Michiel De Proost

In their recent article Hopster, Rueda and Hillenbrink argue that debate on technomoral change would benefit from reflections on second order conceptual change and the role of institutions. This commentary builds on some issues that are only briefly mentioned in their paper, by connecting the literature on technomoral change to the literature on forms of life in critical theory, which allows to explore the complex relationship between concepts and institutions and how they influence moral change. In particular, the phenomenon of crises induced by so called “socially disruptive technologies” will be used to alert us to the possibility of critique aimed at existing institutions that may force change in the forms of life that dominate.

Egg providers have the right to complete and accurate information about egg donation before deciding to donate. Many seek information beyond clinics and agencies, relying on fertility clinic or agency websites and testimonials of (former) egg providers. While several studies have examined fertility clinic websites, online narratives from experienced egg providers remain largely unexplored. This study analyzes how egg providers narrate their experiences in online blogs. A systematic online search was conducted between August 2021 and September 2023 to identify blogs written by egg providers and published independently from clinics and agencies. This resulted in 23 blogs that were analyzed using reflexive thematic analysis combined with interdisciplinary collaborative auditing. The bloggers contributed to the creation of a community where (prospective) egg providers could inform and support each other. Comparable to travel guides that provide comprehensive repositories of information, the bloggers encouraged their readers interested in egg donation to further explore and consider the option with informed awareness of the possible risks and negative outcomes and to advocate for themselves. Decisions to stop donating were detailed with extensive thought and explanation, while decisions to donate again were described as the default choice. In providing information about egg donation and encouraging others to donate, the bloggers often took on the role of peer recruiters. Bloggers' lived experiences provide insights often missing from clinical sources, complementing medical facts with the everyday, embodied realities of egg donation. However, the blogs also showed patterns that reflect the notion of gendered altruism, where egg providers feel a deep, sometimes self-sacrificial, responsibility to intended palogger’s lived experiences provide inrents. Given that the bloggers actively encouraged their readers to donate, the notion of complicity warrants further examination in this context.

Mobile health (mHealth) technologies are increasingly advertised by companies as means for health and wellbeing empowerment. Although several scholars have analyzed the notion of empowerment at play in mHealth discourses and identified crucial elements for its fulfillment, one theoretical framework that is especially absent in this discussion is that of relational theories of selfhood developed in feminist philosophy. In this article, the author aims to correct this deficit by offering a possible pathway to scrutinize mHealth technologies from a feminist perspective. Specifically, the author starts evaluating one type of mHealth, apps for tracking physical activity, through the lens of a feminist conception of self-respect. Doing this reveals a puzzling tension: whether the use of mHealth undermines self-respect or promotes it is not obvious.

The ethical debate posed by the development of digital twins (DT) is entering new territory with the recent publication by Guerrero Quiñones and Puzio, which reflects on how trans identities can engage with DT.1 Although we appreciate their careful engagement with queer phenomenology and feminist bioethics literature, two critical words are missing from their paper: systemic oppression and resistance. Failing to discuss these concepts seems to reproduce practices of idealisation in medical ethics. As Mills points out, remaining silent about oppression often leads to minimal or no discussion of real historical injustices and their present-day consequences, or of ongoing forms of oppression.2 Moreover, idealised rhetoric can cast conceptual shade on philosophically significant practices of resistance and undermine a proper understanding of it within social movements. Let us begin by concisely addressing the contours of oppression as it is often conceptualised in feminist philosophical literature. The concept is generally understood as arising from extensive involvement in social institutions and associated norms that collectively generate relationships of domination and marginalization among different groups. As Young defines it, “oppression refers to the vast and deep injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and …

The principle of trust has been placed at the centre as an attitude for engaging with clinical machine learning systems. However, the notions of trust and distrust remain fiercely debated in the philosophical and ethical literature. In this article, we proceed on a structural level ex negativo as we aim to analyse the concept of “institutional distrustworthiness” to achieve a proper diagnosis of how we should not engage with medical machine learning. First, we begin with several examples that hint at the emergence of a climate of distrust in the context of medical machine learning. Second, we introduce the concept of institutional trustworthiness based on an expansion of Hawley’s commitment account. Third, we argue that institutional opacity can undermine the trustworthiness of medical institutions and can lead to new forms of testimonial injustices. Finally, we focus on possible building blocks for repairing institutional distrustworthiness.

