Michiko Brazier

Prolonging neonatal lifeThe paradox that medicine’s success breeds medicine’s problems is well known to readers of the Journal of Medical Ethics. Advances in neonatal medicine have worked wonders. Not long ago, extremely premature birth babies, or those born with very serious health problems, would inevitably have died. Today, neonatologists can resuscitate babies born at ever-earlier stages of gestation. And very ill babies also benefit from advances in neonatal intensive care. Infant lives can be prolonged. Unfortunately, several such babies will not survive for long whatever is done for them. Others will live to leave hospital, but face severe health problems. Doctors have gained the ability to prolong neonatal life. But should they always do so? This question is central to the recent report of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Critical care decisions in fetal and neonatal medicine.1 In many quarters, the report received a very positive response, commended in The Lancet as “thoughtful, sensitive and sensible” and welcomed by the premature baby charity BLISS. Critics attacked on both flanks. The report goes too far—ushering in a culture of “throw away babies”. Or it does not go far enough—failing to endorse the Dutch precedent to sanction active neonatal euthanasia.TOO FAR?One of the key recommendations of the report is that guidelines be developed in relation to the institution of intensive neonatal care. It is these guidelines, which have been savaged by some parts of the media. The BMA called them “blanket rules” smothering clinical discretion. The guidelines on resuscitation at birth apply to babies born at the borderline of viability, that is, at or before a gestational age of 25 weeks 6 days. The earlier the baby is born, the lower are the chances that he/she will survive to leave hospital. Before 21 weeks 6 days, none of …

This paper explores difficulties around consent in the context of organ retention and return. It addresses the proposals of the Independent Review Group in Scotland on the Retention of Organs at Post Mortem to speak of authorisation rather than consent. Practical problems about whose consent determines disputes in relation to organ retention are explored. If a young child dies and his mother refuses consent but his father agrees what should ensue? Should the expressed wishes of a deceased adult override the objections of surviving relatives? The paper suggests much broader understanding of the issues embedded in organ retention is needed to provide solutions which truly meet families' and society's needs

The High Court ruling that a premature baby should be not be resuscitatedLate in the afternoon of Thursday, 7 October 2004, Mr Justice Hedley ruled in a highly publicised dispute between parents and doctors about the future care of a severely disabled infant.1 With sadness, and some reluctance, the judge held that Charlotte Wyatt should not be subjected to any further invasive or aggressive treatment to prolong her life, despite her parents’ insistence that she be given every chance to survive a little longer. The judgment was limited in scope. The judge did no more than authorise Charlotte’s doctors “in the event of a disagreement between the parents and themselves, not to send the child for artificial ventilation or similar aggressive treatment”.The fate of baby Charlotte attracted massive media coverage. Just a week later another dispute between a mother and her child’s doctors hit the headlines.2 A third dispute about the care of an older child also looks likely to end up in court.3 However, Charlotte’s case is unusual only in that the case was heard in open court and because it attracted such publicity. For at least 23 years,4 the Family Division of the High Court in England has heard a series of cases when parents and professionals have profoundly disagreed about how best to treat, or not to treat, a very sick baby. As happened in Charlotte’s case, the courts have usually,5 in the end, endorsed the professionals’ judgment about the best interests of the infant. The coincidence of three such high profile cases has prompted speculation that parents will …

Radical changes are taking place in the United Kingdom in relation to the classification of, and access to, medicines. More and more medicines are being made available over the counter both in local pharmacies and in supermarkets. The provision of more open access to medicines may be hailed as a triumph for patient autonomy. This paper examines whether such a claim is real or illusory. It explores the ethical and legal implications of deregulating medicines. Do patients benefit? What is the impact on pharmacists? Are the true beneficiaries of change largely the pharmaceutical industries?

The Human Tissue Act 2004 is designed to regulate the storage and use of organs and tissues from the living, and the removal, storage and use of the same material from the deceased. It repeals much criticized legislation, including the Human Tissue Act 1961, and establishes a Human Tissue Authority to ensure compliance with the Act via a licensing and monitoring regime. When the Act comes into force, probably in April 2006, it will be a criminal offence not to comply with certain provisions of the Act, and a new offence of DNA 'theft' will be introduced. Importantly, the Act places consent at the centre of the system, both from the living and from or on behalf of the deceased

Modern medicine is built on a long history of medical experimentation. Experiments in the past often exploited more vulnerable patients. Questionable ethics litter the history of medicine. Without such experiments, however, millions of lives would be forfeited. This paper asks whether all the ``unethical'' experiments of the past were unjustifiable, and do we still exploit the poorer members of the community today? It concludes by wondering if Harris is right in his advocacy of a moral duty to participate in medical research.