Michelle Chun

This article aims to shed light on the so-called post-truth moment and the responses of Walter Lippmann, Carl Schmitt, and John Dewey to the unstable basis and implications of truth—empirical or scientific, moral and axiological—in politics. At stake historically and today is an attempt to find political authority grounded in truth so as to preserve an autonomous sphere of freedom for the individual against the potentially irrational subjectivism backed by coercive force. Lippmann and Schmitt mirror the contemporary distrust (or insistence as inescapable fact) of subjectivism and the rejection of pluralism as offering truth as an ordering principle for politics. I argue that Dewey’s turn to inquiry and his conception of truth and politics provides a timely defense of participatory democracy and a democratic ethos necessary to commit to acting on verifiable truth claims. I conclude by applying Dewey’s insights to current scholarship on truth, inquiry, and polarization today.

This article aims to shed light on the so-called post-truth moment and the responses of Walter Lippmann, Carl Schmitt, and John Dewey to the unstable basis and implications of truth—empirical or scientific, moral and axiological—in politics. At stake historically and today is an attempt to find political authority grounded in truth so as to preserve an autonomous sphere of freedom for the individual against the potentially irrational subjectivism backed by coercive force. Lippmann and Schmitt mirror the contemporary distrust (or insistence as inescapable fact) of subjectivism and the rejection of pluralism as offering truth as an ordering principle for politics. I argue that Dewey’s turn to inquiry and his conception of truth and politics provides a timely defense of participatory democracy and a democratic ethos necessary to commit to acting on verifiable truth claims. I conclude by applying Dewey’s insights to current scholarship on truth, inquiry, and polarization today.