Introduction In their contribution, Ugar and Malele 1 shed light on an often overlooked but crucial aspect of the ethical development of machine learning (ML) systems to support the diagnosis of mental health disorders. The authors restrain their focus on pointing to the danger of misdiagnosing mental health pathologies that do not qualify as such within sub-Saharan African communities and argue for the need to include population-specific values in these technologies’ design. However, an analysis of the nature of the harm caused to said populations once their values remain unrecognised is not offered. Building on Ugar and Malele’s considerations, we add a further perspective to their analysis by showing the need to design considering intended values to avoid the occurrence of epistemic injustices. 2 First, we argue that failing to acknowledge the hermeneutical offerings of the populations interacting with these systems can qualify as _contributory injustice_.

Due to its enormous potential, artificial intelligence (AI) can transform healthcare on a seemingly infinite scale. However, as we continue to explore the immense potential of AI, it is vital to consider the ethical concerns associated with its development and deployment. One specific concern that has been flagged in the literature is the responsibility gap (RG) due to the introduction of AI in healthcare. When the use of an AI algorithm or system results in a negative outcome for a patient(s), to whom can or should responsibility for that outcome be assigned? Although the concept of the RG was introduced in Anglo-American and European philosophy, this paper aims to broaden the debate by providing an Ubuntu-inspired perspective on the RG. Ubuntu, deeply rooted in African philosophy, calls for collective responsibility, and offers a uniquely forward-looking approach to address the alleged RG caused by AI in healthcare. An Ubuntu-inspired perspective can serve as a valuable guide and tool when addressing the alleged RG. Incorporating Ubuntu into the AI ethics discourse can contribute to a more ethical and responsible integration of AI in healthcare.

ABSTRACT: Several suggestions have been made to embolden and reorient the concept of solidarity given the emergence of data-driven medicine. Recently, the European Union introduced a new consent model for so-called data altruism to motivate people to make their data available for purposes such as scientific research or improving public services. Others have introduced the alternative concept of data solidarily, which assumes that people's interests in data sharing result from a collective commitment to assist others. What those perspectives have in common is a focus on top-down organizational structures to deal with data-driven medicine. In this article, I offer an alternative reading of data solidarity, drawing on anarchist theory that highlights the disposition of mutual aid as a broader characteristic of solidarity. I begin by briefly indicating how the existing approaches to data solidarity in healthcare remain legalistic and state-centered without thoroughly considering socially critical notions of solidarity that highlight the impact of structural injustices. I then sketch out how an anarchist understanding of mutual aid could inform the conceptualization of solidarity. Finally, I focus on two implications for the practice of data-driven medicine: (1) current proposals of data altruism seem to engender a form of reversed charity; and (2) data solidarity practices could arise from the bottom-up through spontaneous order and direct action.

Rapid advances in digital hearing technologies, also known as hearables, are expected to disrupt the direct‐to‐consumer health market. For older adults with higher incidence of hearing loss, such disruption could reduce hearing problems, increase accessibility to hearing aids, and mitigate related stigmas. This paper delves into the intersection of disruptive innovation and hearables within the realm of biomedical ethics. Through a comprehensive exploration, we shed light on the ethical implications surrounding hearables. By critically evaluating the key ethical advantages and drawbacks, we find that no single concern presents an insurmountable a priori objection to hearables. We conclude with some ideas to maximize the benefits of hearables and further promote opportunities for equitable hearing health.

