Michele Paolini Paoletti

Platonism about properties holds that there are uninstantiated properties. For properties do not depend on their instances, whereas their instances depend on them. In this paper, I shall discuss two ‘heterodox’ versions of Platonism about properties: Meinongian Essentialist Platonism about Properties and Mutualist Essentialist Platonism about Properties. In Section 1 I shall introduce what I label ‘Orthodox Platonism about Properties’, its virtues and problems. In Section 2 I shall present a weaker form of Platonism, i.e., Essentialist Platonism about Properties (EPP), which only takes into account the essential dependence relations between Platonic properties and their instances. In line with this view, in Section 3 and Section 4 two versions of EPP will be presented: Meinongian EPP and Mutualist EPP. The former roughly consists in claiming that Platonic properties do not have the sort of existence that is typical of substances, though they are endowed with essences. The latter roughly consists in claiming that Platonic properties existentially depend on their instances but their instances essentially depend upon them. In Section 5 and in Section 6 I shall reconsider the problems that affect Platonism about properties and show how Meinogian EPP and Mutualist EPP can successfully cope with them.

This paper presents a dilemma about the relationships between the identity conditions of fictional entities and their authors-namely, whether features that involve the authors of fictional entities may partake in the identity conditions of these entities or not. Both horns of the dilemma are troublesome. On the negative horn, denying that the identity of fictional entities depends on their authors for their identity conditions makes it impossible to account for the distinctness or identity of indiscernible or inconsistent fictional entities. On the affirmative horn, author-dependent identity conditions face three difficulties: the Problems of Necessary Authors, Circularity, and Redundancy. I propose a solution that consists in holding that the features that involve authors may fix, or contribute to fixing, the identity conditions of fictional entities without partaking in those conditions. This solution avoids the difficulties of both horns. Finally, to account for indiscernible yet distinct fictional entities, I introduce primitively individuated and individuating entities, or 'traces'.

Is Homer’s Ulysses the same character as Dante’s Ulysses? How many characters are involved in Sauron’s orcs army? And what about fictional people featuring in inconsistent stories? These and similar conundrums regard the identity of the mysterious inhabitants of fictions: fictional characters (ficta, for short). This book tackles such issues from the standpoint of three major metaphysical perspectives – objectual realism (ficta as objects), non-objectual realism (ficta as properties), anti-realism – and in interplay with literary interpretive practices.

Categoricalism is a doctrine about properties according to which the dispositional aspects of properties are not essential to them. In opposition to categoricalism, dispositionalism holds that the dispositional aspects of properties are essential to them. In this article, I shall construct a new version of categoricalism that should be favoured over the other existing versions: Semi-Necessitarian Categoricalism. In Section 2 I shall elaborate on the distinction between categoricalism and dispositionalism and single out different ‘shades’ of both doctrines. I shall also illustrate the main advantages and problems that characterize categoricalism. In Section 3 I shall introduce Necessitarian Categoricalism—as it has been recently developed by Alexander Kelly and Deborah Smith, among others. Even if Necessitarian Categoricalism solves the aforementioned problems of categoricalism, it also loses its main advantages. In Section 4 I shall refine this version of Necessitarian Categoricalism, thus developing Semi-Necessitarian Categoricalism. In Section 5 I shall face some objections. Finally, in Section 6, I shall briefly draw some conclusions and compare my account with other accounts.

I shall explore in this article the metaphysical possibility of powers’ strongly emerging from relations. After having provided a definition of emergent powers that is also based on the distinction between the possession and the activation of a power, I shall introduce different sorts of Relations that Ground Emergence, both external and internal. Later on, I shall discuss some examples of powers that are grounded on their instantiation. Finally, I shall examine the consequences of accepting such relations within a physicalistic ontology and I shall defend them against two objections based on the notion of bruteness.

I discuss Rooney’s criticisms of structural hylomorphism and defend the later form of hylomorphism. I argue that the problems raised by Rooney are not unique to structural hylomorphism but also affect other forms of hylomorphism that treat forms as non-structural and non-relational entities. A plausible solution lies in understanding structures as external relational modes, which avoids the problematic regresses. I then challenge Rooney’s identitarian hylomorphism, arguing that material substances cannot be numerically identical with composites of a form and matter. This position, which I label "active nihilism," holds that material substances are simple entities, yet still assigns crucial roles to composites of form and matter.

