Michele Odisseas Impagnatiello

Sometimes, a metaphysical theory has revisionary ethical consequences: for example, some have thought that modal realism entails that there are no moral obligations. In these cases, one may be tempted to reject the metaphysical theory on the grounds that it conflicts with commonsensical ethics. This is an ethics-to-metaphysics inference. My claim is that this inference is in general irrational, and that the fact that a metaphysical theory has highly revisionary ethical consequences is no reason at all to reject the theory. I argue for this claim on the basis of general epistemic principles about the transmission of justification, and what makes for a good argument. Furthermore, I argue that my account can explain why a certain narrow class of ethics-to-metaphysics inferences are rational.

What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? While it is popular to think that our most basic conscious experiences are temporally extended, we will be arguing against this view, on the grounds that it makes our conscious experiences depend on the future in an implausible way. We then defend an alternative view of the temporal structure of experience from a variety of different objections. Along the way, we hope to illustrate the wider philosophical ramifications of the relationship between experience and time. What one thinks about the temporal structure of experience is, we believe, deeply interconnected with issues concerning whether consciousness is vague or precise, whether conscious states can be reduced to physical states, whether phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties, and whether phenomenal consciousness can “overflow” access consciousness. As we will see, even seemingly unrelated metaphysical questions, such as the debate between Humean and Non-Humean accounts of natural necessity, bear on questions about the relationship between experience and time.