A growing trend in bioethics highlights the importance of using big data science methods to advance normative insight. This has been called the “digital turn” in bioethics by Salloch and Ursin. Automated data processing can, for example, detect significant patterns of correlation that have escaped the attention of human scholars. Although we agree that such technological innovations could bolster existing methods in empirical bioethics (EB), we argue that it should not be conceptualized as a new turn but rather as a revivification, and possibly an amplification of entrenched debates in EB. We begin by highlighting some convergences between EB and digital bioethics that Salloch and Ursin seem to categorize as fundamental differences and end up with elaborating on some risks related to the integration of empirical findings with normative (philosophical) analysis in the digitalization trend.

With the growing application of machine learning models in medicine, principlist bioethics has been put forward as needing revision. This paper reflects on the dominant trope in AI ethics to include a new ‘principle of explicability’ alongside the traditional four principles of bioethics that make up the theory of principlism. It specifically suggests that these four principles are sufficient and challenges the relevance of explicability as a separate ethical principle by emphasizing the coherentist affinity of principlism. We argue that, through specification, the properties of explicability are already covered by the four bioethical principles. The paper finishes by anticipating an objection that coherent principles could not facilitate technology induced change and are not well-suited to tackle moral differences.

It is a dominant dictum in ethics that ‘ought implies can’ (OIC): if an agent morally ought to do an action, the agent must be capable of performing that action. Yet, with current technological developments, such as in direct-to-consumer genomics, big data analytics and wearable technologies, there may be reasons to reorient this ethical principle. It is our modest aim in this article to explore how the current wave of allegedly disruptive innovation calls for a renewed interest for this dictum. As an effect of prevention and prediction oriented technological innovation, an increased focus on assumedly controllable lifestyle risks may be anticipated. For lay people who might turn into patients, this may entail a reinforced behavior-based individual responsibilisation. Holding on to the OIC dictum, such responsibilisation seems to require that individuals can actually control what is framed as ‘lifestyle risks’ when there is not always a reliable consensus about what one should do. As such, reference to OIC may be mobilised in function of a political task of designing institutions so as to enable such choice and control.

This perspective article explores the use of digital twins (DTs) in medicine, highlighting its capacity to simulate risks and personalize treatments while examining the emerging bioethical concerns. Central concerns include power dynamics, exclusion, and misrepresentation. We propose adopting a relational bioethical approach that advocates for a comprehensive assessment of DTs in medicine, extending beyond individual interactions to consider broader structural relations and varying levels of access to power. This can be achieved through two key relational recommendations: acknowledging the impact of uneven relational structures on access to medical care and promoting social justice by evaluating resource allocation. While DTs in medicine offer promising advancements, a relational bioethical lens may provide a nuanced understanding, fostering equitable, inclusive and responsible integration of DTs into medical practice.

Paragraph 12 of the revised International Code of Medical Ethics (ICoME) states that ‘the physician should strive to practise medicine in ways that are environmentally sustainable with a view to minimising environmental health risks to current and future generations.’1 This emphasis on environmental sustainability is in line with popular discourse as well growing scholarly attention in medical ethics for healthcare’s contribution to climate change. Recent research analyses, for instance, the ‘greening’ of informed consent and related bioethical principles.2 3 It is unclear what the duty of practising sustainable healthcare means at the level of doctor–patient interaction. Parsa-Parsi et al flag the potential conflict in the ICoME’s provisions if ‘the actions of physicians are influenced by environmental considerations to the detriment of patients’ (p. 2), noting that the ICoME does not provide a handhold to improve understanding of such tensions. The code ‘does not go into extensive detail, does not include comprehensive explanations nor any rules or guidance on how to reconcile its principles when they conflict’ (p. 4). For Parsa-Parsi et al, not codes, but textbooks have a crucial role to play in resolving this conflict. It is rife that professional codes can lead to internal inconsistencies and …

Male fertility–related mHealth (MFmHealth), including smartphone applications that allow men to test their fertility at home, is getting some attention now and then. In this commentary, I argue that MFmHealth technology has the potential to undermine established norms around male reproduction but cannot be examined using traditional individualist frameworks in bioethics. Instead, theoretical literature on the concept of vulnerability in feminist bioethics allow a theoretical alliance with critical studies of men and masculinities. Proposed benefits like empowerment, shared responsibility, and democratization may justify disruptive innovation but may also obscure more fundamental ethical concerns about vulnerability and social justice.