It is a great pleasure for the editors of TheoLogica to present this special issue in honour of Dean Zimmerman. Dean Zimmerman’s work in metaphysics has had a profound impact on discussions of analytic theology and the philosophy of religion over the last three decades. Few contemporary philosophers have done as much to bring analytic rigour into conversation with traditional theological concerns, or to frame metaphysical inquiry in ways that illuminate doctrines long central in the Christian intellectual tradition.

I defend the thesis that, if there are substances, substance causation (i.e., causation by substances) is the only sort of causation in the universe – or the only fundamental sort. Subsequently, I develop an account of substance causation that is partly grounded on a peculiar interpretation of absolute change (i.e., of entities’ coming and ceasing to be) and qualitative change, on some ontological assumptions about modes (i.e., individual properties that ontologically depend on their bearers) and powers. Finally, I reply to some objections against substance causation in general (e.g., C. D. Broad’s objection against causes’ being non-essentially-dated entities) and to some possible objections against my own account and I briefly explore three advantages given by the acceptance of the latter.

I shall explore in this article the hypothesis that structures are relations between the components of complex entities. After having introduced hylomorphism, its major advantages and the major views of the nature of structures, I shall introduce the distinctions between external and internal relations and the one between symmetrical and non-symmetrical relations. I shall also describe the theory of non-symmetrical relations that I accept, i.e., the O-Roles theory, as most structures seem to be external and non-symmetrical relations. Later on, I shall develop my hypothesis and I shall deal with one objection, i.e., that relations necessarily come together with Bradley’s vicious regress. Finally, I shall also hypothesize that complex entities are different from structures and from their structured components. In this respect, I shall defend a “simple view” of complex entities. Dwelling on this view, I shall also reply to some recent objections against hylomorphism.

Mechanisms are organized collections of objects and activities that underlie certain phenomena/behaviours. In this article, I shall argue that the organizations of mechanisms should be thought of as external relations, namely, as relations that do not entirely depend on their relata’s existence, nor on their natures, nor on their intrinsic properties. After having introduced in the first two sections mechanisms and the ontology of relations, I shall analyse the organizations of mechanisms along four different dimensions: spatial, temporal, causal and hierarchical. I shall demonstrate that each dimension requires that organizations be taken as external relations. Finally, in the last section, I shall anticipate and reply to two objections.

I shall present a new theory of the distinction between facts and events that is based on taking events as occurrent modes. Roughly, I shall argue that facts are the modes that are involved in events and that they are not further occurrent modes. First, I shall introduce some data concerning the distinction between facts and events. Later on, I shall recall the view of events as occurrent modes and some tools that may be exploited for the task of drawing the distinction between facts and events. Finally, within this perspective, I shall account for data and motivate every relevant departure from them.

I shall defend in this paper the thesis that, if there are irreducible powers such as the power to produce a certain object (generative powers), then there are objects that do not exist and they are part of the fundamental level of the universe. Thus, generative powers come together with Meinongianism. After having clarified my argument, I shall examine and criticize Armstrong (1997)’s attempt to reduce powers to other sorts of entities. Finally, I shall deal with five accounts of generative powers that are somehow alternative to Meinongianism and with some (more general) miscellaneous concerns about the truth of this doctrine.

In this article, I shall examine Jessica Wilson’s schema for weak emergence in connection with two questions: why are only certain proper subsets of the powers borne by lower-level features associated with higher-level, weakly emergent features? Why is a certain proper subset of the powers borne by a given lower-level feature associated with a certain higher-level, weakly emergent feature, and vice versa? I shall consider and criticize four possible answers to these questions, including Wilson’s own view. Finally, I shall suggest my own solution, which is based on something akin to grounding categoricalism. I shall also explore some consequences of accepting my view.

