University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1981
University Park, Florida, United States of America
  •  10
    Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1): 112-113. 1999.
  • Temporal Indexicals and the B-Theory of Time
    Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. 1981.
    Several versions of the Reduction Thesis, which holds that A-determinations of events are reducible to B-relations of succession and simultaneity, are explored and critically evaluated. In particular, various theories of meaning and reference--which have recently been put forth by Keith Donnellan, Robert Stalnaker, Alvin Plantinga, Saul Kripke, and John Perry--are employed for the purpose of mounting a reduction of A-determinations to B-relations. After finding the more traditional versions of t…Read more
  •  15
    Other Times
    International Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1): 112-113. 1999.
  •  29
    Is Temporal Becoming Mind-Dependent?
    Southwest Philosophy Review 5 (1): 63-69. 1989.
  •  182
    Tense and truth conditions
    Philosophia 38 (2): 265-269. 2010.
    The B-theory of time holds that McTaggart’s A-series of past, present, and future is reducible to the B-series of events running from earlier to later. According to the date-theory—originally put forth by J.J.C. Smart and later endorsed by by D.H. Mellor—the truth conditions of tensed or Asentence-tokens can be given in terms of tenseless or B-sentences and, therefore, A-sentence-tokens do not ascribe any A-determinations of pastness, presentness, or futurity. However, as Nathan Oaklander has ar…Read more
  •  37
    The co-reporting theory holds that for every A-sentence-token there is a B-sentence that differs in sense but reports the same event orstate of affairs. Thus, if it is now t7, what is reported by now tokening “It is t7 now” is identical with what is reported by tokening “It is t7 at t7.” Quentin Smith has argued that the fact that the sentence-tokens differ in sense but are co-reporting is compatible with the A-theory supposition that their difference in sense consists in the fact that the A-sen…Read more
  •  114
  •  69
    On the Individual Essences of Moments of Time
    Philo 10 (1): 69-71. 2007.
    In “Can the New Tenseless Theory of Time be Saved by Individual Essences?” Smith objects to the co-reporting theory on the groundsthat, since it grants that every time “now” is tokened it expresses a unique individual essence of that time which can be apprehended only at that time, the co-reporting theory is consistent with an A-theory of time that holds that each moment of time acquires its own particular property of presentness. I argue that Smith’s conclusion does not follow, since moments of…Read more