Miguel Fernandez

In this article, we present results from a literature review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values of nature conducted for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as part of the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature. We identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts. From frequent uses, we determine a core meaning for each value type, which is sufficiently inclusive to serve as an umbrella over different understandings in the literature and specific enough to help highlight its difference from the other types of values. Finally, we discuss convergences, overlapping areas, and fuzzy boundaries between different value types to facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and improve the methods for valuation of nature's contributions to people, including ecosystem services, to inform policy and direct future research. © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Institute of Biological Sciences.

The problem of epistemic bootstrapping requires explaining, in a principled manner, why a subject who engages in bootstrapping fails to know the conclusion of her reasoning. Existing proposed solutions to the problem provide unsatisfactory explanations regarding the bootstrapper's ignorance. This paper puts forward a novel solution and argues that it satisfactorily explains the ignorance of the bootstrapper, while avoiding the difficulties that other proposals face. Section 1 explains what epistemic bootstrapping is, defines the problem it poses for a theory of knowledge, and outlines the basic desiderata demanded of any acceptable solution to the problem. Section 2 explicates the proposal I defend throughout the rest of the paper. Here, I contend that the wrong−making feature of bootstrapping which ultimately explains the bootstrapper's ignorance is a failure to use an independent source in checking the accuracy of the reports of a given source. I call this explanation the “Independence proposal.” Section 2 also argues that the phenomenon of bootstrapping is broader than is usually assumed; there are cases of bootstrapping that do not fit the superficial structure of the prototypical cases discussed in the literature, and any good proposal should apply to these as well. Section 3 argues that the independence proposal does better than other current proposals in fulfilling the desiderata identified in Section 1. Section 4 sums up the central contributions of the paper.

Ante la devaluación de la formación universitaria debido a la escisión entre docencia e investigación, se propone la “investigación formativa” como fórmula de aprendizaje significativo. Se ofrece un marco epistemológico basado en la complejidad del conocimiento en Humanidades, y un planteamiento metodológico organizado sobre la transversalidad y convergencia disciplinar. Se presentan resultados de su aplicación en el estudio de problemas relacionados con el patrimonio arquitectónico y urbanístico. Se muestran casos de estudios diversos que demuestran su flexibilidad, su interactividad en el aprendizaje y su potencialidad de transcender de la comunidad universitaria a la ciudadanía en general.

La reciente publicación de Ilustración, progreso, modernidad, aparece como una excusa para volver a dar cuenta de la relevancia de la historia de los conceptos como parte vital de nuestras formas de investigar el pasado. Para ello conviene empezar por situar los tres conceptos que la edición ha tenido en cuenta, entendiéndolos como conceptos útiles para la comprensión de lo que representa la Sattelzeit. Una vez ello nos ha permitido dar cuenta de los principales alementos del enfoque koselleckiano, tendremos en cuenta las críticas que el enfoque recibe desde otras formas de concebir la historia del pensamiento político. Por último, conectaremos la Begriffsgeschichte con la propuesta del contextualismo de Cambridge.

Este trabajo esboza una forma de justificar el principio estructurador central de una teoría veritista de la evaluación epistémica, en respuesta a críticas planteadas por Eleonora Cresto a mi defensa del veritismo frente a una serie de objeciones en el sentido de que no es capaz de explicar la naturaleza y el valor del entendimiento. La primera sección presenta el esbozo de justificación del núcleo de una teoría veritista; la segunda responde a críticas más específicas de Cresto. This paper sketches a way to justify the central tenet of a veritistic theory of epistemic evaluation, in response to problems raised by Eleonora Cresto concerning my defense of veritism, against a series of objetions to the effect that veritistic epistemology is uncapable of explaining the nature and value of understanding. The first section presents the sketch of justification of the nucleus of a veritistic theory, the second responds to some of Cresto's more specific criticisms