This book provides an exhaustive overview of the ontology of relations. Moreover, it offers a detailed defense of the existence of irreducible relations in the universe and shows that entities such as powers should be better thought of as relations. At first, the author discusses many classical arguments for and against the existence of relations and draws preliminary distinctions between internal and external relations and symmetrical and non-symmetrical relations. He defends the existence of irreducible relations against several objections, most notably three Bradleyan regresses. In response to these objections, the author argues that both internal and external relations should be thought of as relational modes and that intentional, temporal and spatial relations are external. He also presents several problems that are typically taken to affect non-symmetrical relations and introduces one new version of a theory to deal with them-the O-role theory. Finally, the author explores essential dependence relations and causal dependence relations and defends the view that power are relational modes. The Ontology of Relations will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and history of philosophy.

In this article, I argue that life is a strongly emergent phenomenon. For the project of drawing a real distinction between living and non-living beings cannot but appeal to strongly emergent powers. First, I introduce some features whose possession is typically taken to be sufficient for possessing life, i.e., Life-Sufficient Features (or LS-Features). I also clarify what I mean by “strongly emergent powers”. And I fully develop and illustrate my argument. Subsequently, I examine no less than 17 possible reactions to my argument. I show why all of such reactions turn out to be troublesome or inadequate.

There is an ongoing debate on the ontology of relations, which features four main competing approaches: directionalism, positionalism, anti-positionalism, and primitivism. This paper focuses on a particular version of positionalism, namely role positionalism, and proposes the results of an experimental philosophy research concerning aspects of it. We tested the intuitions of ordinary subjects regarding the inter-relational generality of the roles typically assumed for spatial and kinematic relations, namely source, destination, theme, location. According to a 2014 paper by Orilia, this generality is rather wide, as it encompasses relations of temporal order, causation, quantitative order, transaction, possession, and parthood. Our findings do not support this proposal, except for parthood, and, in a limited way, for temporal order. We also tested the intuitions of ordinary subjects regarding the contrast between the pro-converses option, according to which non-symmetric relations split into distinct converse relations, and the anti-converses option, according to which non-symmetric relations have no distinct converses. Although traditionally positionalism is associated to the latter option, in recent works by Orilia role positionalism is associated to the former option for at least some relations, while remaining anchored to the latter option for other relations. Our findings support this mixed line to some extent, but not quite in the way suggested by Orilia in such works.

I wish to prove in this article that Thomas Aquinas was a metaontological pluralist, i.e., that he held that there are many, non-equivalent and irreducible dependence relations in the universe. In this respect, I shall focus on Aquinas' doctrine of the four causes and on the dependence relationships between matter and form in material substances. Subsequently, I shall also reconstruct Aquinas' doctrines by explicitly appealing to metaontological pluralism. I shall explore two routes towards Aquinas' metaontological pluralism: one based on cases of apparent mutual dependence and the other based on the asymmetry of natural priority. Finally, I shall provide two original interpretations of the doctrine of the four causes and of the dependence relationships between matter and form. Such interpretations will be based on the metaphysics of powers. In Section 1 I shall introduce metaontological pluralism and the two routes. In Section 2 I shall examine Aquinas' doctrine of the four causes. In Section 3 I shall provide an interpretation of that doctrine based on powers. In Section 4 I shall consider the dependence relationships between matter and form in material substances. In Section 5 I shall provide an interpretation of such relationships based on powers.

Neo-Aristotelian views of goodness hold that the goodness of something is strictly connected with its goal(s). In this article, I shall present a power-based, Neo-Aristotelian view of goodness. I shall claim that there are certain powers (i.e., Goodness-Conferring Powers, or GC-powers in short) that confer goodness upon their bearers and upon the resulting actions. And I shall suggest that GC-powers are strongly teleological tendencies. In Section 1, I shall present the kernel of Neo-Aristotelian conceptions of goodness. In Section 2, I shall introduce strongly teleological powers and tendencies. In Section 3, GC-powers will be characterized. I shall also examine a number of options with regard to their number and features and how to single out their goodness value. In Section 4, I shall focus on good agents and on three distinct ways in which they may be good: tendential goodness, actual goodness, and purely actual goodness. Relatedly, among the actions connected with a certain GC-power, I shall also distinguish between primary and secondary actions and between pure and impure actions. In Section 5, good actions will be examined. Actions may be good in three distinct ways. Indeed, actions may be endowed with primary goodness, secondary goodness and preventative goodness. In Section 6, I shall face the remaining problems.