Pozzi1 has thoroughly analysed testimonial injustices in the automated Prediction Drug Monitoring Programmes (PDMPs) case. Although Pozzi1 suggests that ‘the shift from an interpersonal to a structural dimension … bears a significant moral component’, her topical investigation does not further conceptualise the type of collective knowledge practices necessary to achieve epistemic justice. As Pozzi1 concludes: ‘this paper shows the limitations of systems such as automated PDMPs, it does not provide possible solutions’. In this commentary, we propose that an Ubuntu perspective—which, so far, has received little attention in connection with epistemic injustice in medical machine learning (MML)—can fill this gap. This perspective can be used to mitigate some of the harmful effects of epistemic injustices by encouraging community involvement and forward-looking responsibility. It may be instructive to note first and foremost that the debate on epistemic justice and artificial intelligence in medicine has mostly been restricted to the Western World, that is, Europe and North America. There has been very little insight or accommodation of insights from the Global South. Ubuntu is a concept originating from Southern Africa that focuses on the close connections and mutual …

Genetic relatedness figures heavily in contemporary ethical debates on egg freezing, although the arguments lack empirical‐based evidence. Rather than adding another theoretical view on the moral relevance of genetic connections, this paper instead proposes an empirically grounded perspective based on two independent qualitative interview‐based studies conducted in Belgium and France. Three themes emerge from our empirical data: (1) prioritizing family building; (2) centering the gestational experience of motherhood; and (3) identifying the complexities and limitations of adoption. These themes suggest that the relationship between egg freezing, genetics, biological motherhood, and adoption is highly complex and less straightforward than what is often assumed in the egg freezing debate. Our study provides more detailed insights into women's ambivalent experiences regarding those reproductive options. We discuss the ethical implications of our empirical findings and hold that pursuing genetic desire is not necessarily the main moral reason why women freeze their eggs.

Recent medical innovations like ‘omics’ technologies, mobile health (mHealth) applications or telemedicine are perceived as part of a shift towards a more preventive, participatory and affordable healthcare model. These innovations are often regarded as ‘disruptive technologies’. It is a topic of debate to what extent these technologies may transform the medical enterprise, and relatedly, what this means for medical ethics. The question of whether these developments disrupt established ethical principles like respect for autonomy has indeed received increasing normative attention during the past years. Yet, more fundamental ethical considerations of a possible disruption of the concept of ‘medical necessity’ (and the potential ensuing clinical ramifications) have been limited if not absent. It is our modest – though morally and practically relevant – aim to address this objective in this article, by exploring how the current wave of allegedly disruptive innovation is invoking a resurgence of this concept and related debates on ‘the’ goal(s) of medicine.

While the literature on oncofertility decision-making was central to the bioethics debate on social egg freezing when the practice emerged in the late 2000s, there has been little discussion juxtaposing the two forms of egg freezing since. This article offers a new perspective on this debate by comparing empirical qualitative data of two previously conducted studies on medical and social egg freezing. We re-analysed the interview data of the two studies and did a thematic analysis combined with interdisciplinary collaborative auditing for empirical ethics projects. Despite their different contexts, major similarities in women’s decision-making and reasoning were found. We developed two main common themes. Firstly, women felt a clear need to plan for future options. Secondly, they manipulated decision-times by postponing definitive decisions and making micro-decisions. The comparison highlights that the passage of time and the preservation of future choice seems to permeate all aspects of the patient experiences in both studies. As a result of considering real-world lived experiences, we suggest that there are many overlaps in women’s reasoning about egg freezing regardless of why they are making a decision to freeze. These overlaps are morally relevant and thus need to be further integrated into the existing arguments that have been canvassed in the flourishing egg freezing and fertility preservation debates across the field, and in policy and practice globally.