Performance-based epistemology conceives the normativity involved in epistemic evaluation as a special case of a pattern of evaluation that can be applied to any domain where there are agents that carry out performances with an aim. This volume presents new essays by leading epistemologists who discuss key issues concerning the foundations and applications of this approach. The essays in Part I examine some foundational issues in the conceptual framework. They address questions central to the debate, including the compatibility of apt success with some forms of luck; the connection between aptness and a safety condition for knowledge; the fallibility of perceptual recognitional abilities; actual-world reliabilism and reliabilism about epistemic justification; the nature of the agency required to make a cognitive success truly one's own; the basic conceptual framework of performance-based epistemology. Part II explores Sosa's epistemology of a priori intuition; internalist objections to Sosa's views on second-order knowledge; the roles that epistemic agency is meant to play in performance-based epistemology; the value that second-order reflection may have; epistemic incompetence; and the problem of epistemic circularity and criticises Sosa's alternative solution.

IntroductionThis study aimed to evaluate, in adults with mild cognitive impairment, the brain atrophy that may distinguish between three AT biomarker-based profiles, and to determine its clinical value.MethodsStructural MRI was employed to evaluate the volume and cortical thickness differences in MCI patients with different AT profiles, namely, A−T−−: normal AD biomarkers; A+T−−: AD pathologic change; and A+T++: prodromal AD. Sensitivity and specificity of these changes were also estimated.ResultsAn initial atrophy in medial temporal lobe areas was found in the A+T−− and A+T++ groups, spreading toward the parietal and frontal regions in A+T++ patients. These structural changes allowed distinguishing AT profiles within the AD continuum; however, the profiles and their pattern of neurodegeneration were unsuccessful to determine the current clinical status.ConclusionsMRI is useful in the determination of the specific brain structural changes of AT profiles along the AD continuum, allowing differentiation between MCI adults with or without pathological AD biomarkers.

In A Virtue Epistemology, Ernest Sosa defines the notions of safety and aptness of beliefs and uses them to characterize two kinds of knowledge, animal and reflective. This paper tries to bring out what I take as an incoherence in Sosa's views concerning how safety and aptness relate to knowledge and to each other. I discuss an apparent counterexample Sosa gives to his final view that aptness suffices for animal knowledge and argue that in fact the principle on which Sosa responds to the counterexample does not permit the response he offers. The principle in question is problematic for Sosa's epistemology in a deeper way: it doesn't seem to cohere with Sosa's view that only aptness, not safety, is required for animal knowledge. En A Virtue Epistemology, Ernesto Sosa define las nociones de seguridad y aptitud de las creencias y las usa para caracterizar dos clases de conocimiento, el animal y el reflexivo. En este artículo discuto lo que parece una incoherencia en las tesis de Sosa acerca de cómo se relacionan la seguridad y la aptitud con el conocimiento y entre sí. Examino un aparente contraejemplo que Sosa plantea a su tesis final de que la aptitud es suficiente para el conocimiento animal, y argumento que el principio que él usa para responder al contraejemplo de hecho no permite dar esa respuesta. El principio en cuestión es problemático para la epistemología de Sosa de una manera más profunda: no parece ser coherente con su tesis central de que sólo la aptitud, no la seguridad, es necesaria para el conocimiento animal.

El concepto del Yo en el pensamiento de José Ortega y Gasset aparece en repetidas ocasiones a lo largo de su obra, abordado desde diferentes perspectivas y entreverado con reflexiones intelectuales de todo tipo: psicológicas, sociológicas, artísticas, históricas, etc. Sin embargo, el enfoque de este escrito se acota a la importante relación epistemológica entre su raciovitalismo y su visión sobre la intimidad personal, centro y origen del desarrollo del Yo humano. Gracias a la riqueza de esta puede el Yo desarrollar su vocación personal hacia la autenticidad a la que está llamado, salvando de esta manera la incertidumbre, el drama y el destino al que se enfrenta a la hora de vivir la propia circunstancia.