What this chapter labels "the naïve view of powers" roughly holds that there is a strict correspondence between powers, their bearers, manifestations and activations, on one hand, and causal processes and their causes and effects, on the other hand. The naïve view of powers seems to run afoul of the possibility that powers compose. Therefore, most power theorists are inclined to reject it. This chapter develops an account of the composition of powers that can actually preserve the naïve view of powers. First, the naïve view is introduced. Then five cases of composition are examined, and it is briefly shown how such cases have led many philosophers to reject the naïve view (or some relevant portion of it). This is followed by an account of the composition of powers. This account is grounded on a distinction between component and derivative powers and on certain dependence relations holding between the latter and the former. This account is able to deal with the cases of composition presented and preserve the naïve view of powers. Finally, some objections and replies are anticipated. This chapter deals with the threat of overdetermination and (briefly) with the distinction between component and resultant forces-which is orthogonal to that between component and derivative powers.

At least since Russell, mainstream analytic philosophy has distinguished internal and external relations and acknowledged the existence of both. This seems in line with both the manifest and scientific images of the world. However, there is a recent deflationary trend about relations, which focuses on the truthmakers of relational statements in order to show that putative external relations are in fact internal, and that internal relations do not really exist. Lowe’s posthumous 2016 paper is a thorough presentation of this line of thought. This article critically analyzes Lowe’s arguments in that paper, and some related arguments in recent works. It finds them wanting and thus reaffirms the irreducible reality of relations.

I shall present in this article a double negation account of the distinction between causes and background conditions. Such an account will be based on the idea that, unlike causes, background conditions allow for certain effects by way of double prevention. In Section 1 I shall introduce objective and non-objective theories of the causes-background conditions distinction and I shall discuss and reject some non-objective theories. In Section 2 I shall examine some existing objective theories and argue that they need to be supplemented in two relevant respects. In Section 3 I shall present my double negation account. Background conditions will be taken to allow for their effects by acting as early double preventers, late double preventers or effect double preventers. In Section 4 I shall deal with two main problems, i.e., the possibility of interpreting background conditions as purely indirect causes and the introduction of negative entities in my account, and with further issues.

I shall refine in this article Jaegwon Kim's theory of events by appealing to modes, i.e., particular properties that also depend on their 'bearers' for their identity. Events will turn out to be occurrent modes, i.e., relational modes having further modes and times as their relata. In Section 1 I shall briefly present Kim's theory and some difficulties that affect it. In Section 2, after having made some preliminary assumptions on modes and universals, I shall introduce occurrent modes. In Section 3 I shall show how my theory can deal with the difficulties discussed in Section 1.

Relationism holds that objects entirely depend on relations or that they must be eliminated in favour of the latter. In this article, I raise a problem for relationism. I argue that relationism cannot account for the order in which non-symmetrical relations apply to their relata. In Section 1, I introduce some concepts in the ontology of relations and define relationism. In Section 2, I present the Problem of Order for non-symmetrical relations, after distinguishing it from the Problem of Differential Application. I also examine four main existing strategies to solve it. In Section 3, I develop my argument. The first step consists in arguing that—among those strategies—relationism can only accept directionalism. The second step consists in arguing that directionalism is affected by a serious problem: the Problem of Converses. I also show that relationists who embrace directionalism cannot solve this problem. In Section 4, I introduce and rebut several strategies on behalf of relationists to cope with my argument. In Section 5, I briefly draw some conclusions.

In this article, I aim at showing how powers may ground different types of probability in the universe. In Section 1 I single out several dimensions along which the probability of something can be determined. Each of such dimensions can be further specified at the type-level or at the token-level. In Section 2 I introduce some metaphysical assumptions about powers. In Section 3 I show how powers can ground single-case probabilities and frequency-probabilities in a deterministic setting. Later on, in Section 4, I move to a theoretical framework where the falsity of determinism is assumed. Within such a framework, I first argue that some probabilities are grounded on basic powers. Moreover, in Section 5, I introduce tendencies and suggest that they are endowed with specific degrees of activation that may change over time. Such degrees explain why tendencies are more likely to be activated than non-activated, or vice versa. In Section 6 I compare my account of tendencies with other accounts. Finally, in Section 7, I anticipate some general objections against my account – objections that it shares with propensity-accounts of probability – and against degrees of activation of tendencies.