Social egg freezing has become an expanding clinical practice and there is a growing body of empirical literature on women's attitudes and the sociocultural implications of this phenomenon. Yet, its impact remains subject to ethical controversy. This article reports on a qualitative study, drawing on 18 interviews with women who had elected to initiate at least one egg freezing cycle in Belgium. Our findings, facilitated by a ‘symbiotic empirical ethics’ approach, shed light on the concerns and perceptions that accompany women's decisions while supporting a more context-sensitive reading of the ethical debate. We identified three key themes: feeling overwhelmed with uncertainty and a threatening future, bodily discomfort and distress during the medical process, and the endless pursuit of peace of mind. One of the issues that emerges from these findings is the risk ritual function of social egg freezing, referring to routine actions of risk anticipation that mitigate uncertainty and express a sense of individual responsibility. While more research is needed, this conceptualisation provides a starting point to flesh out the wider context of this moral practice and its symbolic meaning for women.

Freezing Fertility: Oocyte Cryopreservation and the Gender Politics of Aging is the fourth path-breaking monography in the flourishing literature on egg freezing in just a few years. In April 2019, The Oocyte Economy: The Changing Meaning of Human Eggs by the renowned Australian social scientist Catherine Waldby, was published, the first book to examine the emergence of a global market for eggs through biomedical innovation. In September 2019, sociologist Kylie Baldwin of De Montfort University published Egg Freezing, Fertility and Reproductive Choice: Negotiating Responsibility, Hope and Modern Motherhood, in which she explores the experiences of some pioneering women who are having eggs frozen in the United...

BackgroundDuring the last decade, the possibility for women to cryopreserve oocytes in anticipation of age-related fertility loss, also referred to as social egg freezing, has become an established practice at fertility clinics around the globe. In Europe, there is extensive variation in the costs for this procedure, with the common denominator that there are almost no funding arrangements or reimbursement policies. This is the first qualitative study that specifically explores viewpoints on the (lack of) reimbursement for women who had considered to uptake at least one social egg freezing cycle in Belgium.MethodsTo understand the moral considerations of these women, drawing from twenty-one interviews, this paper integrates elements of a symbiotic empirical ethics approach and thematic analysis.ResultsWe identify four themes: (1) being confronted with unclear information; (2) financial costs as ongoing concern; (3) necessity of coverage; (4) extent of reimbursement. In the first theme, we found that some women were concerned about the lack of clear information about the cost of social egg freezing. In the second theme, we report moral sentiments of injustice and discrimination which some women attributed to their struggles and needs not being recognised. The third theme illustrates diverse views on reimbursement, ranging from viewing social egg freezing as an elective treatment not appropriate for reimbursement to preferences for greater public responsibility and wider access. Finally, we describe the participants’ varying proposals for partial reimbursement and the idea that it should not be made available for free.ConclusionsThis research adds important empirical insights to the bioethics debate on social egg freezing, in particular by presenting (potential) users’ views on the lack of reimbursement. While there is much more to say about the ethical and political complexities of the reimbursement of this procedure, our study highlighted the voices of (potential) users and showed that at least some of them would welcome the coverage of SEF through the public healthcare insurance.

Recently, Petersen provided in this journal a critical discussion of individualisation arguments in the context of social egg freezing. This argument underlines the idea that it is morally problematic to use individual technological solutions to solve societal challenges that women face. So far, however, there is a lack of empirical data to contextualise his central normative claim that individualisation arguments are implausible. This article discusses an empirical study that supports a contextualised reading of the normative work of Petersen. Based on a qualitative interview study, we found that most women could make sense of this argument but addressed other concerns that are overlooked in the premises of moral individualisation arguments, for instance, the influence of relationship formation on the demand of egg freezing. Furthermore, women did not experience social egg freezing as morally problematic. Nonetheless, the interviewees pointed to a need of more societal solutions and even actively advocated for efforts to increase accessibility such as a partial reimbursement and better quality of information. The implications of these findings for empirical bioethics are discussed. While more research is needed, we argue that, in order to better address individualisation arguments and related ethical concerns, we need to contextualise normative evaluations within women’s moral reasoning.