of the analysis built upon these assumptions. The goal is to determine whether the argument presented, supporting the division between “accurate” populational theories of evolution and “erroneous” typological ones, is sufficiently supported by evidence and justified by the methods employed by Mayr and Hull in their historiography. The deconstruction of this classic interpretation of non-Darwinian theories inherently challenges a specific interpretation of Darwinism that was popularized by Mayr and Hull. More specifically, it challenges the vision of Darwinism as the representation of “good” science, differing significantly from other evolutionary theories influenced by ancient essentialism.

The paper analyzes the incompatibility of Evolutionary Epistemology of Theories (EET) with Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. The argument consists of four parts, each addressing a specific problem with EET and offering examples. Firstly, advocates of EET frequently misapply Darwin’s theory by asserting that evolution is teleological, which is at odds with Darwinism. Secondly, the “universal Darwinism” underlying EET is inconsistent with the relativism present in Darwin’s theory. Thirdly, because of the relativistic character of Darwin’s theory, philosophies that appeal to it need to provide additional justification for using Darwin’s ideas outside of biology, which EET fails to do. Finally, the paper demonstrates that the Darwinocentric historiography proposed by EET underappreciates neo-Lamarckism, whose model of evolution is closer to that used in EET.

Edward Dinker Cope (1840-1897) był jednym z najbardziej wpływowych przyrodników XIX wieku, który doprowadził do rozwoju amerykańskiej paleontologii oraz popularyzacji teorii ewolucji Lamarcka. Teorię tę rozwinął pod postacią autorskiej koncepcji psycholamarkizmu. Jednym z pomijanych wątków jego biografii są jego poglądy filozoficzne. Zdaniem Cope’a teologia naturalna powinna zostać zreformowana przez wprowadzenie do niej nowych założeń filozoficznych, zgodnych z formującą się nauką ewolucjonizmu. Cope proponował stworzenie nowej „teologii”, która miała się opierać na jego koncepcji ewolucji kierowanej świadomością, jak również doborem naturalnym. W artykule przeanalizowano filozoficzne propozycje Cope’a oraz ukazano, w jaki sposób zreinterpretował mechanizm selekcji, wpisując go w swoją teleologiczną wizję procesu ewolucyjnego. Zdaniem Cope’a człowiek, posiadając wolną wolę, jest w stanie kierować swoją ewolucją, lecz nie ma gwarancji tego, że będzie w stanie przetrwać. Teza ta miała charakter teologiczny w dziełach Cope’a, który w nieprzystosowaniu widział odpowiednik grzechu, a ten z kolei eliminowany był przez dobór naturalny. W ten sposób akceptacja Boga stawała się jedyną drogą gwarantującą przetrwanie. Jednak ta konkluzja doprowadziła Cope’a do racjonalizacji rasizmu, gdyż widział on w wyzysku innych ras skutki ich ewolucyjnej degeneracji. Poglądy Cope’a odzwierciedlają współczesne problemy, jakie można zauważyć w naukach społecznych, jeśli odwołują się do mechanizmu doboru naturalnego. --------------- Zgłoszono: 29/08/2021. Zrecenzowano: 11/10/2021. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 25/10/2021.

W pracy tej podejmowane jest zagadnienie form przejściowych ewolucji biologicznej w jej najbardziej znanej formie, czyli problemu „brakującego ogniwa”. Problem ten często pojawiający się w rozważaniach wczesnych darwinistów, został całkowicie zarzucony przez współczesnych ewolucjonistów. Zniknięcie kwestii brakującego ogniwa z zainteresowań współczesnej biologii tłumaczy się tym, iż poszukiwane formy przejściowe zostały już odnalezione. Sam zaś problem uważa się za nieistotny, gdyż spowodowany niekorzystnym wpływem różnych czynników pozanaukowych. Celem pracy jest wskazanie przyczyn, które doprowadziły do zmiany sposobu postrzegania owej problematyki. Szczególna uwaga zostanie poświęcona relacji taksonomii do sposobu, w jaki postrzegano poszukiwane brakujące ogniwa. Cały zaś problem brakującego ogniwa, jego przyczyny i zniknięcia, jest interpretowany jako wynik przemian metanaukowych, jakie zaszły w trakcie rozwoju taksonomii.

Historiography is becoming more critical of the typology/ population dichotomy introduced by Ernst Mayr. Therefore, one should look again at the problem of species in non-Darwinian theories: neo-Lamarckism and orthogenesis, and consider the possibility that this problem was overly simplified. What can be seen in both of them is the existence of a tension between the idea of evolution and the essence of species. In neo-Lamarckism, this tension was resolved by recognizing species as static entities which changed only when triggered by external stimulus. In orthogenesis, evolution was seen as constant phenomena and species – as naturally changeable entities. However, orthogeneticists assumed that not only species, but also whole phyletic lines had essences that constrained their further evolution. Thus, in both cases we can see interpretation of species in tune with essentialism, but essentialism is widely differently integrated with each of these concepts of evolution.