In the context of 20th-century philosophical discussions on the nature of the mind,
intelligence, and understanding, divergent conceptions about the explanatory status of mental
phenomena have become established. Within this framework, Gilbert Ryle developed a nonintellectualist conception of understanding as a form of know-how, according to which
understanding consists primarily in the possession and manifestation of capacities and
dispositions that can be evaluated according to the performance…
Read moreIn the context of 20th-century philosophical discussions on the nature of the mind,
intelligence, and understanding, divergent conceptions about the explanatory status of mental
phenomena have become established. Within this framework, Gilbert Ryle developed a nonintellectualist conception of understanding as a form of know-how, according to which
understanding consists primarily in the possession and manifestation of capacities and
dispositions that can be evaluated according to the performance of the action. From this
perspective, Ryle, especially in The Concept of Mind, formulated a systematic critique of
intellectualism and introspective and idealistic conceptions of action. The problem that
structures the research consists of determining whether some of these criticisms can be
understood as specifically directed at Collingwood's conception of historical understanding.
The thesis defended argues that Ryle's notion of understanding provides the conceptual
framework from which criticisms are articulated that come into direct tension with R. G.
Collingwood's theory of understanding as re-experiencing past thought. To support this
thesis, Ryle's conception of understanding as know-how and his critique of the intellectualist
explanation of intelligent action are reconstructed, his treatment of dispositional predicates
and ordinary language is analyzed, and these elements are contrasted with the
epistemological and ontological commitments implicit in Collingwood's conception of
historical understanding