Belief in the existence of individual selves who are both knowers and agents in the world is for many philosophers an indispensable component of a reasonable view of experience. To be sure, some feminist and nonfeminist philosophers alike have challenged the ontological and epistemological commitments of conventional conceptions of the self. These philosophers have questioned, for instance, whether the self is some kind of unity which persists as a unity over time, and whether self‐knowledge is …
Read moreBelief in the existence of individual selves who are both knowers and agents in the world is for many philosophers an indispensable component of a reasonable view of experience. To be sure, some feminist and nonfeminist philosophers alike have challenged the ontological and epistemological commitments of conventional conceptions of the self. These philosophers have questioned, for instance, whether the self is some kind of unity which persists as a unity over time, and whether self‐knowledge is (at least in some degree) possible. Those who challenge these commitments appear to deny the plausibility of the very idea of the self – though many would insist otherwise, or at least argue that the implausibility of that idea would pose no great difficulty for the project of making sense of human subjectivity. Yet many feminist philosophers presuppose both the reasonableness of the idea of the self and the importance of that idea to understanding human subjectivity and identity. In fact, some of the most important developments in feminist philosophy have involved efforts to understand the nature of the self.